



## UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: THE NIGERIAN REINVENTION – AFROJUGATION

AKINYETUN, Tope Shola

### ABSTRACT

*With abundance human and natural resources, Nigeria is expected to have transcended the category of underdeveloped nations. With the potential to be an African Tiger, Nigeria is yet to attain feats commensurate with its strengths. This has been blamed on underdevelopment which also happens to be the same process that fueled development in the Western world. However, in spite of these claims, Nigerian leaders should have since independence forged a path of glorious development for the Nation instead of explaining their inadequacies with blame game. This paper assesses the role of African and specifically Nigerian leaders in furthering the process of underdevelopment in Africa by reinventing the process of subjugation- Afrojugation. This paper holds the position that underdevelopment as currently experienced in Nigeria and the whole of Africa should be blamed on Africans who have taken pleasure in corruption, bad governance, electoral violence and such other anomalies which has hindered the continent's development. It is concluded that there will not be any meaningful development across the continent if Afrojugation is not displaced and if Nigerians don't hold themselves responsible for their problems and confront same.*

**Keywords:** Afrojugation, African Tiger, Nigeria underdevelopment, Corruption, Electoral violence, Bad governance, Ethnopolitics

### **Introduction**

At independence on Oct 1, 1960, the various nationalists cum observers that either fought for or simple wished for the autonomy of Nigeria from her erstwhile masters had a lot of conjectures about the future of the country; how great it would be amidst vast natural and

human resources and how it would favourably compete with nations of the world. They were so keen on assuming power since that was the only way to set Nigeria as a nation on her foot and that was the easiest way of unseating the heap-master that has hitherto denied the country the ability to fully realize its potentials and take its place in the continent. These nationalists saw bright days ahead where everything would be glorious, shining and perky!

Considering the abundant resources in the country and the amount of 'heads' available, no way Nigeria after independence could not have survived and risen to be 'African-Power'- at least that was the dream. Whether it was a day-dream or not is a matter to be delved into soon. However, it is pertinent to state the underlying factors for such dream(s). After all, Nigeria was already a major cocoa exporter, and world's largest exporter of palm oil coupled with crude oil- the black gold, that was already discovered in Oloibiri [present day Bayelsa State] in 1956. So how to be great was not the question if not when the greatness will manifest for all to behold.

Though this is not to say that the colonial masters who were to hand over power were comfortable with it, they would have taken the alternative route if there was any. Prior independence, there has been attendant problems in the polity; starting with the forced amalgamation of 1914, ethnic contestations, isolation from control of resources, estrangement from politics, minority agitations, communal clashes, electoral fraud, leap for hegemony, forced labour, divide and rule, expropriation of surplus value and notably exploitation. All of these [and many more] which would soon haunt the 'newly born' child at infancy were majorly the reasons why different nationalist groups, interest groups and finally political parties sprang up with the sole of aim of displacing 'those' responsible for our backwardness and alienation.

Well, with independence when the Nigerian will be in charge of Nigeria, all of these issues and anomalies should be reviewed and compromise reached [at least that was the thinking]. Nigerians should be able to sit and discuss 'Project-Nigeria', reach a consensus among various major ethnic groups on a way to run the country with the minority groups not left out or feeling inferior, find a way to lay to rest manifestations of ethnic chauvinism, tribalism, nepotism, regionalism, electoral wars, political rivalry, revenue allocation and resource distribution problems, succession, economic mismanagement, political instability, and lay the foundation for national cohesion ridden with harmony, cooperation and unity.

Instead of the above what was experienced after independence was a clear departure. The country, barely a decade after Nigeria's freedom from the whims and caprices of colonialism was bombarded with a myriad of complications which eventually culminated into coup-d'état when the military took over political power; followed by a counter coup and eventually civil war! That was how the path to a shattered dream was set wherein dependence on the former colonial masters and her allies became a norm. The performance of the state actors have thus been characterized by selfish interests which plunged the country into a 'rentier' state branded by externalization, import-substitution, socio-economic and political inequalities, and a disarticulated economy.

As Rodney (1973) puts it, African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist economies; and they are integrated in a manner that is unfavourable to Africa and ensures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist countries. Indeed, structural dependence is one of the characteristics of underdevelopment. Most progressive writers divide the capitalist/imperialist system into two parts. The first is the dominant or metropolitan section and the countries in the second group are often called satellites because they are in the orbit of the metropolitan economies. The same idea is conveyed by simply saying that the underdeveloped countries are dependencies of the metropolitan capitalist economies.

A tenable argument offered for the above by the Nigeria state actors is that the state has been underdeveloped by the colonial masters. They argue that underdevelopment as inflicted by colonialism is responsible for the spate of lack of development presently experienced; that the economy of the state has been tied to that of the European nations in a periphery-center relationship whereby the periphery has come to be an outpost of the center. Thus, development as dreamt by the founding fathers is more of a mirage. Various scholars have written to justify Africa and Nigeria's backwardness as a byproduct of underdevelopment. As defensible and logical as this may sound and is, there is still a missing link of what role has been played or not played by Africans and Nigerians [in particular] in banishing the vestiges of underdevelopment or in ensuring its furtherance as the case may be. In their explanations, such scholars and writers put forward adequate theories to capture the theme of underdevelopment and two of such theories [modernization and dependency] will be appraised before reviewing the actions and inactions of African, nay Nigerian leaders in dealing with underdevelopment.

