



AFGHAN-U. S Relations Between 2014-2019

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ABSTRACT

This research paper addresses the efforts of the U.S. to achieve some level of reconciliation with the Taliban after more than 18 years of war in Afghanistan. It deals with the history of U.S.-Taliban negotiations and the U.S. initiatives to engage with the Taliban, as well as outlining the challenges to these initiatives and determining how effective they have been. In addition, the prospects of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks are assessed. Since the 2001 U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the first two U.S. administrations under consideration those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama justified intrusive interventions into the political, economic, and social affairs of Afghanistan under a “state-building” approach to address a combination of security and humanitarian challenges. The U.S. promoted state-building initiatives guided by a liberal peacebuilding ideology that were supposed to promote peace, democracy, and market-led development in the region. Two years after Trump came to office, his administration abandoned this state-building approach and hopes of a military victory over the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The question of how to establish lasting peace in Afghanistan has also proven to be troublesome for the U.S. and the Afghans. The process of peace talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, which started in early 2018, has lacked transparency and a clear strategy. However, it seems that the U.S.-Taliban peace talks in Doha have started the beginning of an end to a supposedly “endless war” for the U.S. Nonetheless, this might not end the conflict within Afghanistan, as the U.S. peace deal with the Taliban is more likely to create the conditions for future civil war than a sustainable peace among Afghans. It argues that Afghanistan became central to America’s national security perceived interests due to its relevance as a ‘bastion against communism’ in the Cold War context or in the post-9/11 context as a highly significant country in which the phenomenon of terrorism had taken a major foothold. The author contends that US policymakers consistently invoked the notion that America has had an exceptional, brave, and moral part to play in Afghanistan’s affairs. In this way, Washington discursively constructed Afghanistan’s relevance in order to achieve its perceived national interest whilst confidently proclaiming its benevolent role.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, U.S, Taliban, Dayyesh (ISIS), Political, Peace Talk, State Building.

Introduction

The contention in Afghanistan is the United States' longest-running battle by almost six years. Around 10,000 U.S. troops, and more than twice the same number of U.S. temporary workers remain conveyed in this war-torn state. Despite the apparent multitude of weights borne, the United States and its partners have gained impressive ground. The twenty years in length war that followed the 1979 Soviet attack of Afghanistan had brought about the far-reaching annihilation of its state organizations, outfitted power, and public economy. Today, the Afghan state has been reconstituted, Afghan security powers have by and by become a public foundation, and the economy keeps on empowering human advancement enhancements while encountering moderate however sure development. Further, fifteen years after the awful functions of September 11, 2001, U.S. furthermore, united (counting Afghan) powers have destroyed, generally, the psychological militant gatherings working in Afghanistan that assaulted the U.S. country on that game-changing day. Notwithstanding, critical hindrances stay to make sure about long haul dependability and flourishing in the nation: the political framework is set apart by profound cleavages; administration is debilitated by debasement and a failure to convey law, request, what's more, equity over the whole domain; the Afghan military all in all is still not successful enough against a tough Taliban rebellion; also, the economy stays subject to huge implantations of the unfamiliar guide instead of indigenous wellsprings of development. These interior difficulties, combined with outside weights the steadiness of extending Afghan-Pakistani hostility, the pervasiveness of continuous territorial contentions in and over Afghanistan, and the potential for benefactor weariness as the Afghan clash proceeds relentlessly could each what's more, together lead to the unwinding of the security, political, and financial gains chalked up since 2001. Should such inversions lead to a tipping point, the endurance of the Kabul government, if not simply the Afghan state, could be in genuine danger. This unstable situation proposes that the United States and its partners who together offer more than \$5 billion yearly in nonmilitary personnel help to Kabul need to settle on significant choices on how best to help Afghanistan going ahead. Truth be told, U.S. decisions about its future contribution to the nation remain seemingly the most essential outside factor in the development of both the contention and the Afghan state. In light of an inner evaluation that his methodology was delayed in creating progress, if not by and large vacillating, previous president Barack Obama casted off his long-standing objective of finishing the U.S. decisions about its future contribution in the nation remain apparently the most significant outside factor in the advancement of both the contention and the Afghan state. U.S. intercession in Afghanistan during his residency and picked rather to leave pivotal choices about future U.S. points and the methods for accomplishing them up to his replacement. Donald Trump's organization is attempted a survey of these issues, and all things considered, strategy choices concerning troop levels and the course of future U.S. association in Afghanistan will be reported soon. Nonetheless, given the difficulties confronting this White House's public security group, what's more, the time weights of reporting a choice at the North Atlantic Treaty Association's (NATO) the highest point in Brussels on May 25, 2017, it is muddled regardless

of whether the current review will be far-reaching enough. A free exertion to evaluate U.S. procedure in Afghanistan could likewise demonstrate valuable, and this paper is expected to investigate the basic key decisions confronting the United States. While the issues identified with troop levels also, the personality of military activities is without a doubt significant, these are appropriately the territory of government. In this way, the emphasis here is on investigating the bigger points of future U.S. also, partnered inclusion in Afghanistan and the strategy moves toward that could accomplish them—not on the details involved by the other options.

Afghan-U. S Political Relations

The United States should continue to have long-term military and economic commitments to Afghanistan and seek to strengthen to be democratic forces and institutions. When US military and civilian leaders claim Pakistan using proxy forces to destabilize Afghanistan and the region is going to make policies and actions. The United States must do everything it can to encourage countries like China and Saudi Arabia to Solve the problem of the terrorists. Economic aid should be replaced as military spending is on the decline. They should be used more strategically to produce more sustainable solutions. Assessment of the security challenges in the US-Afghanistan relationship. there was a need for coordination between the two sides in the war on terrorism. So far it is not clear that there is such harmony. The harmonies are also needed Be technical as well as strategic. (Dasgupta, 2013).

