



OBSCURITY OF MEANING IN POLITICAL UTTERANCES ON HATE SPEECH IN KENYA

¹Wangatiah I. R. (Masinde Muliro University)

²Dr. Ongarora, D. (Maseno University)

³Prof. Matu, P. M. (The Technical University of Kenya)

ABSTRACT

Political utterances in Kenya and the world over have become a major form of discourse in human life. They constitute a genre of speech communication that is used by politicians as an expression of power and a medium for the creation of political influence among the rank and file in society. The interpretation of meaning in political utterances in Kenya has become controversial with politicians denying certain interpretations of meaning of their utterances. The denial of certain interpretations of meaning in political utterances reflects a possibility of existence of obscurity of meaning in political utterances. This paper seeks to interrogate this linguistic scenario by investigating how obscurity of meaning is made possible in selected political utterances on hate speech in Kenya. To identify relevant data for this study, the researcher visited the archives of leading media houses in Kenya: Kenya Television Network (KTN), Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and Royal Media Services (CITIZEN), and used content analysis procedures to identify political utterances on hate speech contained in pre-election campaign speeches for the 2013 General Elections in Kenya. Political utterances analyzed in this study are those that were rendered at campaign rallies attended by presidential candidates in the March, 2013 General Elections in Kenya. The paper argues that politicians in Kenya use context-dependent linguistic strategies to obscure intended speaker meaning on hate speech. The obscurity in utterance meaning is achieved by the linguistic strategy yielding

multiple pragmatic interpretations in the utterance and this makes it easy for the speaker to deny certain interpretations of meaning.

Key words: political utterance, utterance context-sensitivity, hate speech, obscurity of meaning

1.1 Introduction

Politics, as a social activity, has become an indispensable enterprise in the social fabric all over the world. As conceptualized by Habwe (1999), politics has had an overwhelming importance in people's lives and it relates with people directly and immediately while displaying a complex language matrix on which politicians depend for persuading, commanding, threatening, bargaining, reassuring, imposing and reasoning. The language of politics is generally described as political discourse and political utterances are a component of it. In Kenya, some political utterances are interpreted to contain hate speech messages. Such utterances are understood to be intended to incite one group of Kenyan people against another or an individual on the basis of affiliation to a particular social group. It has become a common practice in Kenya for Politicians to deny political utterances which hearers interpret to contain hate speech because of legal or negative political ramifications. These denials have resulted into a debate on the mutually acceptable interpretation of political utterances between the speaker and hearer or amongst hearers. It is against this background that this paper analyses political utterances on hate speech in Kenya to establish how language is utilized to create obscurity in utterance meaning.

1.2 Requisite background information

The analysis of political utterances on hate speech in this paper is more relevant if it is interpreted within the context of the competitive multi-party politics in Kenya. The speakers and hearers of political utterances in Kenya strive to understand each other as participants in a fluid political environment that is characterised by a highly charged and competitive multi-party politics. As Ramney (1996) puts it, politics involves some conflict; some form of struggle among people who are trying to achieve different goals to satisfy opposing interests. This being the nature of politics, the pre-election campaigns for the March 2013 General Elections in Kenya triggered individual political parties into coalitions of political parties to enhance their capacity to win the general elections. Dhillon (2003) describes a coalition as a union between political parties which come together for the purpose of gaining more influence or power to win an

election. The major political coalitions during the 2013 General Elections in Kenya were the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), the JUBILEE Coalition and AMANI Coalition.

A general observation during data collection was that each political coalition was focused on portraying the rival coalition in the negative sense; as being unfit or incapable to take up the leadership of the country and depicted as thieves, murderers, dishonest, exploitative, selfish and generally not good. Given that a political coalition, as an entity, is basically a composition of individuals who come together because of a shared political ideology and agenda, it can then be concluded that when one refers to a particular coalition in the derogatory sense, in actual fact they are the individuals in that coalition who are being referred to. This information is necessary as part of the wider social context of the political utterances on hate speech in Kenya.

1.3 Political utterances

Expression of political content in any society is made possible using language in both verbal and non-verbal communication. In fact, language is the prime vehicle for politics to the extent that politics cannot exist without language. The language of politics is described as political discourse (Wilson, 2008) and utterances in political speeches form part of political discourse. Political discourse defines the nature of politics and the character of politicians.

Politics in Kenya and the world over has evolved into a social activity that has taken centre stage in the daily activities of human life and it defines how a politician interacts with the rank and file. As a result, politicians have come to be associated, and so it is assumed, with specialised and skilful use of language to win support from members of the society and even influence the thinking and actions of their supporters. In reinforcing the relationship between politics and society, Bayram (2010) observes that the way we perceive language is the foundation of our social construction and individual or group relationships.

The operation of language within social groupings results into context-dependent discourses (Wodak, 2007) such as political discourse. Such context-dependent discourses develop ideologies which are reflected in a social-group's perceptions, argument patterns and impact on their listeners, viewers and readers (Eagleton, 2000). In the context of this paper, politicians in Kenya constitute a social group which displays a context-dependent discourse such as political utterances. As observed by Birner (2014), utterances are context-dependent units of speech that operate within a linguistic and physical context. An utterance will mean different things in

different contexts, and will even mean different things to different people. This feature of utterances alludes to a possibility of obscurity of meaning to exist in utterances. The context-dependent dimension of utterances partly explains why this study chose to apply Relevance Theory by Sperber & Wilson (1986; 1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) as a framework for the interpretation and analysis of political utterances.

1.4 Utterance context-sensitivity

Sperber & Wilson (1986; 1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) in Relevance Theory attempt to provide an account for pragmatic interpretation of utterance as unit of communication. They claim that the comprehension of an utterance is a cognitive process that is driven by the context of the utterance. Cognitive context of an utterance is a psychological construct including not only the context of an utterance but also the contextual factors such as the immediate physical environment, the participant's background knowledge, the known facts, assumptions, beliefs, and cognitive abilities. It is a set of contextual assumptions that are stored in the brain of human being. But these assumptions are incomplete; a complete cognitive context can be formed only from inferences which make the participants achieve the pragmatic meaning in the variable communicative situations. Each assumption is not independent from each other since information is stored in the brain in the form of relevant group. Sperber & Wilson (1986) further claim that a set of facts that an individual can understand construct cognitive context, as a result, these facts will influence the discourse production and interpretation. Cognitive context factors do more than serving as interface between event models and semantic representations; they also seem to regulate the very structures of meaning. The information presented here from Sperber & Wilson (1986; 1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) enhance the understanding of context and how it exists during comprehension of utterances. Context, both linguistic and extra-linguistic, is an important factor in encoding and decoding of utterance meaning. As such, the interpretation of obscurity of meaning in utterances cannot be achieved without reference to the context of utterance.