Rodney (1973) admitted the above observation when he says “not only are there African accomplices inside the imperialist system, but every African has a responsibility to understand the system and work for its overthrow”.

### **Modernization Theory**

That we are backward cannot be attributed to any external force [the assumption]. We are backward because the internal factors that propel development are missing in our countries. Factors such as low division of labour, illiteracy, lack of technology and infrastructure, lack of communication, traditional attitude and more importantly traditional agrarian configuration are present in our society, and this has been responsible for our underdevelopment. Hence, to talk of development, we should first displace these touches of traditionalism. Having discarded these, we should then adopt the industrialized countries as model for development in such a way that there can be transfer of technology, technical-know-how, capital aid, and production apparatus needed for increase of production and efficiency. Various other theories propounded under this school of thought are Dualism (Boeke), Strategy, Balanced Growth (Nurske), Unbalanced Growth (Hirschman), Stages of Growth (Rostow), Big-push (Rosenstein-Rodan), Development Poles (Reroux), Circular Causation (Myrdali), Socioeconomic Change (Weber, Parsons, Smelser, & McClelland) and Social Change (Hagen) theories.

According to Haque (1999), the reason for the emergence of Modernisation Theory was the freedom of Third World countries from colonization and the strategies employed during the Cold War by Western countries in order to prevent these countries from being controlled by communists. According to modernity, policies intended to raise the standard of living of the poor often consist of disseminating knowledge and information about more efficient techniques of production. For instance, the agriculture modernisation process involves encouraging farmers to try new crops, new production methods and new marketing skills (Ellis and Biggs, 2001 cited in Matunhu, 2011). In general, modernization led to the introduction of hybrids, the green house technology, genetically modified (GMO) food, use of artificial fertilizers, insecticides, tractors and the application of other scientific knowledge to replace traditional agricultural practices (Matunhu, 2011).

This is to say that traditional or agriculture societies can only be said to be modern when they demonstrate characteristics of modernity which Coetzee, Graaf, Heindricks, and Wood (2007) gave as:

- (i) Readiness to accommodate the process of transformation resulting from changes.
- (ii) Continuous broadening of life experiences and receptiveness to new knowledge.
- (iii) Continuous planning, calculability and readiness towards new experiences.
- (iv) Predictability of action and the ability to exercise effective control.
- (v) High premium on technical skills and understanding of the principles of production.
- (vi) Changing attitudes to kinship, family roles, family size and the role of religion.
- (vii) Changing consumer behavior and the acceptance of social stratification.

Reyes (2001 cited in Shareia, 2015) also referred to Rostow's (1962) five identified stages, which give shape to the Modernisation Theory of development:

The traditional society;

Preconditions for take-off;

Take-off;

The road to maturity

The age of mass consumption.

Traditional society was famous for a limited range of production. Such a society suffered from a false understanding of environmental capabilities and from a shortage of technology and advanced tools that produced a limitation in production. It represented a biased social classification pattern with the political point of focus on a specific region (Rostow 1962, p. 311 cited in Shareia, 2015).

The first steps for advancement from traditional society in Europe stemmed from two important happenings that occurred after the Middle Ages: the development of modern science and ideologies and the subsequent land discoveries that led to the increase in trade, and the competitive struggles to avoid becoming European territories (Rostow 1962, p. 312 cited in Shareia, 2015). These are considered to represent the preconditions for take-off.

The take-off stage starts from the rise of new industries with the application of new industrial techniques, for example, the growth of cotton textiles, timber cutting and the railroad industry (Rostow 1962, p. 317 cited in Shareia, 2015). The road to maturity stage involves the widespread application of technology in its full range. This phase is actually the time of expansion in which some new fields developed into rivals of older sectors (Rostow 1962, p. 318 cited in Shareia, 2015).

As a society recognizes its need for greater security, welfare and leisure to its labouring forces, it moves into an age of mass consumption. This leads to the provision of extensive

private consumption like durable goods, and an extension of power internationally for the nation (Rostow 1962, p. 323 cited in Shareia, 2015).

As Shareia rightly pointed out:

*Modernisation Theory ignores the particular concerns of developing countries because the main objectives of the accounting systems based on the developed country model are to satisfy the needs of shareholders. In many developing countries, however, few enterprises have private shareholders, investment decisions are often not made on financial grounds, and the market for information is relatively undeveloped and imperfect. The role of accounting systems in developing countries is therefore seen as inevitably being the adoption of those from developed countries. This failure to take account of the unique characteristics and concerns of developing countries is the main weakness of the theory and limits its applicability.*

In the words of Matunhu (2011), Modernization impoverished Africa through colonialism and imperialism by the West and this trend is with us today as the East takes its turn to deplete the continent's resources such as oil and minerals. Africa needs to outgrow poverty and underdevelopment but this may not be possible as long as we still believe in the power and strength of modernity at the expense of promoting new theories for Africa's development. Fighting Africa's poverty involves much more than a simple displacement of the traditional society by the modern society. Ideas of modernization impoverished Africa. The theory failed to recognize the creativity and initiative of the Africans. Instead it places value on externally sourced aid without attending to the inhibiting conditionalities attached to such aid.