One question here is how much our forces are capable of. Another important point is the terrorist shelters the target must be attacked by the US, but no specific plans or policies have been put forward so far. Afghan government officials Many times have warned about this. it is also clear to the region what action is being taken. Unfortunately, we spend time and opportunities are lost and good results are possible is not to have. The question is our problem was the internal weakness. So, what can we expect from the government in the future?

We had wanted to be a player in international politics. But we could not afford the time. In the past years It was possible for us at the time, but we should be aware that we were not well prepared at this time. (Mashal and Crowley, 2020).

We were in a situation where our capacities were at a very low level We were still at war. Currently, we need to take matters more seriously. In the last ten years we must admit that many things have been discussed we have neglected. There is little time for serious decisions. We must decide what kind of government and what kind of society we want to be. Purpose and Our wishes are clear to us. But we must ask ourselves if we stand to achieve our goals or aspirations or still want our people and Deceive the international community with excuses. These decisions are difficult; perhaps serious decisions can make people and losers lose, but if a People and a government to win, we must accept. We still see people still very clearly emphasizing their personal power, interests and thinking about people are not.

Afghanistan must take the war on terror seriously. There should be "Working Opportunities Between Two Countries". The Ministry of Finance plays a central role in Afghanistan's economic policymaking and engagement with donors.

a. Nation Building War Against Terror

The nation-building" approach, which included development, human rights, and women's rights. It has talk on the three axes followed public realities the US development deployment in Afghanistan in recent years, economic opportunities (and follow-up recommendations). In my opinion, the main problem in terms of Afghanistan's relationship with the US is the lack of clarity of priorities. We do not know whether the war on terror a priority or a nation Making Afghanistan is. We need to make it clear whether the two narratives should go hand in hand or be considered separately. We have not been able to figure it out in years How the war has progressed and where development has come. We need to see what kind of focus President Trump has on coordinating with Afghanistan. (Keane, 2016).

b. Facts about US international aid

It is equivalent to 1% of the total annual US budget. International indicators say US foreign aid This value should be 3%. Because America is so big, one percent of the budget It is worth \$ 48 billion. Aid is one of the tools of a foreign site. Assistance is conditional everywhere in the world. The effectiveness of donations around the world is always relatively small. Economic growth and development of a country is a national decision rather than an international agenda. We cannot expect the United States to develop Afghanistan to have. No single country has achieved sustainable development growth by external assistance alone. (Babur, 2015).

US Development Performance in Afghanistan, Economic Opportunities

They spent \$ 33,153 billion in total, including a variety of budgets and payments, in the US development sector in Afghanistan from the beginning to 2014. US military spending is a separate figure at around \$ 1 trillion - \$ 700 or \$ 800 billion. Iraq and Afghanistan total \$ 3 trillion Of the \$ 331 billion, \$ 700 billion has been spent on the military and security sector of the Afghan government and nation, the details of which are not available to us. So, when it comes to US aid, we are not talking about stupid money that should have been used and not made. America It is not proportionate to Iraq in Afghanistan. US spent 40 billion Dollar on three areas: in humanitarian aid like helping people affected by natural pests such as floods and earthquakes, helping immigrants, etc., other than development aid approximately 451 billion Dollar spent. US alone has spent 38 dollar billion on development. US development assistance focused on areas such as agriculture, democracy and governance are economic growth, education, gender, public health, infrastructure, and humanitarian aid. The remaining 37 billion dollar in various other uses It is ripe that we do not know the details. It is noteworthy that in the 38-billion-dollar development assistance, not all the money has been given to the government. Part of it out of budget it is used in what is known as parallel institutions, including civil society institutions, the media, and related activities. Another point is that during the years 2013 to 2014, US aid to the three areas was significantly reduced. (AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENT UPDATE, 2018).

The budget of the Afghan government came into low level, the reasons behind it being that Mr Karzai was not following the reform benchmarks in the cabinet. Commitments that We were not implementing the deposit we had in Tokyo; it was not implementing the mines law and not enforcing the law on money laundering and terrorism financing. So, we lost 4 billion

dollars from Tokyo and the responsible is Karzai. President Hamid Karzai made the reform indicators hostage to the strategic alliance and other issues. The current government's relations are 100 percent different from Mr. Karzai's relations with the United States. (Nassif and Haque, 2016).

Resolves and heals.

If the money helped balance the status quo. The international community's top priority was to contain terrorism and regional diplomacy issues. For the Americans, they are helping Afghanistan by 2014, it has been acceptable in terms of what they consume internationally and comparatively in different countries. Afghanistan has been effective compared to other countries. The Americans have been one of our best partners. Working with European partners relative our cooperation with the US has been extremely difficult. The money that the international community has provided for Afghanistan, half of which is committed by the United States. the d every international conference does not help the United States until the United States lifts its hand. In development aid, the Americans have purity, however, there have been problems with corruption. Former President Mr. Karzai has also sabotaged the military approach, no cooperation between Karzai's government and NATO forces. In the future, the government should not have a negative role. Relations between the two countries under the long-term cooperation agreements with the United States after 2014. The question is, to what extent have we been able to achieve our desired goals based on our relationship with the US? According to the status we have not been able to improve the security situation and not establish good governance. (Felbab-Brown, 2016).

When that happens, the structure of government loses the public support? Government of Afghanistan has already the lost support of people. We are facing great insecurity by pouring rural people into cities. We must think whether our relationship with the Americans will continue in the situation with the current Afghanistan, surrounded by dangerous neighbours, we need to chart a grand strategy. The question is our relationship with America for the benefit of the people or just for the benefit of the national unity government? What is our main problem in the relationship between the two countries? The United States of America has generously assisted Afghanistan, why USA still have major political and economic development problems and failed to address the issues.

