



**ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATIVE
MECHANISMS IN NIGERIA SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (1960-1970).**

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Abstract

Nigeria presents a unique case for investigating the problems of national integration. The country has about 450 ethnic nationalities with different histories, cultures, religions and languages. By 1914, Britain had conquered all these territories and merged them together as a single entity. Throughout the period of colonial rule, the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relationship among these various groups was hostile. This hostility led to Civil War (1967-1970) between the Nigerian government and the secessionist group called Biafra. Nigeria secured victory over Biafra but to avoid outbreak of civil wars in the future, the government implemented series of integrative mechanisms that would unite the ethnic groups. This study therefore assessed the effectiveness of the national integrative mechanisms implemented by the Nigerian government. Historical research method was used to assess the various integrative mechanisms adopted by the Nigerian government and the efficacy of such integrative mechanisms in the face of new waves of ethno-religious conflicts, Boko Haram terrorism and violent militia attacks. In-depth oral interviews were conducted with four (4) experts on Nigerian history. Furthermore, written documents such as government publications, letters, correspondence, documentaries, newspapers, journal articles, books and online sources were explored to enrich the work. Content analysis was used to analyse the data. Based on the outcome of the analysis, the study discovered that the efficacy of national integrative such as the principle of federal character, introduction of the National Youth Service Corps, the establishment of Unity Schools, the promulgation of National Language Policy, and the creation of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja have been compromised on the grounds of political corruption, extreme poverty and poor implementation. The study also observed that the threat of Nigeria's disintegration keeps rising due to the weak institutions that can promote national integration. The study recommended that the Nigerian government should review the constitution to allow for more inclusion of minority groups in the national polity. It also recommended that efforts should be made to improve on the social security of Nigerians to allow the citizens to develop sense of belonging and promote the principle of federal character in the country.

Introduction

Throughout the 19th century, Nigeria was not seen by Britain as a country and neither do the people of Nigeria see themselves as one nation. Rather, the British colonial government saw Nigeria as a commercial venture having purchased the country from the Royal Niger Company in 1899 (Morel 1924). Sir Ralph More, the Commissioner for Southern Nigeria admitted at a conference held in London on September 20, 1900 that the purchase of the Niger Company left the British Government with a debt of £860,000, which served as a major hindrance to effective management of the new British estate in West Africa (Conover 1959, 35). Since Nigeria was a commercial venture of the British imperialists, there were efforts to generate income from the Estate that would make it self-sustaining. However, the financial statement of 1900 showed an expenditure of £176,128 which exceeded the revenue by £12,000 (Morel 1924, 89). Hence, the running of Nigeria was seen as a burden on British taxpayers. To offset this huge debt as well as manage the Estate efficiently, the British Government embarked on projects that would ease administration, facilitate trade and increase revenue. This was made possible through the creation of the Northern Protectorate in 1900, which was followed with the merger of the colony of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate in 1906, and subsequently, the amalgamation of both the Southern and Northern Protectorate in 1914 (Aderinto 2018, 177).

In the early stage of British rule in Nigeria, the Colonial Administration turned towards the establishment of schools, building of hospitals, construction of roads, construction of railways and the establishment of colonial offices so as to reduce the cost of administration and increase revenue. Although, the British colonial government didn't create these social amenities with the aim of integrating the different ethnic groups in Nigeria, they were the earliest attempt to integrate the people that make up Nigeria. Schools, churches and markets became centres of social integration where people of different languages could learn and speak the English language, worship the Christian God or trade together. Construction of roads and railways were carefully done to network the various communities and thereby promote the integration of territories that were formerly independent of each other.

Efforts of the British colonial government to integrate and promote unity in Nigeria through socio-cultural, political and constitutional means did not produce the much needed results. The colonial division of Nigeria into West, South and North served as a precursor to tribalism in Nigeria. British division of Nigeria into three regions (Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo) in the 1946 Richards Constitution paved the way for the rise of ethnic nationalism. The major beneficiaries of ethnic nationalism were the three major ethnic groups namely, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. These three groups have constantly dominated the political scene since 1960.