### **Dependency Theory**

With utmost dissatisfaction with the modernization theory which did take into account the existence of international dependencies. This theory seeks to explain underdevelopment as a symptom and result of the continued dependence of the 'inferior' or developing society on the 'superior' or industrialized society which has over time weakened the internal factors of the developing society. In other words, the same relationship that developed the industrialized society, underdeveloped the developing society, thus as Kuhnen puts it, underdevelopment is not backwardness but intentional downward development. Dynamics external trade, economic factors, politicoeconomic interest and economic relations have been fingered as the root causes of dependence. Such other theories in this line of reasoning are Circular

Deterioration of Terms of Trade (Prebisch), Immiserizing Growth (Bhagwati), Imperialism, Classical Imperialism (Luxemburg, Lenin), and Modern Imperialism (Santos, Galtung) theories.

The theorists of dependency have put forth a conception that conceives of uneven levels of development among countries as being primarily the result of the appropriation of the wealth (or 'economic surplus') of one country by another. Here, uneven development is conceived of as the result of events in the realm of circulation, or exchange, the conditions of which are formed by an international market. The theoretical (and political) implication of this thesis is that "a people can free itself from the rule of capital, and thus regain control over their lives, by a mere improvement in the conditions of exchange or terms of trade" (Reece, 1983).

According to this theory, the system of the capitalistic world causes a labour upheaval that damages the domestic economies of under-developed countries. It diminishes the economic growth rate and ends in the increased inequality of income. It also has a negative effect on the welfare of the majority of people. Further, since there is no basic equality in the goods that are processed and the exchanged raw materials, major and minor countries have been separated from one another more and more by the application of trade dependency. This has also caused a relatively long-term decrease in the price of primary goods compared with the prices of processed goods (Shareia, 2015).

The poverty of an individual worker in Africa is a result of the exploitation of that particular individual by the system or the employer. Thus poverty at all levels is attributable to inhibiting relationships (internal colonialism) between the developed communities (urban areas) and their satellites (rural areas) and also between individuals with different economic powers. The relationship is one in which a metropolis or center exerts pressure upon its satellite or periphery (Matunhu, 2011-emphasis added).

The basic message of dependency school is that the development of the metropolis was a result of the active underdevelopment of the non-metropolis communities. Put differently, the metropolis is dependent for its development on the underdevelopment of its satellite. For instance, human capital has flowed and continues to move away from Africa to the developed world... the white community achieved self- sustaining economic growth, while the black community grew only as a reflection of changes in the dominating economy. For instance in South Africa the enclave economy (affluent and connected to the global economy) determines the country's development path while the second economy (largely

underdeveloped and disconnected from the global economy) is marginalised. The development of the second economy is constrained by human capital flight to the enclave economy (Matunhu, 2011).

**Table 1: Comparison between Modernization and Dependency Theories of Development**

| <b>Dimension</b>                       | <b>Modernization</b>                                                    | <b>Dependency</b>                                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Definition & background                | Development as a systematic process.                                    | Elements of neo-Marxist theory.                                                                    |
| Model                                  | US & Europe-centric. A normative model.                                 | Revolution of underdeveloped nations                                                               |
| Focus                                  | Political; Cultural changes; Imposition of western values and policies. | Totality of society. Social system periphery.                                                      |
| Main direction                         | Institutional structure. A phased process.                              | Differences between countries.                                                                     |
| Problem of underdevelopment identified | Un-industrialized.                                                      | First World and Imperialism.                                                                       |
| Key points in explaining inequality    | Differing value systems and ideas. Immaturity of systems.               | Regions and structural conditions.                                                                 |
| Scope-unit of analysis                 | Nation-State.                                                           | Nation-State.                                                                                      |
| AIS in developing countries.           | Adopted from developed countries.                                       | Using developed countries' systems, which are inappropriate.                                       |
| Positive Aspects                       | Takes modern technology into consideration.                             | Takes into account the differences between developed and developing countries.                     |
| Negative aspects                       | Completely ignores the particular concerns of developing countries.     | Western, capitalist systems are viewed negatively, as inappropriate to publicly owned enterprises. |

*Source:* Shareia (2015)

As elaborate as the above theories are in situating the Nigerian challenge of underdevelopment on the shoulders of colonial masters. Nigerian leaders [who have been in power since independence till now] still have to be held accountable for their adequacies and inadequacies in relation to underdevelopment. Improprieties such as bad governance, leadership crisis and sit-tightism, corruption, electoral violence, military intervention, ethnicity, insecurity and authoritarian rule can be attributed to the Nigerian state actor, all of which can be subsumed under what I call ‘Afrojugation’, that is the African role in under-developing Africa; with specific reference to Nigeria.

## **Afrojugation**

### **Governance and Leadership Crises**

The search for a true and patriotic leader in Africa and Nigeria in particular is a search in motion. A leader visionary enough to place the interest of the nation and the continent above his. A leader with the political will to break the cycle of viciousness and who will, against all odds, dare the devil of backwardness, dependence and reliance and set the country [and the continent] on the path of greatness with a robust economic policy and a sound political ideology.

A governance approach highlights issues of state responsiveness and accountability, and the impact of these factors on political stability and economic development. For too long, social scientists dealing with Africa’s development have concentrated on economic issues, overlooking the highly important political dimension of the process (Bratton and Rothchild, 1992). To Afegbua & Adejuwon (2012), “governance consequently, is concerned with the uncovering viable regime forms as well as degree of stateness – the capacity to entrench the authority of the central state and to regularize its relations with society”.