U. S and Afghanistan Security Treaty

Signing the Security Treaty with the US was one of the challenges for the President of Afghanistan because it was signed and not signed. There were reactions. Signing of security pact with US is domestic dimension, fierce reaction of jihadist leaders, many scholars and clerics. They have come to believe that Afghanistan's problems are not a military solution, but the only solution to the current Afghan crisis and to achieve political stability, Security and economics are the negotiation and compromise of the parties involved. While this is inconsistent with US military presence policy It is Afghanistan. But in the foreign dimension, the neighbours worry means the presence of a powerful state equipped with the most advanced military equipment. They cannot find the information, especially after US intelligence officials revealed their conversations with world leaders after the crisis. (R. Evans, 2014).

They are becoming increasingly sensitive to the US military presence in Afghanistan, and the US presence in Afghanistan is a measure of US intervention. Central Asian countries and those countries know Afghanistan is a supervisory member of the Shanghai Organization cannot be a concern for member states. Ignore this organization, in addition to some of these countries are Afghanistan's neighbours. On the domestic side, there is no doubt that the presence of the United States and the international community, in cooperation with neighbouring Afghanistan, has led to the institutionalization which if it is to be done, strengthening and sustaining this institution in Afghanistan will require the cooperation of the international community, especially the United States. Hence, not the presence of the US and the international community in Afghanistan can have a negative impact on the process of systematization and economic development unless another sponsor to be considered as an alternative to America. Therefore, the combination of these two opposing demands can be difficult and one of the major challenges for the government Afghanistan Says The Afghan President has repeatedly shifted US work and policy toward Afghanistan to "Hamid Karzai", especially after The benefit of Afghanistan is unknowingly calling for new commitments in the fight against terrorism, night strikes and the peace process. (Jarvenpaa, 2011).

Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, however, did not sign a security treaty with the United States. Karzai's three conditions International guarantee of ending war in Afghanistan and starting peace in the country include: American judicial immunity, no entry Arbitrary to Homes and Operations Arbitrarily, but Ashraf Ghani Signs the Agreement Although the Americans did not Accept the Terms.

Washington Security and Defence Treaty Introduction

At the same time as the Loya Jirga was inaugurated, the context of the Afghanistan-US Security and Defence Treaty was released by the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Approving the Agreement on Long-term Cooperation between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Strategic Partnership Agreement) Signed on May 2, 2012, reaffirming the commitment of the Parties to this Agreement and the Parties To long-term strategic cooperation (in their areas of interest, including peacebuilding, security and stability, strengthening state institutions, supporting development Long-term economic and social development of Afghanistan; and encourage regional cooperation. (Eviatar, 2014).

Acknowledging the provisions of the Strategic Partnership Agreement that the cooperation between the parties is based on mutual respect and mutual interest, Emphasizing the provisions of the Strategic Partnership Agreement that both parties are committed to their commitment and commitment to the realization of a future based on justice, Peace, security and the opportunity to provide the Afghan people with confidence and once again reaffirm their strong commitment to national sovereignty, independence, the territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan are emphasized. Interested in continuing to strengthen close defence and security partnerships to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan, contributing to regional peace and stability? And globalization, combating terrorism, reaching an area that is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and enhancing its capabilities. Afghanistan to repel threats to its national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and with the United States

seeking access to facilities has not been a permanent military presence in Afghanistan and does not want a presence that poses a threat to Afghanistan's neighbour's; The United States does not use the territory of Afghanistan or its facilities in that country to attack other countries. (Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2018).

Recalling the contents of the May 21, 2012 Chicago Summit Statement on Afghanistan by the Afghan Leaders and Countries Assisting the Mission Security in Afghanistan (ISAF) are cooperating under NATO leadership, and in particular their commitment to a sovereign, security and Democratic and also considering that the ISAF mission ended in 2014 and that the transition process is complete Close to these countries through a mutual commitment between NATO and Afghanistan to create a new NATO-led mission to train, consult and Assistance to the Afghan National Security and Defence Forces continues, with the mission requiring a legal basis and agreement on There is also how to determine the qualifications of this presence. Reaffirming the continued support of the Parties to establish regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms to strengthen security and stability through resolving Tensions, ambiguities, and misunderstandings. (NATO's 25th summit meeting, 2012).

Considering the decision of the Consultative Loya Jirga in 2013 on the importance of this security and defence cooperation agreement to strengthen Afghanistan Increasingly the areas of defence and security cooperation between the parties based on the principles of full respect for their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and lack of Intervene in the internal affairs of each other and to promote security and stability in the region and to fight terrorism.

Agreeing on the importance of cooperation based on mutual respect, non-interference and equality between Afghanistan and its neighbour's, and on requesting all countries to: Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs and democratic processes; Emphasizing the cooperation of the parties on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of both parties, respecting the objectives of the United Nations Charter and the joint request of the parties To develop a framework for defence and security cooperation between them and reaffirming their strong commitment to sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity The National Assembly of Afghanistan, as well as respecting Afghan laws, customs and customs; agree. (S. Smith, 2019).

Afghan Conditions for Strategic Alliance with U.S

After US-led coalition forces came to Afghanistan in 2001 to combat terrorism and eliminate the Taliban. The hope was to build a strong, popular government and end the civil war in Afghanistan's war-torn country. But Over time, Afghanistan has faced many challenges despite the presence of foreign forces. Increase actions Terrorism, spreading poverty and unemployment, the lack of a strong central government are just some of the problems in Afghanistan that provide the right background and context for The powers of the curse have created a region to pursue their interests in Afghanistan to turn it into a field of open competition. with it is understandable that Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government sought to conclude a strategic alliance with regional and extra-regional powers. Treaty Which could serve the national interests of the United States in the region, and especially the interests and goals of this country in Central Asia, and the security concerns of the United States. Especially

on the issue of extremist movements and tendencies in Pakistan. Understanding such interests is common to the President we call for strategic partnership ': Afghanistan declares its intention to conclude a strategic alliance with the United States. Karzai has stated We are, but we have conditions for this partnership. (E. Neumann, 2015).