In 1967, the newly independent Nigeria faced its toughest test of disintegration when the Eastern Region opted for secession. This led to 30 months civil war was fought by the Igbo against the independent Nigerian government. The war ended in 1970. After the war, the Nigerian government came up with national integrative mechanisms so as to promote the socio-economic and political development. These included the introduction of the National Youth Service Corps, the establishment of Unity Schools, the promulgation of National

Language Policy, and the creation of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. There is, however the need to assess the effectiveness of these integrative policies in the face of new threats such as ethnic-religious conflicts, Boko Haram terrorism and violent militia attacks.

Concept of National Integration

National integration is a term used to describe nation-building, domestic solidarity, national cohesion, domestic allegiance or the domestic issue includes agreement on the political community's boundaries and the essence of the political regime. This implies forging a between a state's representatives on the level of harmony they want to have, as well as the sort of political framework and organizations they want. This actually implies creating consensus among different groups that make up the state. There can be almost no entirely homogeneous culture. Hence, integration has various political, cultural, psychological and financial elements. Integration is a constellation of various values, languages, standards and a network of social and moral institutions.

National integration is the consciousness among the people in a country that share common identity. While people belong to distinct nationalities, cultures, regions and speak distinct languages, it implies that they still acknowledge themselves as one (Asaju and Egberi 2015, 127). National integration can also be seen as the mechanism by which several groups within a specified territory are unified or collaborate under circumstances that do not seem to allow any other manner to satisfy their scheme requires.

National integration is determined by the degree to which individuals and groups in a single community adjust to the requirements of cultural life while coexisting harmoniously National integration, on the practical side, is a process, not an end in itself, and is generally influenced by contending with social forces. It is a process that leads to political cohesion and loyalty feelings by people belonging to distinct social organizations or political units towards a key political power and organizations. Political actors are induced, in a different regional environment, to pass their allegiances, interests and political activities to the center whose entity holds or seeks authority over a pre-existing nation-state in a mechanism. also note that the knowledge of a common identity among a people of the country is national integration.

National integration includes creating society for solidarity and institutionalizing forms of social interaction; providing legislation and statutes that define types of interaction; and giving validity within the social system to the means of attaining required objectives. According to Weiner (cited in Okorie 2012), national integration refers to the process of uniting cultural and socially distinct communities into a single territorial unit and creating a national identity. Integration, as used in this sense, presupposes the nature of an ethnically diverse society in which each community is distinguished by its own language, culture, arts and other self-conscious cultural qualities. National integration therefore refers specifically to the question of creating a sense of identity that overshadows or removes subordinate parochial loyalty.

This study agrees with the view of Birch (2012) that the components of national integration are in four areas: creation of symbols of national identity, establishment of national political institutions, creation of an educational system, and the development of national pride. On this basis, the study defines national integration as the unification and consolidation of a society with the aim of ensuring the maximum well-being of the largest number of its members, as

well as the development of its distinctive personality in order to make its own contribution to humanity and to world civilization. The primary barrier to national integration growth is the presence within the state of ethnic minorities that withstand integrative trends.

Historical Overview of the Nigerian Civil War

The events leading to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) stemmed from ethnic, religious and dispute over resource control. Among the series of political problems before the outbreak of the civil war were the 1953 Kano Riot, the 1966 Census Crisis, the 1964 Federal Election Crisis, and the 1966 Coups and Counter Coups. The 1953 Kano Riot arose as a fear on the part of the leaders of the North that the leaders of the South were trying to force them into a national integration for which they were not prepared. The Southerners led by Chief S. L. Akintola of the Action Group went to Kano to gather support in an attempt to educate the Northerners about the benefits of self-government. This eventually led to a four-day riot in Sabongari, Kano on May 16-19, 1963 (Horowitz 2001). Apart from loss of life, the implication of this riot was that it worsened the relationship between the leaders of the South and North.

The Census Crisis of 1962 was based on ethnic suspicion where the Southerners assumed the Census Board influenced the data to continue the Northern agenda. According to Diamond (1988, p. 131), Southern politicians believed the British government had manipulated the census data in favour of the north in order to 'ensure that Northern politicians had political power'. Nigeria's National Census of 1962 was not the first with ethnic controversy. Previous efforts to count Nigerians in 1952/1953 met with popular resistance and charges of regional prejudice. Hence, the division between the north and the south had been established even before independence.