Concerning leadership in Africa, Ake and Onoge (1995) argue that:

*Political leadership is parochial rather than national; and corruptly converts national resources into its project of primitive accumulation. Ethnic diversity is manipulated to stay afloat to the detriment of national cohesion. There is an embarrassing lack of national heroes. The failure was usually explained either by the easy manipulability of the cultural pluralist background, or by the “two publics” antagonism.*

According to Afegbua & Adejuwon (2012) “political leadership in Africa is parochial rather than national; it corruptly converts national resources into its project of primitive accumulation”.

Ayittey (2012) submits that corruption epidemic in African countries owes its existence to the long term tenure of their dictators. Examples of past dictators with long tenure include Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie (44 years), Gabon's Omar Odimba Bongo (42 years), Libya's Moammar Gaddafi (42 years), Togo's Gnassingbé Eyadéma (37 years), and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak (31 years). Similarly, some of the current dictators with tenure spanning more than three decades include Angola's José dos Santos, Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Mbasosgo, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, and Cameroon's Paul Biya.


Adeola (2007), concerning leadership in Nigeria says:

*The history of great nation have been linked to visionary and purposeful leadership, be it in the advanced industrialized countries or developing nations. Such leaders have played significant roles in the socio-economic development and political emancipation of their countries. Closely linked to leadership is ideology. In the absence of visionary leadership to give a clear-cut ideology, a nation continue to lack orientation and commitment. Consequently, leadership has failed to harness the resources and the ingenuity of the people for national development.*

Meredith (2006) points out that the first generation of African nationalist leaders also enjoyed great prestige and high honor. These include Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah (1957–1966), Egypt's Abdel Nasser (1956–1970), Senegal's Leopold Senghor (1960–1980), Cote d'Ivoire's Houphouet-Boigny (1960–1993), Guinea's Sekou Touré (1958–1984), Mali's Modibo Keita (1960–1968), Togo's Sylvanus Olympio (1958–1963), Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978), Tanzania's Julius Nyerere (1961–1985), Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda (1964–1991), and Malawi's Hastings Banda (1963–1994). He also adds that "In one country after another, African leaders acted in contempt of constitutional rules and agreements they had sworn to uphold to enhance their own power. Constitutions were either amended or rewritten or simply ignored."

Maathai (2009) argues that the African continent is built on an unstable foundation of bad governance and corruption. He went further to present a diagram to drive home his submission (see figure below).

**Figure 1: Leadership and Institutional Structure in Africa**



**Source:** Maathai (2009)

Afegbua & Adejuwon (2011) concludes by asserting that “the trouble with Africa is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the African character or political system in operation. The character of political leadership became a problem as most of them lost or lacked control of effective leadership. This led to the scramble and partition of state resources to suit their purpose”

### **Corruption**

Central to the problems faced in the whole of Africa is corruption and it has taken a central stage in Africa’s history since independence; even though many argue that corruption in Africa started since colonial rule. However, the scope of this paper focuses on the consciousness [or lack of] of African leaders in perpetuating the furtherance of underdevelopment in Africa; with particular reference to Nigeria. Corruption has led to and has been caused by bad governance and leadership crisis and all other issues raised under ‘Afrogation’. Hence, corruption in Africa since the end of colonial rule is both a cause and an effect of bad governance, poor leadership, military intervention, rent-seeking, authoritarian rule etc.

Indeed, the reinvention of underdevelopment in Africa via ‘Afrogation’ is mainly to permeate, perpetuate, elongate and institutionalize corruption in Africa. Leadership crisis and more prevalently, electoral violence in Africa is a function of the glorification of corruption. The demand for corruption by African leaders at all levels has made them regard corruption as a major ingredient of governance; hence, the need to do anything and everything possible to remain in power; if not for anything, at least to absorb corruption and even cover their tracks.

Jain (2001) gave a concise definition of corruption as “an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game”.

Corruption affects the development in various ways. For example, billions of dollars that would have been used to provide social amenities in some African countries such as Nigeria are siphon and kept in foreign accounts. The former World Bank president, Paul Wolfowitz revealed that public officials in Nigeria have embezzled more than \$300 billion from the nation's pulse for the past forty decades (Ndibe, 2006)

Since democracy berth in Nigeria in 1999, corruption has constituted a major hindrance to development in the country. For the past 15 years, budgetary allocations for infrastructure development have not yielded any positive achievement. For instance, billions of dollars were allocated for the Turn Around Maintenance (TAM) of the four refineries, yet the refineries are not working to full capacity. The health and the power sectors are in comatose due to corruption. Furthermore, the majority of the federal roads are dead traps because funds that are allocated for the maintenance these roads are mismanaged. The former governor of Abia State, Uzor Kalu once accused the former Minister of Works Tony Anenih of the embezzlement of N3 billion that was meant for the maintenance of federal roads. Corruption in Nigeria has been blamed for the high-rate of poverty in the country, for example, the official released of the poverty profile of Nigeria by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revealed that 112 million Nigerians live in relative poverty (Awojobi, 2014a).