Roberts (2006) observes that pragmatics, as a branch of linguistics, attempts to explain what someone meant by saying what he/she said on a particular occasion by providing an account of studying the way context of utterance influences the interpretation of the utterance. The notion of context of an utterance can be understood in three different ways:

- i. As the actual discourse event of verbal exchange (or monologue). In this sense, Robert (2006) says context is associated with a very concrete situation including the speaker, the addressee(s), the actual sound waves, a physical locale, and things pointed out in the utterance or by the speaker.
- ii. As the linguistic content of the verbal exchange; that is, what is actually said. Robert (2006) explains that, in this sense, context may be characterised as a linguistic string under a syntactic analysis with associated syntactic and prosodic structures.
- iii. As the structure of the information that is presupposed and/or conveyed by the interlocutors in the exchange.

The three ways of characterizing discourse context; as the concrete situation of verbal exchange, as the linguistic content of the exchange and as the structure of the information involved, are not mutually exclusive since there is no verbal exchange without a concrete situation and the linguistic content itself as an aspect of the abstract information structure of the exchange.

Roberts (2006) concludes that it is convenient to characterize context in which an utterance is made in terms of information structure in conventionally given ways; and to study how that information structure interacts with the information contributed by the utterance itself to efficiently convey the intended meaning. The context-dependence dimension of interpretation of utterance is most obvious when phenomena like anaphora, ellipsis and deixis are involved. Such phenomena leave the semantic interpretation of utterance incomplete and the truth-conditions can only be determined on the basis of contextual clues. According to Roberts (2006), the context of an utterance interacts with the semantic content of the utterance in two fundamental ways; contextual felicity and context update.

Context felicity refers to the aptness of an utterance to express a proposition that one can be taken to be reasonable and relevant given the context (Roberts, 2006). To evaluate felicity as condition for utterance context-dependence, context then must be considered so as to determine what was expressed; either because the utterance was incomplete by using structural elements like anaphora, ellipsis and deixis or because the prima facie interpretation of the utterance appears irrelevant or infelicitous. Roberts (2006) provides vital insights to the central argument in this paper since it elaborates on how context interacts with utterances. Considering the genre of utterances under investigation in this study, and the general extra-linguistic environment of

political campaigns for the 2013 general elections in Kenya, this paper assumed that the political utterances under investigation were felicitous to the context and the hearer. In relevance theoretical terms, utterances that fulfil the felicity condition can be interpreted to fulfil the expectations of relevance to the hearer. As such, this paper went ahead to investigate how politicians manipulated language to produce utterances that conformed to the hearer's expectation of relevance; thereby fulfilling the felicity condition in the utterance yet creating obscurity in utterance meaning.

Another way in which the context of an utterance interacts with the semantic content of the utterance during utterance interpretation is by inducing context update. When this happens, the facts of each utterance in a discourse and the content of the utterance itself get added to the information contextually available to the interlocutors. Roberts (2006) notes that in instances where the interlocutors are generally cooperating with each other, the addressee (hearer) after hearing an utterance may reject the speaker's implicit claim on the cooperation, if not rejected, the hearer may hand the speaker some relevant information or unless rejecting the utterance, the hearer may be taken as rude or infelicitous by saying something that doesn't address the utterance. Thus requests, commands, questions and assertions can contribute towards satisfying the presuppositions of subsequent utterances, and hence providing context update. In relevance theoretic terms, context update may be achieved through recovery of appropriate contextual assumptions to provide more information that leads to establishment of utterance meaning, and as far as this paper is concerned, this process may help to resolve obscurity of meaning.

1.5 Hate speech in Kenya

From a functional perspective, hate speech can be interpreted as a type of political discourse designed to promote hatred among people of the same community on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity or national origin. In a paper on 'Guidelines for Monitoring Hate Speech in Kenya', The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) (2010) observes that hate speech is a term which refers to a whole spectrum of negative discourse, stretching from hate or prejudice and inciting to hatred. Hate speech is designed to degrade, intimidate, or incite violence or prejudicial action against a person or group of people based on their race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, language ability, or appearance (such as height, weight, and hair color). Although hate speech, as described here, is termed as "speech", it covers not only oral or written communication but also any other form of expression such as movies, arts, gestures (symbolic

speech). In hate speech, words are not “only words”, but “words that wound” which lead to harm and violence.

NCIC (2010) explains that the greatest problem with combating hate speech is not the law; the law is quite sufficient, but its observance and application by organs charged with responsibility of monitoring hate speech is the problem. This problem is caused mainly by the lack of awareness on what hate speech entails and underestimating the dangers of hate speech for the society as a whole. Consequently, there is need to guard against perpetration of such speech, even where hate may not be the primary intention but is the result. This preceding explanation by NCIC (2010) attempts to explain the fluid nature of hate speech utterances and possibly sheds light on why there is lack of concurrence between speaker and hearer on the interpretation of political utterances on hate speech.

In determining whether a certain speech is hate speech, or was intended to stir up or incite ethnic hatred, the inquiry on that aspect of speech is factually driven. According to NCIC, the following factors may be taken into account in determining a linguistic item on hate speech:

(a) The speech needs to be examined as one whole; merely picking out a section of the speech that is ambiguous and when heard on its own could raise questions about the intention of the speaker does not help in defining hate speech. The entire speech must be taken into account.

(b) Attention may be paid to the actual language (use), tone of the language or expression; this may be supported by examining whether the language intended to inflame or incite hatred or violence. Seeking answers to questions such as:

- i. Was the speaker using allegory in the speech or was it direct?
- ii. Was the tone one intended to fan emotions or was it calm?
- iii. What signs (paralinguistic features) were used in the cause of making the speech and were they violent?

(c) The accuracy of the statement; a speech on a historical or current fact or on a likely interpretation of a clause (for instance, a clause in the constitution) is unlikely to amount to hate speech. However, when the speech contains stereotypes or lies then it is likely to stir up emotions of hate; for example stating that traditionally, members of a certain community were known to be long distance traders may be a historical fact. But stating

that members of that community are known to move about aimlessly would be stereotyping which would not be a fact and such an utterance could excite hate against the community.

(d) The totality of the context; the surrounding circumstances in which a statement was made could help define it. For example, if during a debate on whether leaders tend to fan ethnic hatred in their address a statement is made as an example, even though the statement itself may amount to hate, the speaker may not be perpetrating hate speech.

Having applied the factors stated above in analyzing a hate speech linguistic item, NCIC goes further to identify the following as some of the indicators of a linguistic item containing hate speech message:

- i. Speeches that cause hatred must be such that it will solicit disdain against a person or group because of their ethnicity
- ii. Speeches or utterances that encourage ethnic, religious or group violence must encourage the audience into some negative action.
- iii. Utterances that degrade others must infer or state that another person is a lesser human.
- iv. Utterances that dehumanizes must state or infer that the other person is not human, for instance, calling them a weed.
- v. Utterances that promote discrimination on the basis of tribe, color, ethnic group, religious group.
- vi. Use of abusive, negative and insulting language.