Karzai made this statement at the inauguration of the Loya Jirga or the Supreme Council of Afghanistan. Karzai's terms They were:

A: Overseas Operations in Afghanistan: Karzai Says US Soldiers Threaten Afghan Citizens in Overnight Operations. As if they are insurgents, and to the very conservative Afghan community is considered an insult to privacy. Karzai

"Citizens of Afghanistan cannot feel safe if they think American troops might attack their homes at midnight," he said. So far Karzai's conditions have been unacceptable to US officials and there is no sign of Coalition forces' willingness to halt night strikes. Does not have. According to coalition estimates, there are an average of 12 operations per night in Afghanistan. A spokesman for the coalition said Over 85% of all-night operations are fired without a single casualty, making it the safest of all is another. Civilian casualties accounted for less than one percent of all civilian casualties during night operations.

B) Removing international prisons in Afghanistan and removing existing detention centres to Afghan forces and eliminating them Parallel offices with the Government of Afghanistan. In fact, the basic principle underlying Karzai's terms is respect for Afghan national sovereignty by the force. (Zulfqar, 2014).

US Goals and Interests in Strategic Alliance with Afghanistan

Although the United States announces the target of a military strike on Afghanistan to eliminate the Taliban and fight terrorism, the reality is, and it has long-term goals for the United States. Indeed, the United States pursues two short and long-term goals in invading Afghanistan and deploying it. The short-term goal is what the US cites as the main reason for its presence in the region, which is to combat Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and jihadist groups that are currently going on. But the main purpose of the United States for its presence in Afghanistan is security interests, its economy is in Central and South Asia, which include: (J. Tellis and Eggers, 2017).

US Economic Interest in Central Asia

Although oil and gas were not the cause of the US invasion of Afghanistan, Afghanistan remains a key player in US plans to maintain It controls a large part of Central Asia's offshore oil and gas reserves. About Turkmenistan's oil and gas fields to the north Afghanistan has been in the US for nearly a decade now with serious plans by business groups for Turkmenistan's oil pipeline. To the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan and the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan. Such a pipeline is benefit for The United States and the reasons is pulling the Central Asian oil states out of Russian influence and strengthening the US position in the region, Preventing Iran's Regional Infiltration by Preventing Turkmenistan's Iran Gas Bond and Defusing Turkmenistan's Iran Oil Pipeline For the Arabian Sea) in the northeast Indian Ocean, between the Arabian Peninsula and India (, diversifying US oil and gas

resources, and By increasing production resources, helping to keep prices down, generating profits for construction and oil companies, providing a foundation It is important for the economic prosperity needed in the region, which can be the basis for political stability. (Rumer, Sokolsky and Stronski, 2016).

USA political and security interests in Afghanistan

One of the main goals of the United States in deploying Afghanistan is to exert pressure on China and Russia and prevent these countries from increasing their influence and role. Developments in Central Asia and the Middle East. In fact, the United States is worried about China's closer proximity to Russia if it creates a block Power can ruin the balance of power at the expense of the United States. The United States looks at Afghanistan as the gateway to Central Asia states. The United States sees its interests in Afghanistan only in the long run. In other words, achieving the goals the United States requires a sustained presence and is ongoing in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries. Tracing the discourse of competition between civilizations in order to achieve economic and military goals US foreign policy remains. From this point of view, the interests and values of the Asian and Russian civilizations have given rise to the States the United States is hesitant to look at the strength of these countries and find ways to counter these countries' growing power and influence. (Waldman, 2013).

Existence military in strategic areas is one of the main policies of the United States. In this regard, Central Asia, meanwhile, plays an important role in Afghanistan as the gateway to Central Asia has attracted the attention of American policymakers. It is through this that the United States of America many crises have been used as tools to increase their role and contain other powers that are potentially rival to the United States and therefore, the conclusion of the strategic alliance between the United States and Afghanistan once again gives American statesmen the opportunity to take advantage of Afghanistan's not-so-good situation to move forward with its macro goals and policies.(Dormandy and Keating, 2018).

The Impact of US Policies on Afghan Political-Security Developments

What differences can be drawn in the US-Afghan relationship between the Trump era and the Obama era? Despite the differences between the two experienced political traditions (Republicans and Democrats) in the US foreign policy apparatus as well as the priorities that may be exercised by delegates and representatives of both traditions over Afghanistan, one of the major differences that marked the Trump era by making Obama different, the offensive policies stem from Mr Trump's personality model. Trump is moving away from past US traditions or at least political principles that are usually influenced by US foreign policy and has pursued an offensive policy in many countries, including Afghanistan and its neighbours. There are several components to President Trump's aggressive policy in Afghanistan and the region. First, after Trump's inauguration, for the first time, the number one person in the United States has been ruthlessly out of touch with Pakistan. (Thomas, 2019).

This serious stance has been publicly pursued by Mr. Trump and, consequently, by US foreign policy officials. That is why, unlike in the past, Pakistan is faced with a very serious dilemma

and cannot tailor its behaviour to that of the past and take a stand for the United States. Therefore, a differentiation of Trump's approach to Obama is the aggressive attitude towards groups known in the public literature as the main supporters of terrorism and terrorist groups in Afghanistan, which is Pakistan. Although in the past such discussions were influenced by public opinion, first there was never a clear-cut position taken by the United States on this measure. The second distinction in Trump's approach to Obama is that the United States seems to have made a serious decision to fight terrorism and extremist groups such as ISIS, the Taliban, and the like in Afghanistan. That is why, contrary to the tradition of the past and the decision taken by the Obama administration to withdraw US and international forces from Afghanistan, during the Trump era, the return of a portion of US and international forces is proposed to be taught by Afghan security forces. Act or pursue US strategic interests and demands in Afghanistan and the region. (Sohail, 2018)