The level of corruption in Nigeria has eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigerian society and that has been responsible for the crises of development in the country. Another way of stealing in Nigeria is through the self-increment of salaries by the members of the National Assembly without recourse to the constitutional body that is responsible for fixing the salaries of elected public officers. According to Awojobi (2014), "the lawmakers have perfected a system of increasing their own salaries, which make them earn more than their foreign counterparts."

The high level of political corruption and its aftermath effect on the nation's development prompted the Obasanjo government to establish the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) in 2004 and are laden with high profile corruption cases involving huge sums of money. Most of the accused persons are past governors and ministers of the federal republic of Nigeria. If this monies were channelled for the provision of amenities in the country, Nigeria would not have the problems of erratic power supply, bad roads, poor health services, insecurity, high rate of poverty, high level of unemployment and the high rate of dropout of school-aged children (Awojobi, 2014).

It is saddening and disheartening to learn that a large number of African countries right after independence have neck deep into corruption; an indication that most of the leaders sought to cling to power for their personal gratification. The table below adopted from Owoeye and Bissessar (n.d.) gave a clear analysis of how soon African countries became corrupt in relation to their year of independence.

**Table 2: Year of Attaining Independence, Frequency of Leadership Changes, Successful Coup D'état, 2011 Corruption Perception Index, and Ranks**

| Country                  | Year of Ind. | F<br>L<br>C | L<br>W<br>S | S<br>C<br>D | Corruption Perception Index (2011) | CPI World Rank | CPI Rank Within Africa | Longest Tenure by a Leader |
|--------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Algeria†                 | 1962         | 14          | 28          | 2           | 2.9                                | 112            | 24                     | 13                         |
| Angola                   | 1975         | 2           | 2           | 0           | 2.0                                | 168            | 47                     | 33                         |
| Benin†                   | 1960         | 19          | 23          | 4           | 3.0                                | 100            | 16                     | 20                         |
| Botswana                 | 1966         | 4           | 4           | 0           | 6.1                                | 32             | 1                      | 14                         |
| Burkina Faso             | 1960         | 7           | 6           | 6           | 3.0                                | 100            | 16                     | 25                         |
| Burundi                  | 1962         | 13          | 12          | 5           | 1.9                                | 172            | 50                     | 13                         |
| Cameroon                 | 1960         | 2           | 2           | 0           | 2.5                                | 134            | 30                     | 30                         |
| Cape Verde               | 1975         | 3           | 3           | 0           | 5.5                                | 41             | 2                      | 16                         |
| Central African Republic | 1960         | 8           | 5           | 4           | 2.2                                | 154            | 40                     | 12                         |
| Chad                     | 1960         | 9           | 8           | 3           | 2.0                                | 168            | 47                     | 22                         |
| Comoros†                 | 1975         | 18          | 20          | 5           | 2.4                                | 143            | 34                     | 6                          |
| Congo, D. R.             | 1960         | 4           | 4           | 3           | 2.0                                | 168            | 47                     | 32                         |
| Congo, Rep.†             | 1960         | 12          | 23          | 4           | 2.4                                | 143            | 34                     | 28                         |
| Côte d'Ivoire            | 1960         | 5           | 5           | 2           | 2.2                                | 154            | 40                     | 33                         |
| Djibouti                 | 1977         | 2           | 2           | 0           | 3.0                                | 100            | 16                     | 22                         |
| Egypt                    | 1953         | 8           | 12          | 1           | 2.9                                | 112            | 24                     | 30                         |
| Equatorial-Guinea        | 1968         | 3           | 2           | 1           | 1.9                                | 172            | 50                     | 33                         |
| Eritrea                  | 1993         | 1           | 1           | 0           | 2.5                                | 134            | 30                     | 19                         |
| Ethiopia                 | 1930         | 10          | 8           | 6           | 2.7                                | 120            | 28                     | 44                         |

|               |      |    |    |   |     |     |    |    |
|---------------|------|----|----|---|-----|-----|----|----|
| Gabon         | 1960 | 4  | 4  | 0 | 3.0 | 100 | 16 | 42 |
| Gambia, The   | 1965 | 5  | 4  | 1 | 3.5 | 77  | 10 | 24 |
| Ghana         | 1957 | 17 | 15 | 5 | 3.9 | 69  | 8  | 20 |
| Guinea        | 1961 | 5  | 5  | 2 | 2.1 | 164 | 46 | 23 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1973 | 13 | 10 | 3 | 2.2 | 154 | 40 | 23 |
| Kenya         | 1963 | 4  | 4  | 0 | 2.2 | 154 | 40 | 14 |
| Lesotho       | 1966 | 10 | 7  | 3 | 3.5 | 77  | 10 | 26 |
| Liberia       | 1847 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 3.2 | 91  | 13 | 27 |
| Libya         | 1951 | 2  | 2  | 1 | 2.0 | 168 | 47 | 42 |