The information on hate speech by NCIC was quite insightful to this study. Apart from providing the study with guidelines on how to identify linguistic items with hate speech messages, it provided a comprehensive framework on what hate speech entails. The guidelines by NCIC assisted this study to contextualize the principles suggested in Relevance Theory on how to understand utterances. Though not having used the exact technical terms in Relevance Theory, NCIC (2010) supports the argument that effective analysis of the meaning of an utterance starts with the search for explicatures (interpretation of the language unit as a code for communication) and proceeds with the search for implicatures (which are arrived at by the analysis of context of the utterance). However, NCIC (2010) does not make a statement on how politicians in Kenya

use linguistic strategies to generate multiple pragmatic interpretations in political utterances on hate speech which result into obscurity of utterance meaning.

1.6 Obscurity of meaning in utterance interpretation: A Relevance Theory perspective on political utterances on hate speech in Kenya

This paper analyses political utterances on hate speech in Kenya to establish how meaning is obscured by speakers of political utterances. The paper has applied principles and guidelines contained in Relevance Theory in the analysis of the utterances. The initial version of Relevance Theory is spelt out in Sperber & Wilson (1986) and later expounded in Sperber & Wilson (1995) and in Wilson & Sperber (2004). Relevance Theory is a cognitive-pragmatic communication model for interpreting and understanding utterances. It is an inferential approach to pragmatics that is based on the concept of relevance in life. Sperber & Wilson (1986) explain that in inferential pragmatics, the analyst seeks to explain how the hearer infers the speaker's meaning on the basis of the evidence provided. The hearer searches for the speaker's meaning by looking for relevance in the speaker's utterance using the available contextual information as evidence.

The theory proposes that understanding and comprehension are directed and channelled by the innate principle of relevance. Sperber & Wilson (1986; 1995) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) argue that humans tend to pay attention to what is relevant to them and that humans form the most relevant possible representations of phenomena and process them in a context that maximises their relevance. The principle of relevance works like a filter in the mind of the communicators so that only the information that is selected by that principle leads to understanding of the meaning of the utterance. It is on the basis of this general principle of relevance that this study sought to find out how politicians conform to the hearers expectation of relevance when making political utterances. The principle implies that utterances which hearers do not find relevant to them are not processed for meaning in their mind. Relevance Theory operates on three tenets which include the notion of context, the principle of relevance for communication and the comprehension procedure of Relevance Theory:

a) The notion of context

Context plays a key role in the interpretation of utterances. The search for relevance in an utterance is a psychological process guided by the mental context of the communicators. Sperber & Wilson (1995:15) define context as a psychological construct and a subset of the hearer's assumptions about the world. Schroder (2012) simplifies the interpretation of context as referring

to some kind of encyclopaedia about the world which contains the values and norms of a society, personal belief system and cultural norms. Context constitutes all the knowledge that the communicators will have stored in their mind at the time they enter a conversation. There are two kinds of contexts relevant for the interpretation of speech event: the linguistic context and the situational or physical context. Blass (1990) describes a linguistic context as including linguistic information that precedes the speech event while the situational context includes virtually everything non-linguistic in the environment of the speaker. Of interest to the objectives of this paper is to find out how politicians in Kenya utilize the context of an utterance to obscure the meaning of political utterances on hate speech while ensuring the utterance fulfils the second principle of Relevance Theory, the principle of relevance for communication.

b) The principle of relevance for communication

According to Relevance Theory, utterances raise expectations of relevance because the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition, which communicators may exploit. Intuitively, an input such as a sight, a sound, an utterance or a memory is relevant to an individual when it connects with background information (linguistic context) the individual has available to yield conclusions that matter to him/her: say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression. The discussion in this paper holds the assumption that whereas political utterances on hate speech are designed to obscure meaning, they are packaged to fulfil the principle of relevance.

Wilson & Sperber (2004:612) provide the following principle of relevance as being the basis for Relevance Theory as a theory of inferential communication:

“Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.”

This means that by saying something in the normal course of human interaction, one is telling the hearer not only that he/she thinks that what is being said is worth the time and effort the hearer will take to process it, but also that no more easily processed utterance would give the same result (utterance meaning). This paper argues that the principle of relevance is important in the interpretation of political utterances on hate speech because it is one of the aspects that

enable the hearer to identify the intended speaker meaning from other competing meanings which create the obscurity of meaning in the utterance.

The principle of relevance for communication operates on the basis of cost and benefit in the mind of the communicators and it is guided by two aspects: the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative principle of relevance. The cognitive principle of relevance enables the hearer to single out one possible interpretation as interpretation of communicated utterances, thoughts, gestures and perceptions when information is channelled through it. Wilson & Sperber (2004:610) states that the cognitive principle of relevance is:

“Human cognition tends to be geared to maximization of relevance.”

What this principle means is that the human mind is designed to always remain focused on arriving at the most relevant meaning of an utterance within competing interpretations. This paper argues that obscurity of meaning in these utterances is due to the utterances eliciting multiple pragmatic interpretations due to aspects of context and language used by the speaker. As such the cognitive principle of relevance attempts to explain how the hearer is able to process the utterances and pick out the possible intended speaker meaning from the multiple interpretations elicited by the utterance; thereby resolving the obscurity of meaning in the utterance. The cognitive principle of relevance has two components: an informative component and an intentional component.

The informative component is also referred to as ‘inferential communication’ in relevance-theoretical terms. It communicates the content of the message which is arrived at through linguistic processes such as implicatures, explicatures, disambiguation and enrichment. These linguistic strategies, depending of contextual assumptions that interlocutors a hearer build around an utterance, may result into multiple pragmatic interpretations of an utterance; thus, creating obscurity of meaning in the utterance.

The intentional component of cognitive principle of relevance communicates the intention of the speaker. It consists of verbal and non-verbal cues that a speaker builds around his/her message so that the hearer understands the message as intended by the speaker. The intentional component may include aspects of ostensive stimuli that a speaker builds around an utterance to provide hints to the hearer on the intended speaker meaning.

The two components work simultaneously in the mind of the hearer and they are processed or monitored against a presumed shared context between the speaker and the hearer. The shared context constitutes the socio-cultural norms and the knowledge of the world. When the hearer fails to establish a shared context with the speaker, then the information is interpreted against the hearer's context. Of interest to this paper is how context is important in the resolution of obscurity of meaning in political utterances on hate speech.