In 1964, Nigeria held its first general election where Douglas (1965, p. 174) observed that it was marred with constitutional chaos and high level of national disintegration. The major political parties were divided into two ethnic camps. The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) received the support of people from Southern Nigeria. All political parties in the south such as National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and the Action Group also supported UPGA. In the north, the leading political party was National Alliance of Nigeria (NAN) and received the support of northerners including Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The political atmosphere was heated and various politicians in the Eastern Region wanted secession as the only way out. The elections were eventually held and led to the victory of NAN and NPN, it was however marked with violence. The outcome of the election had grave effect on the unity of the country. Gradually, the military became involved with the justification that the crises between the south and north threatened Nigeria's national security.

On January 15, 1966, a small group of army officers, mainly Southeastern Igbos, overthrew the government and assassinated the political figures from northern Nigeria including the

Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Obi-Ani and Obi-Ani 2016). The Federal Military Government that assumed power was unable to calm ethnic tensions or create a constitution that was acceptable to all parts of the country. Attempts to set up the Federal system greatly increased tensions, leading to another July 1966 coup. The military governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu refused to acknowledge Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon as the Head of State. Subsequently, coup-related massacre led to death of thousands of Igbo in the north which prompted mass movement of Igbo back to the south. In his bid to save the country from disintegration, General Gowon divided into 12 states (Onuoha 2018). Ojukwu reacted to this development by issuing series of "survival edicts" during the spring of 1967 which put federal government assets under the control of the Biafra. Gowon opposed these moves by instituting both land and sea blockade into eastern Nigeria On May 27, 1967, Ojukwu officially announced the secession of Biafra as an independent republic (Ojukwu 1989). Although the secession of Biafran was ultimately unsuccessful, their propaganda and their ability to gain international recognition prolonged the conflict beyond the expectations of many outside observers.

The Federal Government fought the war to maintain the corporate existence of Nigeria, while the Igbos fought based on the principles of self-determination. This process of creating a new state by the Igbo and the counter measures adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria to truncate this process was the single most important factor for the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war on May 30, 1967. The war was estimated to cost about 1 million lives and had particularly devastating effects on national integration in Nigeria.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Integrative Mechanisms since 1970

At the end of the 30-months civil war in Nigeria, the Federal Military Government under General Gowon embarked on peace-building process through the implementation of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Some of these policies were meant to integrate the already divided nation. Inevitably, the failure of these policies fuel long-standing after-war memories. Basically, this section examines the integrative mechanism pursued by the government in the post-civil war period.

On the 15th of January 1970, General Yakubu Gowon gave a victory speech to the Nation,

On our side, we fought the war with great caution, not in anger or hatred, but always in the hope that common sense would prevail. Many times we sought a negotiated settlement, not out of weakness, but in order to minimise the problems of reintegration, reconciliation and reconstruction. We knew that however the war ended, in the battlefield or in the conference room, our brothers fighting under other colours must rejoin us and that we must together rebuild the nation anew (Yakubu 1970)

Months before the end of the civil war, General Gowon had anticipated that there would be need to help the victims to be reintegrated into the Nigerian society. Thus, in 1968, the federal military government set up the National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC) with the primary task of organizing post-war food relief efforts, compensating those whose land was destroyed or damaged by the conflict, resettling and aiding displaced communities, and conducting rehabilitation programs. The Commission was established through the promulgation of Decree No 41 and led by Mr. Timothy Omo-Bare (Ojeleye 2016, 101). The Commission was tasked with the responsibility of providing humanitarian assistance to the most affected persons during the war. Critics have argued that the Commission made little or no impact in the lives of those that were affected during the war. There were claims that the Commission was controlled by Hausa and Yoruba with little representation of Igbo.