Do we not think that there is a contradictory view in the US government of negotiating with the Taliban? Following months of bloody attacks in Kabul in recent months, Trump has announced that talks with the Taliban are no longer possible, but his deputy secretary of state says they are ready to negotiate with the Taliban. We believe that the aggressive or soft policy that the United States is pursuing in Afghanistan against various groups, such as terrorist groups such as the Taliban and others, is not in order to prioritize the demands and expectations of the Afghan community and the strategic interests of Afghanistan. But what is strategically important to the United States and White House agents is the interests of the country, and how these benefits are made easier and less costly by adopting a strategy. So, I think in Afghanistan, groups like Taliban and any such terrorist and fundamentalist group have become a playing card for international and regional actors, including the United States, so there can never be inherent hostility in US foreign policy or policy. Look at terrorist groups such as Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, but White House agents have a particular stance toward these groups in terms of seasonality and monsoon. (Frud Bezhana, 2019).

In this respect, we sometimes see a paradox in US foreign policy and its behaviour toward these groups. Given this contradiction, what will be the definitive approach of the US government to the Taliban. What future lies ahead for the Taliban? We still need time, and for now final judgment will be premature, because the Taliban is not alone, but with regional and international backing and influential actors in the Afghan judiciary acting as supporters of the group. As a result, the relationship between the United States and the Taliban can never be evaluated and analysed in a way that the United States can easily take a specific and decisive, whether offensive or non-aggressive, attitude toward the Taliban; Related to some other issues in the international system and the strategies and behaviour patterns of some influential actors. That is why, despite the offensive nature of Trump's approach, you are seeing some flexibility in US foreign policy. (FELBAB-BROWN, 2017).

Can U.S continued approach to the Taliban still be a winning card for the Afghan government?

We believe that the offensive nature of President Trump's personality model can be analysed and evaluated in other areas before reflecting the kind of U.S confrontation with the Taliban. U.S experience at least after Mr. Trump becomes President of the United States, many do not

exhibit the same visions and visions of an aggressive approach to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, but a proportionate and flexible view of the main nature of US policy. We are in favour of Taliban and other groups. But if the US aggressive policy toward the Taliban is implemented, then it may provide opportunities for the Kabul government, but so far, we have not seen such a strategy from the United States.

Trumps Foreign Policy Towards Dayyesh in Afghanistan

How will Trump's foreign policy impact Dayyesh future in Afghanistan? The Islamic State has carried out seven bloody attacks in Kabul alone in the past year. On the other hand, Russia is also concerned about Dayyesh activity in Afghanistan and considers it particularly questionable in the north. What is the view on the relationship between Dayyesh and the US and the Trump administration's policy towards this group and its future in Afghanistan? Daesh in Afghanistan is not a process that results in a value system, the political and social realities of Afghan society. In other words, the political and cultural traditions of Afghan society have never been continuing to be ISIS. Once we accept this, the next issue will unfold, namely that ISIS is a project made by influential political players in Afghanistan to play with their strategic interests. I think that the great powers, including the United States, are playing with all these groups in terms of time and space in Afghanistan, and they are like playing cards with these powers, so ISIS cannot be cut off from the policy requirements of the great powers. In Afghanistan. ISIS is not a patchwork that is at least in line with Afghanistan's value, political and social systems, so you cannot at least culturally make ISIS's presence in Afghanistan appropriate to the capabilities and capabilities needed to expand and expand this group elsewhere. To analyse at least this analysis in Afghanistan is not optimistic. (Frederick Harteis, 2019).

With the advent of Trump, the United States dropped its biggest bomb on ISIS in Nangarhar, but things are going differently in northern Afghanistan. On the other hand, ISIS has really ramped up in Kabul for the past two years. How do you think Trump's approach will affect the future of Dayyesh presence in Afghanistan? Let's not forget that Dayyesh has suffered enormous defeats in Iraq and Syria, and there are indications is Afghanistan could be a good platform for some ISIS members from neighbouring countries. When we emphasize that Dayyesh (ISIS) is a project and a game card used by different actors, it is natural that all actors, including the United States, play against this group, flexibly and in terms of time and space and priorities. That is what other actors are going to do against Afghanistan. Therefore, it is generally and very uncertain to analyse and evaluate the future of Dayyesh in Afghanistan clearly and predict that the United States will take a tough stance against Dayyesh and concludes that the United States' serious determination seems to lie. (Lalkovič, 2017).

That there should be a serious fight against ISIS and suppress Taleban in Afghanistan. But if ISIS were not the playing cards, there could have been some predictions, but unfortunately because in Afghanistan ISIS, Taliban and every other terrorist group are the playing cards of the actors involved, so how they decide against these groups is appropriate to the time and circumstances. The location and political conditions and regional developments can be changed. By given the confrontations between Russia and the US in the region and around the world, and part of these political confrontations are also being pursued on Afghanistan, do we

not think that Afghanistan will become an arena of confrontation between the two powers and the Dayesh as a playing card with both sides? (Gussarova, 2019).

While theorists of Afghanistan's foreign policy say that after the national unity government comes to power, we are seeing more sharp shifts in Afghan foreign policy and that Afghanistan has abandoned neutrality in its foreign policy, leaving the US and NATO security system alone. A system that can serve the interests of Afghanistan has been chosen.

If Afghan state actors do not act cautiously and focus on Afghanistan's strategic interests, there can be a very bitter future for Afghanistan. To add another point, some influential groups in Kabul may have been neutral and more in line with US and Western world policies, but within this system, there are still influential players and other key players. They are always interested in the policies of other actors or competing actors and may be in harmony with them. So, I think this is directly related to the kind of strategy that is being adopted by the whole political system in Afghanistan. If the priorities of different countries are different, if the Afghan political system does not manage these priorities seriously and in the best interest of the country, then Afghanistan's future will be more bitter now than ever before, and wars will become more widespread. (S. Pathak and Maini, 2017).