The second aspect of the principle of relevance for communication is the communicative principle. The communicative principle of relevance states that:

“Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.” (Wilson & Sperber, 2004:612)

This principle means that when communicators talk to each other, they only say what they consider to be relevant to the speaker, hearer or both within that context of the utterance and therefore each utterance gets transmitted with its own value of relevance. Thus, the process of searching for relevance in the utterance is immediately initiated by the mere act of uttering the words. In the interpretation of political utterances on hate speech, this paper argues that these utterances yield multiple pragmatic interpretations in the search for relevance and therefore depicting obscurity of meaning. Therefore, the hearer needs to resolve the obscurity of meaning by factoring in other considerations of context including ostensive stimuli and resolution of linguistic strategies such as disambiguation so as to arrive at the possible intended speaker meaning.

c) The comprehension procedure of Relevance Theory

The comprehension procedure of Relevance Theory is based on the balance between effort and relevance. According to Wilson & Sperber (2004:612) a hearer processes information by:

- i. Following a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects,
- ii. While testing his/her interpretive hypothesis in the order of accessibility,
- iii. Then stops the processing of information when his/her expectations of relevance are satisfied at the point the mind establishes a positive cognitive effect.

The specific sub-tasks of comprehension procedure involve interpreting the information by constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content via decoding, disambiguation,

reference resolution and other pragmatic enrichment processes. The hearer's mind then establishes explicatures by constructing another appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumption, and establishes implicatures by constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implication (Wilson & Sperber, 2004). The comprehension procedure of relevance theory is important to the discussion in this paper since it provides a theoretical account of the procedure that result into resolution of obscurity of meaning in utterances that may display multiple pragmatic interpretations.

Verbal comprehension of an utterance, which leading to the resolution of obscurity of utterance meaning, starts with the recovery of a linguistically encoded sentence meaning, which then must be contextually enriched in a variety of ways to yield a full-fledged speaker's meaning. The process of contextual enrichment of an utterance to resolve obscurity of meaning may involve resolution of linguistic features such as ambiguities and referential ambivalences, interpretation of ellipses, and other under-determinacies of explicit content. There may also be implicatures to identify, illocutionary indeterminacies to resolve, metaphors and ironies to interpret to establish a possible intended speaker meaning.

The obscurity of meaning in an utterance is due to the ability of an utterance to elicit different propositions as multiple pragmatic interpretations. The comprehension procedures leading the hearer to the intended speaker meaning must involve linguistic strategies for identification of explicatures and implicatures of the utterance. The hearer's linguistic strategies for utterance comprehension need to reflect the speaker's linguistic strategies for encoding propositions in the utterance if the interlocutors must engage in effective communication. Going by this argument, then the analysis of data in this study should reveal speaker's linguistic strategies for encoding hate messages in the political utterances. Thus, the following linguistic strategies have been used by politicians in Kenya in encoding propositions in political utterances on hate speech while creating obscurity of utterance meaning:

- a) Ambiguity
- b) Ellipsis
- c) Minimal propositional content
- d) Semantic incompleteness
- e) Creative metaphors

1.6.1 Ambiguity

Fromkin, *et. al* (2007) observe that when words, phrases and sentences have more than one meaning, then they are ambiguous. Piantadosi, Tilly & Gibson (2012) succinctly say that a linguistic form is ambiguous if it can map to more than one possible meaning. However, language has a mechanism of handling ambiguity by conveying bits of information about the speaker's intended meaning. Wilson & Sperber (2004) in Relevance Theory observe that the speaker's intended meaning of the utterance is arrived at through a process of disambiguating the ambiguous linguistic form.

In the campaign speeches for the March 2013 general elections in Kenya, several utterances exhibited ambiguity which created obscurity of meaning in the utterances. Consider the following utterances below:

Speaker 1: ...*manaake sisi tunasema na kutenda; sio wale wa kusema na kutenda, kusema na kutenda* (with a sarcastic and derisive laughter) *kuiba ndio unajua zaidi halafu unasema kusema na kutenda.* (...because we talk and do; not like those of 'talk and do', 'talk and do' (sarcastic and derisive laughter) stealing is what you know best and then you say 'talk and do'.)

In the above utterances, personal pronouns 'u' (you) and 'sisi' (us) have been used to launch hate speech sentiments based on the ideology of 'Us against Them'. The speaker wants to influence the perceptions of the hearer that the implied referent 'u' (you) is not one of them on the basis of social, political and economic classes. However, the speaker creates some ambiguity in the utterance in the manner in which the personal pronouns have been used in the utterances.

Notice the pronoun 'u' (you) in the word 'unajua' (you know) within the sentence '*kuiba ndio unajua zaidi*' (stealing is what you know best). The ambiguity created by the use of 'u' (you) in this utterance can only be understood if the utterance is given a context-based interpretation; without which the ambiguity may not be evident. The utterance in which 'u' (you) is used is delivered in direct speech yet the subject that 'u' (you) refers to is not specified in this utterance. The utterance is therefore ambiguous because 'u' (you) could refer to the person being spoken to (the hearer of the utterance) or the person being spoken about who is not the hearer. However, the shared context between the speaker and the hearer assists the hearer to disambiguate the utterance by assigning the appropriate referent to the pronoun. Within the political circles in

Kenya, the slogan *'kusema na kutenda'* (to talk and to do) is associated with the JUBILEE presidential running-mate (William Ruto) and this becomes shared background information between the speaker and hearer which assists the hearer to disambiguate the utterance as to who the referent is.

Another instance of ambiguity in the utterances above is in the personal pronoun *'sisi'* (we) as seen in the utterance *'sisi tutatekeleza yale ambayo tunasema'* (we shall accomplish that which we are saying). Given pragmatic interpretation, the personal pronoun *'sisi'* (we) in this utterance does not have a specified referent. It is therefore ambiguous because the speaker could be using the pronoun *'sisi'* (we) to refer to that group of politicians in the political coalition to which he belongs or to refer to himself and his hearers (audience) at that moment as a group of people who support the political coalition to which the speaker belongs. However, the linguistic context already created by the speaker enables the hearer to disambiguate the ambiguity created by the personal pronoun *'sisi'* (we) and assign the correct referent to the personal pronoun; that *'sisi'* in the context of usage refers to the group of politicians in the CORD Coalition.

The above illustrations of ambiguity in political utterances on hate speech fit into the preceding argument if the utterances are given pragmatic interpretation. They display what Ibrahim (2005) describes as lexical ambiguity. The lexical ambiguity in such utterances could probably explain why politicians in Kenya find it easy to deny certain interpretations given to political utterances they make. This argument is supported by the inherent ability of ambiguity as a linguistic strategy to create obscurity of utterance meaning by yielding multiple pragmatic interpretations in utterances as shown below:

Speaker 1: *...kuiba ndio unajua zaidi...* (...stealing is what you know best...)