|              |      |    |    |   |     |     |    |    |
|--------------|------|----|----|---|-----|-----|----|----|
| Madagascar   | 1960 | 11 | 8  | 4 | 3.0 | 100 | 16 | 23 |
| Malawi       | 1964 | 4  | 4  | 0 | 3.0 | 100 | 16 | 30 |
| Mali         | 1960 | 7  | 4  | 2 | 2.8 | 118 | 27 | 23 |
| Mauritania   | 1961 | 10 | 9  | 6 | 2.4 | 143 | 34 | 21 |
| Mauritius    | 1968 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 5.1 | 46  | 3  | 10 |
| Morocco      | 1955 | 4  | 3  | 0 | 3.4 | 80  | 12 | 38 |
| Senegal      | 1960 | 3  | 3  | 0 | 2.9 | 112 | 24 | 20 |
| Seychelles   | 1976 | 3  | 3  | 1 | 4.8 | 50  | 5  | 27 |
| Sierra Leone | 1961 | 17 | 13 | 6 | 2.5 | 134 | 30 | 17 |
| Somalia†     | 1960 | 14 | 17 | 2 | 1.0 | 182 | 53 | 22 |
| South Africa | 1961 | 15 | 15 | 0 | 4.1 | 64  | 7  | 9  |
| Sudan†       | 1956 | 14 | 26 | 4 | 1.6 | 177 | 52 | 23 |
| Swaziland    | 1921 | 5  | 5  | 0 | 3.1 | 95  | 15 | 26 |
| Tanzania     | 1964 | 4  | 4  | 0 | 3.0 | 100 | 16 | 21 |
| Togo         | 1960 | 8  | 7  | 2 | 2.4 | 143 | 34 | 38 |
| Tunisia      | 1956 | 4  | 4  | 2 | 3.8 | 73  | 9  | 31 |
| Uganda†      | 1962 | 13 | 15 | 6 | 2.4 | 143 | 34 | 8  |
| Zambia       | 1964 | 4  | 4  | 0 | 3.2 | 91  | 13 | 27 |
| Zimbabwe     | 1980 | 1  | 1  | 0 | 2.2 | 154 | 40 | 32 |

*Source:* Roberto Ortiz de Zárate's World Political Leaders 1945-2011, First African

Leaders, and Current Rulers Longest-time in Office at <http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith> and The 2011 Corruption Perception Index was obtained from Transparency International in Owoeye and Bissessar (n.d.).

**Notes:** FLC represents the frequency of leadership changes, LWS represents the number of leaders who served since independence, SCD represents the number of successful coup d'états, and † represents countries with more leaders than the frequency of leadership changes due to collective presidency.

Corruption has hindered the country from rising to the fore to compete at the international level, since majority of her citizens are living in poverty in the midst of plenty which a selected few have siphoned for their personal interest. Corruption is no doubt a bane for Nigeria's development and has been responsible for the rise in interest in political office by state actor, gladiators and spectators. The average Nigerian has come to realize that there is money in 'politics', it is the shortest route to make it and they would do all it takes to capture political power, including bowing to godfathers. Citing Calerie (1996), Awojobi noted that huge sum of money that would have been used to provide infrastructural facilities are stolen by African leaders and send to Western countries for safe keeping at the expense of African development. It was evaluated that the sum of \$30 billion aid to Africa ended up in overseas bank accounts. Adusei (2009) cited by Awojobi (2014) however confirmed that this statement was affirmed to by United Nations (UN) and the Africa Union (AU) who stressed that an estimated sum of \$148 billion is embezzled in Africa yearly by political leaders, multinational companies, business executives and the civil servants with the aid of financial institutions the Europe and North America.

Omotoye (n.d.) highlighted the causes of corruption as:

1. Lack of patriotism: Many of Nigerian politicians and "big" businessmen and women are not bothered about the future of the nation. They are self-centered and interested in personal achievements.
2. In some cases, unemployment of the youth is a cause for concern.
3. The Nigerian society value money more than morality.
4. The lackadaisical attitude of the government to corruption. Many corrupt officials were set free, even after they were found guilty of corruption. For example, the Siemens and Halliburton scandals.
5. Abject poverty as a result of the socio-economic problems in the country.

One thing is very clear and certain from the foregoing, that Nigeria cannot rise beyond its present level if corruption as a cancerous menace is not nipped. There is no more need for blaming the Europeans for our present misfortunes or inadequacies. We are where we are because we have refused to set our priorities. The only way forward in curbing underdevelopment ridding other manifestations of ‘Afrogation’ is to deal decisively with corruption. Omotoye (n.d.) however did presented the following solutions in dealing with corruption:

1. The government should empower the EFCC and ICPC to carry out their investigation without interference.
2. Hard work should be rewarded and recognized.
3. The press should be able to expose corrupt practices whenever they are found in the society.
4. The Judiciary should not delay cases of corrupt practices.
5. Religious beliefs should go beyond the foundational interpretation and application of the “prosperity message.”
6. Leadership at every unit or level of government should lead by example.
7. The immunity clause being enjoyed by Nigerian leaders in the constitution should be expunged.
8. The teaching of moral education or religious knowledge should be emphasized in all schools (primary, secondary, and tertiary institutions).
9. The government should also enforce equality before the law and ensure that appropriate sanctions are meted out to offenders.

### **Electoral violence**

Election in Nigeria since independence has been regarded as a do-or-die affair wherein the end justifies the means. Regardless of the method employed, what matters most is who takes the day. The desire for hegemony and the commission for others to stop it has been a major feature of electoral activities in the country. Violent-conflicts trailing various elections in the country attests to the fact that the surest way to be in control of the national cake and be in charge of its ‘sharing’ is through election, hence, the need to do all it takes to stand tall at the end of the day. Indeed, elections have come to be regarded as war; a kind of war where anything is fair!

Despite the scantiness of literature of electoral violence in Nigeria, many scholars have made remarkable attempts, and their submission will provide basis of understanding of the concept.