The successors of General Yakubu Gowon seem to be not contented with the policies of Gowon towards the Igbo. In some of them wanted the Igbo to be degraded and declared "conquered." Hence, subsequent heads of state came up with policies that discouraged national integration in Nigeria. For instance, the Obasanjo-led Federal Military Government took away Igbos' properties in Port Harcourt and other parts of Nigeria, renamed them Abandoned Properties and without further guarantee annexed them to the Federal Government by Decree No. 90 of 1979 (Godwin Onuoha 2018, 14). The Federal Military Government came with the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee (APIC) which oversaw the auction of Igbo properties beyond Igboland. The Decree empowered the Committee to sell properties that belonged to Igbos:

Every sale or disposition of abandoned properties conducted by the Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee (hereinafter in this Act referred to as "the Committee") set up by the Federal Government shall be deemed to have been lawful and properly made and any instrument issued by the Committee which purports to convey any estate or interest in land, shall be deemed to have been validly issued and shall have effect according to its tenor or intentment (Ogbonna 2016; Chp One [1] of Abandoned Properties Act, 1979).

According to Mr. Godwin Onorowa (Oral Interview, October 4, 2019), the sale of properties which belonged to Igbo in other parts of Nigeria was a significant setback to post-war Nigeria national reconciliation. In his words, "the properties were declared abandoned and forcefully taken over by the Federal Military Government through a Decree. The properties were thereafter sold to non-Igbos at discounted prices. Unfortunately, no compensation was given to the original owners. How do you achieve integration using such method?"

State creation was another integrative policy pursued by the Nigerian government after the civil war (Alapiki 2005, 49). There was a common perception among the Igbo that setting up only two Igbo states in the 1976 state formation exercise had put the Igbo at a huge

disadvantage especially in comparison to creating 5 states in each of the Hausa / Fulani (northern) and the Yoruba (western) regions. Falola & Aderinto (2010) observed that the creation of states in 1967, 1976 and 1987 overhauled the connections between communities in many parts of the country and promoted a "divided-self" in the people of Nigeria

In the post-war era, however, these policies were never actually implemented, posing the question of whether or not the Gowon regime was committed to true reconciliation. The condition escalated when the federal government publicly refused, rounded up and deported the workers of humanitarian organizations and countries willing to help in these activities at the end of the war in Biafra. The concerns of the federal government arose from the belief that these relief organizations and church institutions played a crucial role in supporting the war result in Biafra. The East-Central State was the only state out of the twelve established in 1967 to be ruled by an "administrator," working from a position of relative weakness and inequality while the others had military rulers (Akinsanya 1976). This condition lasted for five years after the war even when the Gowon government was toppled.

The post-war rhetoric for integration faced another crisis with the implementation of the 1970 Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree No. 46, which prohibited senior Igbo civil servants and employees from being reabsorbed into the civil service on the grounds that they were accomplices who supported Biafra's war effort. Consequently, most top Igbo extraction officials were regularly removed from the armed forces, jailed, or forced to retire. This was a situation that was radically different from what was expected, but the reasoning behind the government's action was to compensate the ethnic groups who remained in the union following Biafra's independence. The plight of military officers of Igbo ethnic origin became even more serious as they were rounded up. Some officers remained in detention, while others were reabsorbed and placed on probation for a period of four years without promotion (Ogbonna 2016).

In addition, the need of integration and reduction of all conflicts after the civil war led the Federal Military Government to issue Decree No. 24 of 22 May 1973 that established the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). The Decree stated that the "NYSC is being established with a view to the proper encouragement and development of common ties among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity" The NYSC scheme was therefore developed as a mechanism for national recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction. Sadly, many youths in the NYSC programme were killed in the communities they were sent to due to religious conflict, ethnic violence or political violence.

Militancy and Terrorism as Threats to National Integration in Nigeria

Nigeria has experienced post-colonial history of unconventional conflicts waged by non-state political actors such as the Maitatsine sect (founded in 1980), Boko Haram (formed in 2002), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (formed in 2005), the Ombatse militia group (founded in 2013), The Avengers (formed in 2016), and a host of several Shiite movements. Adeakin (2010, p. 129) is of the view that these violent groups emerged due to the political environment of Nigeria which is dictated by bad governance, religious extremism, poverty, corruption and ethnic rivalry over resource control. This shows that Nigeria's national security has been threatened not only by nation-states but also by non-state actors as well as narcotic cartels, multinational corporations and even natural disasters.