Interpreted within context, this utterance contains the following pragmatic propositional information:

- i. The subject marker *'u'* (You) could have been used by the speaker to refer to the hearer of the utterance given that the entire sentence is rendered in direct speech.
- ii. The subject marker *'u'* (You) could as well have been used by the speaker to refer to someone else other than the hearer of the utterance given that the utterance is in a speech being delivered to supporters of the speaker's political coalition and

therefore the political utterances on hate speech are intended to wound a member of the rival political coalition.

The ambiguity in the above utterance is described by Ibrahim (2005) as pragmatic ambiguity and it results into multiple pragmatic interpretations of the utterance due to the use of a personal pronoun 'u' (you) referring to an inexplicit referent. Notice that the ambiguity in the utterance is enhanced by the speaker using the pronoun 'u' (You) which lacks both anaphoric and cataphoric referent in this context. Thus, the pronoun 'u' (you) is indeterminate. A similar interpretation is applicable to other utterances like the one below in which ambiguity has been achieved by the use of the personal pronoun 'sisi' (we):

Speaker 1: ...*sisi tutatekeleza yale ambayo tunasema...* (...we shall accomplish what we are saying)

On its own, the utterance above does not contain hate speech message. The pronoun 'sisi' (us) has been used by the speaker within the linguistic context of other surrounding utterances to achieve an ideological framework of 'Us against Them' upon which the main hate speech utterance '*...kuiba ndio unajua zaidi halafu unasema kusema na kutenda...*' (...stealing is what you know best then you say talk and do...) is based. Therefore 'sisi' (us) in this context can yield the following pragmatic interpretations which make the meaning of the utterance obscure:

- i. 'sisi' (us) referring to the speaker, his fellow politicians and the hearer.
- ii. 'sisi' (us) referring to the speaker and his fellow politicians alone because it is them who are in real competition for political power.

Thus, ambiguity as a linguistic strategy used by politicians to encode hate speech messages in political utterances results into obscurity of utterance meaning due to multiple pragmatic interpretations of the utterance.

1.6.2 Ellipsis

Wilson & Sperber (2004) in Relevance Theory identify recovery of ellipted elements as one of the pragmatic processes of establishing implicatures of an utterance. Recovery of ellipted elements occurs in an utterance which exhibits ellipsis of a syntactic element. Johnson (2013) describes ellipsis as instances of anaphora in which a missing element is able to find an antecedent in the surrounding discourse as in the example below:

Holly Golightly won't eat rutabagas; I don't think Fred will either.

In the example above, the dependent clause has the VP element 'will eat rutabagas' left out. Filling in of the ellipsed VP will have the clause read as below:

'I don't think Fred will eat rutabagas either'.

Such is a case of VP ellipsis. Ellipsis of such elements in a sentence occurs for other syntactic groups such as NP in the subject position of a sentence.

In an earlier publications, Biber *et. al* (1999) observe that subject ellipsis is not a rarity, especially in conversation. Sentences lacking overt subjects are often easily interpretable and do not appear to be errors on the part of speakers. For example, "don't know" is an understandable reply when responding to a question one does not know the answer to, even though the subject "I" is omitted. Haegeman & Ihsane (1999) argue that because English speakers cannot use verbal agreement to identify ellipsed subjects, they must look to antecedents in the broader context of the text. Hendriks (2004) expounds on this by observing that if lexical material is left unpronounced in oral texts, a hearer must rely on other parts of the sentence, on contextual information and on intonation to recover the unpronounced material.

Political utterances on hate speech in Kenya exhibited instances of ellipsis. Consider the utterances below:

Speaker 1: ...*wakaanza kupiga watu wetu; damu ili mwagika*... (...they started beating (shooting) our people; blood was shed)

In the above utterance, the subject is omitted. Though the Kiswahili language used by the speaker has a subject marker 'wa' (they) on the verb phrase (VP) '*wakaanza*' (they started), the structure of Kiswahili language, just like other Bantu languages, requires that the utterance has an overt noun phrase (NP) in the subject position as the antecedent to the subject marker embedded on the VP as in the illustration below:

'*Askari wakaanza kupiga watu wetu*' (Police started beating our people)

In the above example, '*Askari*' (Police) is the NP in the subject position of the utterance with its subject marker 'wa' (they) embedded on the VP '*wakaanza*' (they started). From this illustration therefore, it is clear that the speaker of the utterance above ellipsed the subject of the utterance.

This is a case of subject ellipsis in which the speaker assumes that the hearer will recover the omitted information from the shared context of the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence in Kenya already created by the speaker. Within this set of utterances, by anaphoric reference to the preceding utterance, the ellipsed subject is identified as '*Jamaa*' (Fellows) in the utterance '*Jamaa wakatoa bunduki*' (Fellows produced guns). Even with anaphoric reference to recover the ellipsed subject, the lexical item '*Jamaa*' (Fellows) does not reveal the specific subject referred as a proper noun since '*Jamaa*' (Fellows) is a collective noun. However, the hearer is able to understand who '*Jamaa*' (Fellows) in this context are and by lexical broadening establish that '*Jamaa*' (Fellows) refers to 'armed police officers' who represent government agencies. Thus, the ellipsis used in this instance requires multiple levels of interpretation involving contextual inferences to arrive at the ellipsed referent. Given that the utterances in which ellipsis appear can be interpreted to contain hate speech messages, it can be speculated that ellipsis of the NP element in this utterance, and use of anaphoric antecedent element involving lexical replacement, was a strategy by the speaker to avoid liability for mentioning the ellipsed referent in negative sense. As hate speech, therefore, the speaker leaves for the audience to fill up the implied referent.

Another case of ellipsis can be seen in the utterances below:

Speaker 1: ...*sio wale wa kusema na kutenda, kusema na kutenda* (with a sarcastic and derisive laughter); *kuiba ndio unajua zaidi halafu unasema kusema na kutenda*. (Not like those of 'talk and do', 'talk and do (with a sarcastic and derisive laughter); stealing is what you know best and you say 'we say and do')

In the excerpt above, the embedded clause '*Kuiba ndio unajua zaidi...*' (stealing is what you know best') lacks an explicit subject. Reference to the co-text of the utterances still does not establish the antecedent subject implied by the subject marker '*u*' (You) on the VP '*unajua zaidi*' (you know best). However, from the response the speaker receives from the hearer in form of widespread laughter and applause, it is clear that both the speaker and the hearer know that the implied subject is the JUBILEE presidential running-mate. The recovery of the ellipsed subject NP is based on the shared contextual assumptions surrounding the genesis of the initial utterance '*kusemanakutenda*' (talk and do); a slogan coined by the JUBILEE presidential running-mate.