In recent years, especially after the new US strategy, we are seeing an increase in India's role in Afghanistan. What is the security, political and economic implications of India's increasing role in Afghanistan? We think part of the prominent role that Indians can play in Afghanistan comes from the kind of conflict or dualism that exists between Pakistan and India, that is, the conflict between Islamabad and Delhi. Both countries' relations with Afghanistan reflect. Accordingly, to whatever extent Pakistan's role in Afghanistan may be diminished, the role of the Indians will be highlighted, and vice versa. (Vinay, 2017).

For the Indians at least, for now, the new White House policy is that Pakistan's role in Afghanistan is diminishing, and U.S is in alignment with New Delhi. In the meantime, the US seems to have welcomed the policy of Delhi in Afghanistan, although Kabul Government have also expressed interest for the policy, some officials in the Afghan presidential palace are said to have been concerned about the developments in Delhi in recent days. They have meetings and discuss. The symbolic and symbolic implications of this statement are that Afghanistan and the cast of the presidential palace no longer have a look at Pakistan, and have focused India on all areas, including economic, political and cultural relations, rather than Pakistan have given. One of the experts in Afghanistan believes that to maintain his hegemony, the US is forming a security rectangle, one of which is Afghanistan. (Mistry, 2016).

Do you think the US, Afghanistan and India are turning to the corners of this security rectangle as their main American allies in the region?

We cannot agree with this, and there are several reasons. The three sides of Afghanistan, India, and the United States, as the main pillars of peace in the region, must be based on a number of components; for example, this triangle can be effective at least at a time when policy making at the regional level is relatively stable. While policymaking at the regional level is so volatile and volatile that it is not possible to form these security aspects. It is possible that the diplomatic

apparatus and lobbyists of Islamabad may be activated by tomorrow as if the situation in this triangle would otherwise change. Such a capacity is possible in the foreign policy apparatus of Islamabad, and the past tradition of Islamabad policymaking confirms this. You saw Pakistan, at least in 4 years, rotate its territory and airports to attack the Taliban-backed regime that supported it. Such a rotation illustrates one point that Islamabad's actors are literally pursuing Pakistan's strategic interests. (RANADE, 2017).

Do we think that Afghanistan is still a 100% reliable partner for the United States in the region, and the United States is not a reliable partner for Afghanistan, so anything can be done with the regional actors and the interests of the powers Great to change America?

Exactly! Afghanistan and the political system in Kabul still lack the necessary conditions for a good partnership for powers such as the United States at the regional level. It will go. But since a variety of variables influence the White House's priorities, serious flexibility in US policy is predictable.

Consequences of the US strategy in Afghanistan

We are seeing increasing tensions among the political power-seekers in Afghanistan. To what extent is the situation affected by the White House approach in Afghanistan? It is natural that some of the positions taken by the Afghan Presidential Palace reflect the kind of support that the White House may have for Afghanistan. On the other hand, it is only natural that there is a good deal of domestic actors in Afghanistan, foreign actors and extraordinarily influential great powers, and the possibility of advancing internal competitions and struggles. Since the Afghan Presidency, despite opposition from other actors, can take on some of the roles and strategies, it seems as if the White House is seriously supporting the Afghan Presidency. On the other hand, the kind of strategy pursued by the President of Afghanistan cannot be viewed as directly emphasized in the US foreign policy apparatus. More specifically, the impact of US policy will be accepted by the continuation of the political crisis that exists in Afghanistan, especially as we face two major elections and the end of the national unity government? Situational reflections that are currently visible among Afghan influential groups or internal actors, before reflecting the internal situation and internal relations of Afghanistan, are more reflective of the situation that exists among the major players in the international arena. (AUŠTREVICĪUS, 2017).

For example, the rivalry between Russia and the United States at the regional level is intensifying and shrinking in Afghanistan's internal conflicts. In other words, it looks as if the Afghan Presidential Palace is at the forefront of US strategy advocates and is acting warmly, and it is also likely that North Afghanistan is warmly supported by other US regional actors and competitors and is ready to do so with all its might. Veto any decisions made at the Afghan Presidential Palace. The vetoing of the orders and policies adopted by the President in the North indicates that the northern actors seem to have a backing of the external power. But I reiterate that the major players are pursuing their own special interests at the regional level before their hearts can be drawn to the interests of Afghanistan and different groups, with various playing cards including fomenting internal conflicts in Afghanistan. This is because unfortunately the

situation in Afghanistan is so complicated that it cannot be analysed and evaluated with several factors and factors. In the meantime, predicting the future is also difficult. (Baiza, 2017).

Afghanistan has become a thriving home in the present situation at any moment an unimaginable event may occur. The Afghan presidential election is also affected by the general situation in Afghanistan, affected by the layouts and arrangements adopted by regional actors and major powers around the world, all of which come together and thus Afghanistan and the political situation. In this country they are made more complicated and more difficult than in the past. But if the political system in Afghanistan achieves a new understanding and achieves some of the conditions of a powerful state, then it is time to be able to say a word and determine its position in the interests of national interest. Otherwise, the situation will continue as it is, and in my opinion, there will be no hope for tomorrow's Afghanistan. It is at least very difficult to improve Afghanistan's political and security situation, if not impossible, unless at least a regional and international convergence towards Afghanistan is achieved. (AFGHANISTAN IN 2019 A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, 2019).