According to Fischer (2002) electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced “protection,” blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination.

Uwa and Ologunowa (2013) classified electoral violence into: pre-election period, campaign period, election day violence and post-election/result conflict and opined that past elections in Nigeria were characterized by both psychological and physical violence. Generally, violence involves the threat or use of physical force with the intention of injuring, killing and intimidating another person. Citing Osimen (2012), Uwa and Ologunowa (2013) aver that electoral violence involves destruction of property with a view to inflicting emotional or psychological injury and economic loss on another person. One of the major benefits of democracy is that it inhibits collective violence by providing mechanisms for non-violent competition for power and resolution of conflicts.

In the words of Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart, (2010) the failure to address the pressing issues facing ordinary Nigerians is a bleak and irksome reminder that politics in Nigeria is not yet by, about, or even for average citizens. Elections have been about power: controlling it, undermining it, distributing it. Among both political elites and civilians, alliances form along expedient lines of convenience, ethnicity, and religion. These political alliances can be fluid, particularly among the elites, and all too frequently they encourage allegiance to factional rather than national interests

Omoruyi (cited by Monday and Simon, 2013) argued that poverty and unemployment have been intractable obstacles to free and fair election and democratic governance in Nigeria since independence. Unemployment as a common bane of Nigerian development engenders poverty both of knowledge and material in turn engenders ignorance, gullibility, thuggery, hooliganism and election rigging in the bid of economic survival. They went further to posit that this explains why violence, militarization, thuggery and the use of money to influence voters usually characterize elections in Nigeria. By using thugs and money for election rigging through snatching of ballot boxes, multiple voting, assassination, maiming of life and manipulation of election results in favour of candidates who have the money to buy their ways through democratic principles and fundamental human rights are grossly trampled upon. Invariably, most people are always disenfranchised, thus negating the democratic principle of universal participation which is the involvement of men and women in the process of electioneering and actual vote cast on election days.

Looking at how African leaders have exploited electoral violence to inflict underdevelopment in Africa or Nigeria, Uwa and Ologunowa (2013) was quoted saying:

*Electoral violence in Nigeria is most often carried out by gangs (commonly called thugs) whose members are openly recruited, financed and sometimes armed by public officials, politicians and party officials or their representatives. These gangs, comprised primarily of unemployed young men are mobilized to attack their sponsors' rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections and protect their patrons from similar attacks. Often, sponsors of electoral violence take time and again to the same criminal gangs, violent campus-based "cults" and other sources to recruit agents of political violence. Those recruited are paid, often very little, and sometimes armed for the sole purpose of carrying out violent abuses on behalf of their political sponsors.*

Monday and Simon (2013) went further to argue that apart from the institutionalization of electoral corruption, there also have been cases of bribery among the election actors such as the polling agents and the returning officers during elections. All these unethical election activities engender violence and constitute bane to democratic governance in Nigeria. In addition, there are reported cases of election officers exploiting the poor rural and difficult riverside regions to cause delay in the distribution of election materials to such areas most especially where their favoured supporters resides. As a matter of fact, most cases of election rigging in Nigeria are reported from the remote and rural areas of the country. When the electoral body assigned with the responsibility of managing elections are corrupt, the end product of the elections always end in shambles.

They concluded by submitting that most Nigerian politicians adopt violent, insulting, damaging and confrontational style of campaign which is not healthy for democratic culture. The use of abusive, foul and threatening languages as well as the involvement of ritual activities and actions of vendetta are reported to have characterized election campaign in Nigeria. Election campaign is also associated with thuggery, fake promises, deceit and intimidation which have been intensifying spate of violence and as a result compromise the principles of democracy in the country. In a democracy, issues or matters that can lead to national conflict and embarrassment are easily avoided in the course of campaign. In Nigeria, election periods are always trying moments for its citizens because of the use of language of war by politician during campaign. It is this method of provocative campaign that fuels pre-election and post-election violence in the country. Since 1960, there has been no election held

in Nigeria without fatal casualties. This has become the political scenario in the country which only the bold, wicked and violent can freely participate in active party politics.

### **Military Intervention**

Military intervention in Nigeria have been explained as the necessity of the military; a highly disciplined and hierarchically structured organization, to clean the mess created by the then civilian government. They were committed to 'saving' the country from collapse due to economic mismanagement and misdirection. This necessitated interregnum as a corrective measure. The military even went ahead to design transition programme to hand over power to the military. But for one reason or another, the military found enough reasons to return to power making the military spend more than anticipated. One would expect that with the military in power, the 'corrective' and 'saving' mission will be well accomplished yet the reverse was experienced. The military not only entrenched 'gun-culture' in the country, they also divided the country further along ethnic and sectional lines. In other words, democratization which would have helped in the development plan was intermittently disrupted by the military and by implication set the country aback on its road to development.

At the end of the colonialism in Africa, it was natural, that the political culture of the colonialist had been imbibed. The political institutions that were developed or borrowed were democratic ones. However, Africans were learning the operations of these institutions across the continent when suddenly in 1952, the Egyptians military overthrew King Farouk. This singular phenomenon unleashed a 'bush-fire' effect in Africa, for Sudan followed in 1958, Algeria, 1965, Congo (Brazzaville), 1963, Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa) 1965, Central African Republic, 1966; in West Africa, Togo, 1963, Ghana 1966, Benin (Dahomey) 1963. The contagious effect of the coup d'etat continued with Nigeria taking her twice in January 1966, 1975-1979 1983, and 1993. This phenomenon continued in Nigeria until 1999. The military had ruled for thirty (34) years out of 49 years of Independence at this time. Quantitatively many Nigerians especially the youths had lived military than civilian rule (Frank and Ukpere, 2012).