This is a case of subject ellipsis in political utterances on hate speech whose NP is recovered from an extra-linguistic context. The utterance below helps to illustrate this argument further:

Speaker 2: ...*waambiwe haiwezekani tena kikundi cha watu wachache mno wao ndio walala hai na sisi walala hoi...* (...they should be told that it is no longer possible for a very small group of people are rich and the rest of us are poor...)

Similarly, speaker 2 in the above utterances fails to provide the NP in the subject position by merely starting the utterance with a VP on which the subject marker 'wa' (they) is used to refer to the implied NP recoverable from the shared context. The pre-election campaign mood in which these utterances are rendered makes it clear that the utterances are implying the politicians in the speaker's rival political coalition, JUBILEE Coalition.

It is noticeable that instances of ellipsis in political utterances on hate speech involve the omission of subject NP or subject ellipsis. One possible reason for this is that the utterance contains hate messages and therefore the omission of the subject NP is deliberate to avoid possible accusation from the implied referent. Given that the speaker provides enough background information for the utterance, the speaker finds it safe not to mention the implied referent since the hearer can retrieve the implied referent from the context.

The omission of subject NP in political utterances on hate speech creates a possibility of different implied referents and this leads to obscurity of utterance meaning since the utterance generates multiple pragmatic interpretations as shown below:

Speaker 1: ...*wakaanza kupiga watu wetu...* (...they started beating our people...)

The utterance above lacks an explicit subject leading to the question, '*Nani alianza kuwapiga watu wetu?*' (Who started beating our people?). The mental search for the possible answers to this question leads to the following possible responses making utterance meaning obscure:

- i. *Askari* (Police)
- ii. *Wafuasi wa serikali* (Supporters of the government)
- iii. *Wafuasi wa chama pinzani* (Supporters of the rival political party)

Thus in political utterances like the one being discussed here, political speakers use ellipsis of the subject NP in their political utterances so as to leave such utterances with multiple pragmatic interpretations. Just like in utterances by Speaker 2 above, the subject marker 'wa' (they) on the VP 'waambiwe' (they should be told) does not have an antecedent in the surrounding utterances making the meaning of the utterance obscure. The ellipsis of the NP in this utterance creates obscurity of utterance meaning by making the utterance have multiple pragmatic interpretations.

1.6.3 Use of minimal propositional content

Bach (2001) observes that the semantic content of a sentence can be too skimpy, relative to a speaker's likely communicative purposes in uttering the sentence. One way of making the semantic content of a sentence skimpy is by making the proposition it expresses to lack elements that are part of what the speaker means. Such sentences are described as expressing minimal propositional content. When a speaker utters a sentence with minimal propositional content, what the speaker means is arrived at through expansion of the utterance. In the understanding of Relevance Theory, the process of expansion to recover the missing information in an utterance requires context dependent procedures to identify the missing information. Bach (2001) provides the following example to illustrate minimal propositional content in an utterance:

- i. Everyone went to the wedding.

This utterance contains an implicit quantifier restriction and the speaker's meaning is arrived at through an expansion of the utterance within its context by the listener, perhaps using the expanded version in the italics below:

- ii. Everyone *[in the family]* went to the wedding.

Minimal propositional content can also be achieved through implicit qualification as shown in example (iii) and (iv) below:

- iii. I will be there *[at the agreed time]*.
- iv. I haven't had a coffee break *[this morning]*. (Bach, 2001)

An important feature of minimal propositional content is that expressions which display this linguistic strategy appear structurally complete. In syntactic terms, such expressions fulfill the basics of a proper syntactic structure only that in terms of the propositional content, the expression is deficient. This study has established instances of minimal propositional content in political utterances on hate speech as a linguistic strategy used by politicians in Kenya. Consider the utterances below:

Speaker 1: *Tarehe nne mwezi wa Machi mwaka huu tutaona kivumbi. Kivumbi ya kuleta Kenya mpya...* (On fourth of March this year we shall see a cyclone. A cyclone to bring a new Kenya...)

The first sentence in the excerpt above lacks complete propositional content to read like the sentence below:

'Tarehe nne mwezi wa Machi mwaka huu tutaona kivumbi [cha kupiga kura]' (On fourth of March this year we shall see a cyclone of vote casting)

The missing qualifier *'cha kupiga kura'* (of vote casting) creates obscurity of the meaning of the utterance since within the context it can receive varied interpretations. However, the missing qualifier is recoverable from the extra-linguistic context of the utterance. The speaker possibly avoids providing complete propositional content because of the interpretation the word *'kivumbi'* (cyclone) can receive in the environment of fierce political contest between CORD and JUBILEE. This argument is further justified by the fact that the previous speaker at the same CORD rally had just been calling upon the hearer *'...musikubali kura ziibiwe...'* (...do not allow votes to be stolen...). Thus *'kivumbi'* can be interpreted to imply different propositional information of availed reference to the reaction from the hearer in case votes are stolen. The above utterance therefore contains implicit qualification which the hearer recovers through expansion of the utterance within the context of the political environment. As much as the speaker expands on the implicit qualification in the subsequent utterance by saying *'kivumbi cha kuleta Kenya mpya'* (A cyclone to bring new Kenya), it cannot be taken for granted that *'cha kuleta Kenya mpya'* (to bring new Kenya) is the missing qualifier of the *'kivumbi'* (cyclone) as used in the first utterance. In fact, the speaker merely complicates the propositional content by making the utterance *'kivumbi cha kuleta Kenya mpya'* (cyclone to bring a new Kenya) that also displays minimal propositional content. The phrase *'Kenya mpya'* (a new Kenya) is as well not qualified because critical analysis will demand elaboration on 'what new Kenya is or entails'

A similar case of implicit qualification in an utterance that displays minimal propositional content is also evident in utterance below:

Speaker 1: *...kuiba ndio unajua zaidi...* (...stealing is what you know best...)

The expanded version of this utterance would read like the one below:

‘...*kuiba [mali ya umma] ndio unajua zaidi...* (...stealing [public property] is what you know best...)

Or

‘...*kuiba [kura] ndio unajua zaidi...* (...stealing [votes] is what you know best) – to mean manipulation of election results.

The expansions of the propositional content in the above utterance are the most likely ones within the political context of the utterance. This is because, in the Kenyan political landscape, political coalitions focus on depicting each other in the negative sense. The existence of several possible expansions of an utterance with minimal propositional content reflects the obscurity of the meaning of such an utterance.