The reason is that the various frontline groups in Afghan politics are each linked to one place and ultimately to one actor. In other words, if every actor and group is tasked with advancing the strategy of a foreign and large international country, it is natural that the conflict of actors outside of Afghanistan will be directly reflected in domestic relations and that its direct and practical consequences will be crisis and conflict. Which is being unveiled in Afghanistan. That is why I think that a regional and international consensus is needed in Afghanistan's affairs and that with this great international dichotomy and conflict, the situation in Afghanistan will not improve. In the meantime, if there is a relative consensus on the Afghan issue, one of the differences that should be drawn from President Obama's policy is that there should be no more merciless treatment of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and the Taliban, ISIS and groups. Terrorists are, in fact, regarded as a threat to the entire regional and international system. Unless regional and international actors reach such an understanding and, for example, do not see Dayyesh (ISIS) as a threat to their day and tomorrow, it is natural that this will continue to be the case. (Johnson,2016).

Peace Talk

The talks that began between the Taliban and the US in Qatar are, in fact, a continuation of nine previous rounds of negotiations, and the two sides want to reach their desired results as soon as possible. According to reports, the two sides have withdrawn from their previous demands and resumed suspended negotiations. The withdrawal of demands means that the Taliban may have abandoned the urge to deploy the Islamic Emirate system in Afghanistan, promising more political and financial support to the Americans, and lowering American troops before a final deal could be another option. But in any case, the new talks are complementary not to the previous one and given Pakistan's (Taliban's) backing of the talks, the withdrawal of the two sides from their earlier demands will facilitate and facilitate the ground for a US-Taliban peace deal. The talks will be a signature of a US-Taliban peace deal. On the other hand, according to sources close to the Taliban, the initial process of secret US-Taliban talks began at 4 arcs and ended at 2 arcs and the two sides reached general agreement. Sayed Akbar Agha,

a former Taliban member, also confirmed to the news agency that the secret meeting between Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban representatives after four days ended yesterday, and the previous disputes were resolved. So, the talks that officially resumed on Saturday, December 6, after a relatively long two-month stoppage, are in fact a formalization of agreements previously secretly made between Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representatives in Qatar. (Qazi, 2019).

U. S and Taliban Negotiations

It would be realistic if the Afghan government did not expect the United States and the Taliban to consider the interests of the government and the people in their agreements because the fundamental principle in the negotiations is self-interest and the pursuit of self-interest rather than others. As a result of the US-Taliban ceasefire negotiations, the only cease-fire between the US and Taliban forces would be that they would not attack the Taliban when the US troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, and that the US troops would simply cross the Taliban and leave them alone. Not targeted. According to the agreement and possible ceasefire between the Taliban and the US, violence may be reduced in Afghanistan, but the Afghan security forces will continue to be a target of war by the Taliban. The Taliban will do more than ever to achieve prestige and overtones in inter-Afghan talks and negotiations on their attacks on Afghan security forces and sabotage the country's major cities. Therefore, the Afghan government, in the light of the current realities of Afghan war and peace, will seek to pursue strong inter-Afghan negotiations and efforts to secure peace and stability in the country, with strong backing and tailored preventive and retaliatory military programs. To safeguard the national interests and freedoms of Afghanistan, and the overall Islamic Republic of Afghanistan system, in the inter-Afghan negotiations with the Taliban for the last six years. (E. MILLER and S. BLAKE, 2019).

Is Peace in Afghanistan Possible?

The US-Taliban peace deal will secure peace between the US and the Taliban and will only pave the way for inter-Afghan talks; The fundamental principle for forming inter-Afghan negotiations and reaching a peace agreement with the Taliban and ending conflict and war in Afghanistan is the political consensus of the influential political spectrum and the presence of a unified program of inter-Afghan negotiations. We are also witnessing the recent announcement of cooperation by regional countries, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, which, in my view, have a profound impact on the peace process in Afghanistan, and this cooperation can lead to maximum impact when cooperation make a statement at practice. Unless the Afghan government, pursue Afghan peace on its American path and hope that the US will bring peace to the country, Peace in Afghanistan is achieved when the Afghan government demonstrates strong political will, bringing together all political factions at the centre of a single program and goal, and practically transforms political consensus from slogans. (Ismail, 2020).

Taking into account the existing realities of society, the Afghan government takes into account different political spectrum, including by building influential political parties (jihadists and democrats), members of the National Assembly, university professors, civil society and

scholars through open elections. Afghanistan's foreign policy and peace in the inter-Afghan negotiating group, reinforce the prestige of pro-Islamic negotiators and core values for nearly two decades, so that it can unanimously defend national interests and existing values. On the other hand, the temporary stoppage of US-Taliban talks, according to the author's analysis, is a diplomatic back-and-forth diplomatic tactic between the two parties to determine the outcome of the Afghan election. Determining the outcome of the Afghan presidential election brings two options to the United States. If the election have a clear winner, the United States will try to get the Taliban to participate in the Afghan political system with the help of regional countries, especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and then the Taliban as a political party with an Islamic Party model and winning high seats. Political will be part of the Afghan government. The second option is if the Afghan election does not have a clear winner. By modelling the Bonn Conference, the United States will then, with the help of its strategic friends, try to persuade the Taliban to work together with the various Afghan political factions in a relatively new structure. (B. Cunningham, 2019).

In this case, amendments to the constitution will be announced and some changes to the Afghan political system will not be unexpected. The benefits provided will be the sole interests of the US and Taliban, and the outcome of the US-Taliban peace agreement will facilitate inter-Afghan negotiations. But how to safeguard and defend the values and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's existing system will be the responsibility of a negotiating body that participates in inter-Afghan negotiations at the Afghan-led government. Whatever the outcome of the Afghan election, the winner will be the time for the Afghan government and people to come to the inter-Afghan negotiation table in full or at least partial political consensus and firmly defend the achievements of jihad and recent decades. (Kane, 2019).

Will Intra-Afghan Peace talk can end conflict in Afghanistan?