Numerous militant groups arose in the Niger Delta since the 1997 return to civilian rule. Most of them were grouped along national, regional or cultural lines, such as Ijaw National Congress, Africa's Egbesu Boys and Atangbala Boys. The first organization to transcend these divisions was the Niger Delta Emancipation Movement (MEND), which emerged in 2005. Despite uniting numerous Niger Delta non-state warring factions, MEND was not a single, cohesive body. Instead, MEND acted more as an umbrella organization for various Niger Delta dissident-groups. Jomo Gbomo, spokesman for MEND, notes:

MEND is an amalgam of all arm-bearing groups in the Niger Delta...' and continues by stating their objectives:'... fighting for control of oil revenue by Niger Delta indigenous peoples who have re(Oriola, Haggerty, and Knight 2013)latively no benefit from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last 50 years'(Oriola, Haggerty, and Knight 2013).

During their first major attack in January 2006, MEND abducted and arrested foreigners working in the oil extraction industry. Ransom kidnappings have since become MEND's daily technique (Duffield 2010). Certain tactics include attacks on MNOCs (including offshore oil platforms, pipelines, production facilities, transportation ships and vehicles), attacks on Nigerian soldiers and government buildings (Hazen and Horner 2007). Since returning to civilian rule in 1997, successive governments have made numerous efforts to resolve the Niger Delta conflict. Some of these interventions include the creation of the Niger Delta Development Board (1961), the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (1992) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (2001). In 2009, the government offered all protesters an amnesty package, and in 2010, President Jonathan offered a similar deal to stop their activities.

Although, MEND activities have been technically eliminated in the Niger Delta, the idea of using violence to push for national recognition became popular among the people. Boko Haram founder, Mohammed Yusuf (1970 –2009) exploited the situation by attacking churches, mosques, markets, banks, telecommunication facilities, military barracks, police stations, schools, local government secretariats, among others. Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf is at the heart of Boko Haram's emergence. Born on January 29, 1970, Yusuf was born in the village of Girgir, Jalasko, Yobe State, Nigeria and dropped out of high school for education as a Muslim

cleric in Chad and the Republic of Niger. He joined the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (a Shiite organization) in the 1980s; in 1994 he became the ' Emir' of the Jamaatul Tajdid Islam (JTI, Movement for the Revival of Islam, Borno Chapter); and in 2000 he became a member of Jama'atu Izalatul Bid'awai kamatu Sunna (Izala, Movement for the Removal of Change and the Reconstruction of Sunni Islam). His position as member of the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria elevated his status and helped to establish another group, Ahlul sunna wal'jama'ah hijra (Adherents to the Sunnah and the Community), which he later changed to Jama'atu Ahlus-SunnahLidda'Awat Wal Jihad (People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad). Today, the group is popularly called Boko Haram because of the philosophies advocated by Yusuf that revolve around nabbing' western education as a sin;' refused to recognize the Sultan of Sokoto as the head of Muslims in Nigeria; condemned Izala ideology as far as true Islam teaching is concerned; dismissed as fraudulent the Nigerian government and security forces.

Although, literature is silent between 2003 and 2008 on Boko Haram's activities, it was the time that gave the group a strong foothold in Nigeria. The period laid the foundation for financing Boko Haram, stockpiling weapons, recruiting and networking. For example, in 2001, Yusuf received part of the £ 1.8 million sent to terrorist networks by Osama Bin Laden. He also travelled to Saudi Arabia and formed cooperation in Somalia with al-Shabaab and other local al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. Several police stations were raided and carted away in Bama, Gwoza, Kala-Balge during this time. Among the unemployed Izala youth, membership was gained in particular. To join Boko Haram, hundreds of graduates burnt their certificates. The new recruits were given grants to start small businesses and a new settlement was established near Kannamma, Yobe State, called Afghanistan. By 2009, Yusuf had an estimated 280,000 followers for insurgency training, some of whom he sent to Afghanistan. Before his death in 2009, Yusuf gave Boko Haram a clear vision, claiming that Sharia state "should be founded in Nigeria and, if possible, through faith preaching throughout the world."