1.6.4 Semantic incompleteness of vague expressions

Bach (2001) explains that another way of making the sentence of an utterance to appear skimpy is to have it fall short of expressing a complete proposition even relative to a context. When a speaker utters a semantically incomplete sentence what he means is arrived at through a completion of its incomplete explicit propositional form. The following are examples of semantically incomplete sentences:

- i. Danielle just FINISHED a novel. (doing what: reading, writing, editing, typing, eating?)
- ii. Gentlemen PREFER blondes. (to what: brunettes, sheep?)
- iii. Brad is TOO old/not young ENOUGH. (for what?) (Bach, 2001)

In the above examples, the semantic content of the utterance would have been completed if the speaker had provided information which answers the question in parenthesis. From the options provided as possible answers to the question in parenthesis, it is evident that semantically incomplete utterances include vague expressions. He Ziran (2000) considers vagueness as the language property of indeterminacy. He thinks that the study of vagueness in language is significant only when vagueness is analyzed from the perspectives of language use and comprehension. He Ziran (2000) explains that the meaning of a single word which is indeterminate can be determined only in the field of pragmatics, that is to say, when that word is placed in a specific context. Carter and McCarthy (2006) define vague language as words or phrases which deliberately refer to people and things in a non-specific, imprecise way. Vague expressions are therefore indeterminate structures in language; they are semantically incomplete.

A key feature of semantically incomplete expressions is that such expressions are grammatically proper structures but semantically incomplete at the explicit level of language analysis.

Instances of vague expressions that reflect semantic incompleteness are evident in political utterances in Kenya. Consider the utterances below:

Speaker 3: *Muko tayari?* (Are you ready?)

Response: *Tuko tayari* (We are ready)

Speaker 3: *Waambiwe haiwezekani tena kikundi cha watu wachache mno ndio walala hai na sisi walala hoi.* (They should be told that it is not possible again that a very small group of people are rich and the rest of us poor.)

In these utterances, the question asked by the speaker, '*Muko tayari?* (Are you ready?), is not specific; it prompts the question: '*Tayari kufanya nini?*' (Ready for what?). As much as the hearer answers affirmatively '*Tuko tayari*' (we are ready), it is not certain that the hearer and the speaker are sharing the implied meaning in the speaker's utterance. This is therefore a case of semantically incomplete expression which is vague and would require pragmatic interpretation to arrive at the intended speaker meaning. The subsequent utterance by the speaker, '*Waambiwe haiwezekani tena...*' (They should be told that it is not possible again...), is equally vague in the sense that the utterance has an inexplicit referent which leaves the question '*Nani aambiwe?*' (Who should be told?) unanswered by the utterance. When semantically vague expressions are given pragmatic interpretation, they generate multiple propositions which lead to obscurity of utterance meaning. The multiple propositions in such utterances are as a result of the speaker using vague expressions. For instance, the utterance '*Muko tayari?*' (Are you ready?) can receive different pragmatic interpretations such as:

- i. *Muko tayari kuanza vita?* (Are you ready to start fighting?)
- ii. *Muko tayari kupiga kura?* (Are you ready to vote?)
- iii. *Muko tayari kupigania haki zetu?* (Are you ready to fight for your rights?)
- iv. *Muko tayari kupindua serikali?* (Are you ready to overthrow the government?)

The fact that such expressions result into obscurity of utterance meaning by making the utterance to elicit multiple pragmatic interpretations makes it easy for the politician to deny certain interpretations if accused of hate speech.

1.6.5 Creative metaphors

Lakoff & Johnson (1980) in the theory of conceptual metaphor see metaphors as a means of understanding something in terms of something else by “mapping” one conceptual domain onto another. Muller (2004) explains that creative metaphors characteristically display a deviation from what might be expected in a given situation such as the delivery of a political speech. Creativity in metaphors involves, not only deviating or rule-breaking, but also awareness of when and where creativity is appropriate and useful. Muller (2004) concludes that creative metaphors challenge discursive or linguistic norms in a way which is acceptable by a relevant audience. In fact, creative metaphors require a creative co-production by the audience and this also requires readiness to accept the metaphor. If a metaphor is not accepted by an audience and is not explored by being interpreted and discussed, then the creative metaphor fails in its political-communicative purpose. Sperber & Wilson (2012) observes that, from a Relevance Theory perspective, metaphorical interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as other aspects of language use involving literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations. There is no mechanism specific to metaphors, no interesting generalization that applies only to them. In political speeches, creative metaphors are a stylistic feature which display some form of creativity within political discourse.

The data of political utterances in this study has instances of creative metaphors used by politicians in Kenya in making political utterances on hate speech. Consider the utterance below:

Speaker 1: *Tarehe nne mwezi wa Machi mwaka huu tutaona kivumbi. Kivumbi ya kuleta Kenya mpya...* (On fourth of March this year we shall see a cyclone. A cyclone to bring a new Kenya...)

In the utterances above, the speaker refers to the events expected to take place on fourth of March as ‘*kivumbi*’ (a cyclone). The hearer knows that what is expected to take place on the fourth of March is voting exercise for the general elections in Kenya. In natural life, a cyclone is a phenomenon that disturbs the order of the existing state of affairs. Ideally, a cyclone is a turbulent disturbance of existing state of affairs in a given place or region that leaves a clean-up effect. So the speaker is metaphorically using the image of a cyclone to describe the change expected by the election exercise on fourth of March 2013. To the speaker, after the election which he expects to have a cyclone-effect on Kenya, Kenya will be a new country with a

different person (in this case the speaker himself) occupying the presidency and different political order. This is a case of creative metaphor involving use of a lexical item as an imagery which the hearer subjects to lexical broadening process to arrive at the pragmatic interpretation of the metaphor as implicatures. In order to assess the effectiveness of this metaphorical utterance in communicating the intended political message, the speaker engages the hearer in an interactive dialogue by posing a question to solicit concurrence from the hearer:

Speaker 1: *Sio?* (Isn't that so?)

Response: *Eeh!* (Yes)

Similar interpretation to the one above can be advanced to explain the metaphor involving the lexical imagery in the utterance below:

Speaker 4: '*...wale wanaosema JUBILEE ni ukabila tunasema ni mashetani.*' ('...those who are saying JUBILEE are tribalists, we are saying they are devils')

The speaker refers to the implied referents in the utterance as '*mashetani*' (devils). This lexical imagery can be understood if subjected to lexical broadening and pragmatic interpretation to arrive at implied meaning of 'evil' (as the implicature derived from the metaphor '*mashetani*' (devils)).

Apart from lexical imagery, aspects of metaphorical anecdotes are also evident in the political utterances on hate speech in Kenya. Consider the utterances below:

Speaker 5: *Unajua ngiri? Anafanana na nguruwe; anasahau mingi sana. Akitoka hapa anafika pale amesahau. Sio?* (Do you know warthog? It resembles a pig; it is so forgetful; if he leaves here reaches there has forgotten. Is it not so?)