The world has turned a blind eye to multilateral Afghan peace talks in Doha, Qatar. The US special envoy for peace in Afghanistan has spoken of progress in the four sections of the peace agreement. The inter-Afghani summit, hosted by Germany in Qatar, begins on Sunday and will continue until Monday. US-Taliban peace talks are set to resume on Tuesday. However, the question arises: If the US and the Taliban reach a peace agreement, will the war in Afghanistan end?

Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, the head of the Taliban branch in western Afghanistan Said: No. According to him, Taliban who have a political office in Qatar and are conducting talks with the US "do not represent all Taliban fighters".

In an interview with Deutsche Welle, Niaz said many Taliban fighters disagree with what is happening in Qatar these days: "America and Russia do not deceive themselves. There are also a thousand deals behind the scenes to do with the Taliban's fate. These, jihadi leaders, have sold themselves. They no longer have a place in Afghanistan". (Will a possible peace deal with the Taliban end the war in Afghanistan? 2020).

He claimed that "the Taliban led by Mullah Habibullah are backed by numerous foreign countries such as the US, Russia, Pakistan and Iran and are negotiating for their interests."

"There is no use," he said on the process of peace talks in Qatar. "No two people who have gone to Qatar on behalf of the people, and neither the Taliban who are sitting in Qatar, no longer have a place in Afghanistan". The exact number of fighters in the Taliban is not clear, but it will be in thousands. The group is accused of receiving government backing but rejected the need: "We have agreed with the government in Pakistan for the past five years, as well as with the Afghan government. We are at war with the government now because they broke the covenant, they had with us and arrested our people in the cities. (Beheshti, 2019).

Peace between Afghan-Taliban

The leader of the Taliban branch said his group is willing to negotiate peace with all political arrangements in Afghanistan but is not willing to negotiate with any foreign country: "We want peace within our own country and by the Afghans themselves. We do not want peace and dictation from Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. We want peace inside Afghanistan and that is why we are sitting here. After the death of former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban branch disobeyed the former leader of the group, Mullah Mansour, and announced that he would continue what he calls "jihad" independently and chose Mullah Rasul as its leader. The Taliban, led by Mullah Habibullah, calls the rebel group outlawed and repeatedly attacked. Clashes between the two Taliban groups have left many dead. Omar Sadr, an Orientalist scholar in Afghanistan, believes that the issue of peace in Afghanistan should be resolved after rooting out and eradicating "violent religious extremism and its funding sources". Sadr told Deutsche Welle, "The Afghan conflict will not end with these negotiations because it is a change of political power relations between foreigners, the government, the opposition and the Taliban, and it will not change the structure of the conflict". Although the Taliban and the United States have said that the seven rounds of peace talks in Qatar have always emphasized the severity of the war and attacks, Omar Sadr believes that the recent deadly attacks in Ghazni and Kabul showed that all Taliban have come out of the peace talks. They are not satisfied and they do not believe in a political solution: "The Taliban militants are not satisfied with the peace talks and have protested to their political leaders and said that you are negotiating there, while our casualties are still high . (Kanwal Shiekh and Khan, 2019)

The Taliban are not the only threat

The Afghan National Security Council and the President of the country have already reported the activities of 4 insurgent and terrorist groups in the country. Along with this, ISIS has become a big problem. After defeating Syria and Iraq, the group looks to Afghanistan and seeks more foot and troops there. The National Security Directorate recently announced the detention of three professors at Kabul University's Shariah faculty and two of its graduates. The detainees in a video released by national security confessed to involvement in the deadly attacks in Kabul. (How Islamic State Infiltrated Kabul University, 2019).

Conclusion

Although significant security, political, and financial advancement has been made in Afghanistan, much remaining parts to be never long-haul dependability and extinguish the Taliban revolt. In this regard, while the contention in Afghanistan is presently do not reliably in the public eye, it survives from incredible significance to the United States. Going ahead, U.S. strategy should intend to secure the trustworthiness of the Afghan state and, toward that end, endeavour to end the contention in manners that relieve the dangers of illegal intimidation, unsteadiness, and struggle in the district .

The Current Situation

- The security climate in Afghanistan is as yet unsafe, proved by the uptick in savagery in 2016 and the lessening government control in provincial zones .

- Factions of the Government of National Unity stay isolated, and a degenerate support framework keeps on obstructing change .

- Economic development has contracted since the drawdown of global powers, while the administration remains vigorously reliant on the unfamiliar guide .

- Afghan-Pakistani relations have frayed because of enlarging contrasts in security when provincial rivalry in and over Afghanistan continues .

- The United States' eagerness to inconclusively finance Afghanistan with some \$23 billion every year is unsure, particularly when al-Qaeda's centre has been diminished to disjointedness .

- However, the blend of a debilitating Afghan system and an unchecked Taliban resurgence could prompt the calamitous breakdown of the Afghan government and state, bringing about either a re-visitation of turmoil or on the other hand the recrudescence of psychological oppressor gatherings.

- The United States needs to build up a procedure that ensures the additions in Afghanistan while ending the contention .

- Regional choices settling the India-Pakistan struggle, making an impartial Afghanistan, or pressing Pakistan is too hard to even think about relying on alone .

- Unilateral alternatives either seeking after significant heightening or a total separation are similarly improbable as a result of their significant expenses also, chances, separately.

- Only restricted methodologies decently extending the current responsibility, looking for a political settlement, or encouraging a drawn-out counterterrorism organization are left. Since a counterterrorism-just arrangement is probably not going to be strong, the United States ought to organize coming to a political settlement with the Taliban while proceeding to reinforce the Afghan state and its security powers .

- To be effective, Washington should engage the U.S. diplomat in Kabul to direct the organization's whole procedure in Afghanistan; convince the Afghan government to start a

genuine public discourse on political compromise; participate in direct talks with the Taliban; focus on the Taliban shura, if vital while initiating Rawalpindi to oblige the Taliban's safe-haven in Pakistan; and secure provincial help for a political settlement in Afghanistan.

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