Boko Haram grew from 2009 to 2012 into a more violent and brutal group of terrorists. The new leadership under Abubakar Shekau has expanded the group funding to include drug trafficking throughout the Sahelian region, ransom kidnapping, organized bank robbery, market raids, prisons attacks, police stations and military barracks to loot sophisticated artillery and external funding from other terrorist groups. Membership was extended to convicts equally after being released in jail-breaks in Boko Haram. For example, 721 prisoners were released to rescue their leaders by Boko Haram during the jail-break operation of the group in Bauchi Prison. Likewise, Koton-Karfe prison in Kogi State was attacked by Boko Haram in 2012 and released 200 prisoners. This display of force appealed to new recruits who believed that the all-powerful terrorist group would release them once they were arrested by the ' infidel Nigerian state.'

Terrorist attacks by Boko Haram from 2012 to 2015 focused on Northeast Nigeria's territorial control. The group took effective political control of 28 cities and challenged 21 cities in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe with the Nigerian government. The territorial regulation of these cities opened up new possibilities for membership recruitment, education, financing and expansion of arms. On membership recruitment, Abdullahi announced that, without firing a

single shot, Boko Haram seized Bara City in Yobe State. They were preached and gained large numbers of followers trained as suicide bombers. Similarly, in conquered territories, the pool of funds, fuel and food supplies became available to Boko Haram. The group attacked Chibok in December 2015, the rural community where 276 girls were kidnapped in 2014, plundered the farms and stole more than 200 cows.

The group formalized its network with international terrorist organizations including the Islamic State in March 2015. This allegiance was in the promotion of support, weaponry, education, learning and networks in its core areas. The result was that Boko Haram received technical support from ISIS, especially in conducting a social media war that, according to Sarah, made the group more recognizable and appealing to funders, fighters and loyalists.

While Boko Haram's philosophies had its origins in the 19th-century Ottoman dan Fodio Jihadi wars as well as the early activities of Islamic movements in Nigeria; it found its way into modern Nigeria due to the ethno-religious division that make up the political space.

Conclusion

The major findings of the study are highlighted below:

- 1) The British Amalgamation policy of 1914 was exploitative and instead of promoting national integration in Nigeria, it further divided the people. This finding is in agreement with the findings of other scholars such as Oluwatobi (2018) who argued that primary aim of the amalgamation was to protect the British economic interest and to facilitate the exploitation of the nation's resources. Similarly, Ojo (2014) argued that while Nigeria may have been created by the British; a large number of Nigerian politicians have cremated it. He pointed to incidences of internal conflicts, corruption and dilapidated infrastructure within the few years of independence.
- 2) The British colonial government promoted uneven development of Nigeria through legal frameworks and socio-political policies. Development in Nigeria is not equally shared between the south and the north. According to Bourne (2015), the ethnic configurations of Nigeria and the patterns of development between the north and the south makes it difficult for anyone to understand. There is evidence that development in the south was much more favoured by the British than in the north (Falola 2003) .
- 3) Religious division, poverty, corruption and question over resource control are the major drivers of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. According to Samuel (2012), the source disintegration in Nigeria is anchored on Religious division, poverty, corruption and question over resource control
- 4) The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) provided the framework for national integrative mechanisms in Nigeria. Several authors are of the view that the Nigerian Civil War became a source of inspiration for the Nigerian government to develop framework for national integration (Ojo, 2009; Bourne, 2015; Olayoku, 2019)

- 5) The integrative mechanisms adopted by the Nigerian government in the post-Civil War era was effective only between 1970 and 1979.
- 6) The effectiveness of various integrative mechanisms adopted by the Nigerian government in the post-Civil War era is no longer effective in meeting the socio-economic and political development of the country in the 21st century.
- 7) The emergence of violent ethnic militia groups and spread of terrorism in could lead disintegration of Nigeria. Based on the analysis of the activities of ethnic militia groups as well as the Boko Haram insurgents, there is high level of concern by Nigerians and the international community that the country is a failed state and may disintegrate if the situation is left unchecked.

Recommendations

Based on the outcome of the content analysis, the following recommendations were made:

- 1) It is therefore recommended that the Nigerian government should review the constitution to allow for more inclusion of minority groups in the national polity.
- 2) Furthermore, efforts should be made to improve on the social security of Nigerians to allow the citizens to develop sense of belonging. National orientation should also be used to improve upon existing principle of federal character which is suffering from corruption.

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