Response: *Eeh* (affirmative) (Yes)

In the above utterances, the speaker tells a short descriptive story about '*ngiri*' (warthog). A quality about '*ngiri*' (warthog) that the speaker identifies is '*sahau mingi*' (highly forgetful) and this becomes the quality of comparison between '*ngiri*' (warthog) and the implied referent. To be sure that the message has not lost relevance to the hearer and that communication is still successful, the speaker uses question and answer to confirm if the hearer is in concurrence with him. The affirmative response from the hearer confirms to the speaker that communication is successful. The anecdote is being used by the speaker to create a context for a shared

background. To identify the contextual implicature, that the implied referent is unreliable and never learns from past experiences, the hearer needs to search for appropriate contextual assumptions from the extra-linguistic context surrounding the implied referent. The search for appropriate contextual assumptions results into multiple interpretations which make the meaning of the utterance obscure.

Given the existence of literal meaning and implied meaning in creative metaphors, political utterances on hate speech that utilize creative metaphors yield multiple pragmatic interpretations. Further, the inherent nature of creative metaphors regarding their ability to be mapped onto different conceptual domains enables creative metaphors to generate multiple pragmatic interpretations in a given context, for instance, the creative metaphor on '*kivumbi*' (cyclone) can generate the following implicatures:

- i. A coup or political revolution
- ii. Turn out in large numbers to vote
- iii. A violent demonstration

Thus, use of creative metaphors in political utterances on hate speech yields multiple pragmatic interpretations which create obscurity of meaning in such utterances.

1.7 Conclusion

This paper sought to establish how meaning is obscured in political utterances on hate speech in Kenya. It has been established that obscurity of meaning in these utterances is due to their ability to generate multiple pragmatic interpretations. Politicians in Kenya make use of linguistic strategies such as ambiguity, ellipsis, minimal propositional content and creative metaphors to encode hate speech messages in political utterances. The linguistic strategies enable political utterances on hate speech to yield multiple pragmatic interpretations which lead to obscurity of intended utterance meaning. However, the hearer is able to resolve the obscurity of meaning through pragmatic processes guided by inferential evidences.

REFERENCES

- Bach, K. (2001). *Regressions in pragmatics*. Downloaded from userwww.sfsu.edu/.../Bach.Regressions.pdf. Retrieved on 27th April, 2015
- Bayram, F. (2010). *'Ideology and political discourse'*. Retrieved from research.ncl.ac.uk/ARECLS/volume7/bayram-vol7.pdf. Downloaded on 20th August, 2013.
- Biber, D., Johansson, S., Leech, G., Conrad, S. and Finegan, E. (1999). *Longman grammar of spoken and written English*. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
- Birner, J. B. (2014). *Introduction to pragmatics*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Blass, R. (1990). *Relevance relations in discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carter & McCarthy (2006). *A Pragmatic study on the functions of vague language*. Retrieved from www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/elt/article/viewFiles/27266/16559. Downloaded on 21th May, 2015.
- Dhillon, A. (2003). *'Political parties and coalition formation'*. Retrieved from www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/.../bookchapter/.pdf. Downloaded on 1st Feb. 2015
- Eagleton, T. (2000). 'Ideology' in Wodak, R. (Ed). (2007). *Language and ideology*. Downloaded from www.lang.lancs.ac.uk/staff/wodak/papers/ideology_jlp.pdf.
- Fromkin, V., Rodman, R. and Hyams, N. (2007). *An Introduction to language* (8th ed) U.S.A.: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Habwe, J. H. (1999). *Discourse analysis of Swahili political speeches*. University of Nairobi: Unpublished PhD thesis.
- Haegeman, L. & Ihsane, T. (1999). 'Subject ellipsis in embedded clauses in English language and linguistics'. Vol. 3/1: 117-45. Retrieved from infolingua.univ.mlv.fr/colloquies/Bonifacio/proceedings/teddiman.pdf. Downloaded on 27th April, 2015.
- Hendriks, P. (2004). *Coherence relations, ellipsis and contrastive topics*. Retrieved from los.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/2/132.short. Downloaded on 4th July, 2015.

- He Ziran. (2000). *A Pragmatic study on the functions of vague language*. Retrieved from www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/elt/article/viewFiles/27266/16559. Downloaded on 21th May, 2015.
- Ibrahim, W. J. (2005). *Types of ambiguity*. Retrieved from basiceducation.uomosul.edu.iq/files/files/files_4745295.pdf. Downloaded on 20th July, 2015.
- Johnson, K. (2013). *What VP ellipsis can do*. Retrieved from people.umass.edu/kbj/homepage/content/what_vpe_can_do.pdf. Downloaded on 4th July, 2015.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). *Creative metaphors in political discourse*. Downloaded from www.metaphorik.de/09/Muller.pdf. Retrieved on 27th April, 2015.
- Muller, R. (2004). *Creative metaphors in political discourse*. Downloaded from www.metaphorik.de/09/Muller.pdf. Retrieved on 27th April, 2015.
- National Cohesion and Integration Commission (August, 2010). '*Guidelines for monitoring hate speech in the electronic media in Kenya*'. Retrieved from www.cohesion.or.ke/~cohesion/images/downloads/guidelines%2520monitoring%2520. Downloaded 22nd Oct. 2014
- Piantadosi, S. T., Tilly, H. & Gibson, E. (2012). *The Communicative function of ambiguity*. Retrieved from tedlab.mit.edu/tedlab_website/.../piantadosi_et_al_2012_cogn.pdf. Downloaded on 19th April, 2015.
- Ramney, A. (1996). *Governing: An introduction to political science*. (7th ed). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Roberts, C. (2006). 'Context in dynamic interpretation.' In Horn, L. R. & Ward, G. (Eds.). (2006). *The Handbook of pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (pages 197-220).
- Schroder, H. (2012). "A relevance-theoretical analysis of intercultural misunderstanding in global communication. *The University of Nairobi journal of language and linguistics*. Vol 2 (2012).p42-61.
- Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1986). *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Oxford: Basill Blackwall.

- Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1995). *Postface to the second edition of relevance: Communication and cognition*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (2012). *A deflationary account of metaphors*. Retrieved from philosophy.as.nyu.edu/.../SperberWilsonAdeflationaryaccountofmetaphors... Downloaded on 7th July, 2015.
- Wilson, D & Sperber, D. (2004). *Relevance Theory*. Retrieved from <http://www.Phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/PUB/WPL/02papers/wilson-sperber.pdf>. Downloaded on 12th July, 2013.
- Wilson, J. (2008). 'Political discourse' in Schffrin, D., Tannen, D. & Hamilton, H. E. (2008). *The handbook of political discourse*. P. 398-415. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing House.
- Wodak, R. (2007). *Language and ideology*. Retrieved from www.lang.lancs.ac.uk/staff/wodak/papers/ideology_jlp.pdf. Downloaded on 20th Sept. 2013.