Frank and Ukpere (2012) furthered argued that consequent upon the long years of military governance, the obvious outcome would be militarized political culture, manifested in the political behaviors of the dramatis personae in the democratic arena. The Nigerian civic culture was eroded and militarized culture imbibed. Thus, the rule of operation became that

of order, combat rather than dialogue, disregard of court orders and violation of human rights became the tenets of militarized civic culture in a democratic dispensation.

In spite of the armaments and security apparatus of post-independence West Africa, intra-state or internal conflicts have continued to pose problems to many governments in the sub-region. National security therefore appears no longer a military matter alone, as the security of the individual now seems more important than the security of the state in most developing countries particularly so in our post-cold war world (Apogan-Yella, 2005)

In the words of Afegbua and Adejuwon (2012), Nigeria, is the “Giant of Africa”, the country became independent in 1960. Out of 56years of independence, the country has been under the control of tyrannical and autocratic military dictators for about thirty years. The military employed all sorts of intimidation, aggressive and elimination methods to remain and withhold the political power. Under the new dispensation, the country seems to be experiencing nascent democracy though leadership into public and political office still follow imposition pattern [emphasis added].

### **Ethnicity**

Politics of identity, divide and conquer, ethno-politics, tribalism, regionalism, plurality, religion difference, and recently zoning are various tactics adopted by the Nigerian state actors in running the nation. They have conveniently ridden on the differences between the various ethnic groups to cling unto power. The formation and leadership of the early political parties formed on the eve of independence were majorly regional with the founding fathers acting as champion in their respective regions. This made it difficult for a party with a national outlook to emerge making it difficult for NPC who failed to secure the majority required to form the government alone to enter into coalition with NCNC making them what Osaghae tagged ‘strange bedfellows’. Having this in mind, one can succinctly assert that ethnicity is deeply rooted in Nigerian history. Away from its origins in the colonial dispensation, following the logic of this paper, it is expected that the nationalists [majority of whom are schooled] would avoid the pitfalls of the colonial government and work on the residues of politics of identity and ethnicity.

Chapman (1969) in Kalejaiye and Alliyu (2013) defined Ethnicity as “a term that half-heartedly aspires to describe phenomena that involve everybody, and that nevertheless has settled in the vocabulary as a marker of strangeness and unfamiliarity”. Citing Osaghae, they

hinted that ethnicity has to do with ‘the employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation.

Umezina (2012) who argued that ethnicity is the greatest of all problems militating against Nigeria’s development as a nation, explained an ethnic group as one which ascribes to itself the common blood or common ancestry. The group may be numerically or geographically big or small. But the common feature shared by all ethnic groups is the claim to a common ancestor whether imaginary or real. The psychological feeling that accompanies the awareness of this common origin engenders togetherness and solidarity among the members.

Abubaker (2001) contributed that the behavior of an African state towards her citizens exacerbates the corruption and ethnic division through alienation. For example, after having won independence, most African nations were not concerned with the luxury of democracy but with development and national integration, a fact that led to justification for one-party rule, autocracy, and military dictatorship on the continent.

With over (400) ethnic group, belonging to several religious sects, Nigeria since independence has remained a multi-ethnic nation state, which has been grappling and trying to cope with the problem of ethnicity and ethno-religious conflicts (Salawu, 2010).

The level of ethnic rivalry in Nigeria has made it impossible for her to produce the right leaders who live above boards, who exude impeccable and predictable character, and who are ready to spend themselves for the development of the nation. Ethnic affiliation has not allowed such leaders to emerge. At each election, the emphasis has always been on where the candidates came from rather than on the right candidates for the election. This explains why the National Assembly is replete with many people who are there neither for the interest of the nation nor for their own ethnic groups (Umezina, 2012).

Aluko (2003) highlighted the manifestations of ethnic problems as:

1. Emergent culture of violence and civil wars
2. Attempts at secession
3. The problem of refugees and Genocide and mass killings
4. Retarded developmental efforts and stagnated economic growth
5. The problems of political instability
6. Emergence of ‘ethnic ideology’, its internalization and impact on national integration.

Basically, ethnic politics and social conflicts have resulted in political underdevelopment in Nigeria. As a phenomenon, political instability largely caused by ethnic politics has itself

connoted a number of implications for the country. For instances, there has been a state of unfavourable atmosphere for taking an effective viable decisions and actions by the leaders. Under a condition of instability, the people and their leaders are distracted by pursuing their self-fish ambitions and embezzlement of national cake and resources. Again, the existence of political instability arising from ethnic inclination and marginalization has been discontinuity in policies and programmes in Nigeria. The series of policy discontinuity registered in the country have successfully undermined the attainment of socio-economic advancement for the country (Kalejaiye and Alliyu, 2013).

Kalejaiye and Alliyu (2013) went further to argue that the conflict of economic interest set the stage for the events that propelled the country into the politicization of ethnicity. The logical deduction is that ethnic politics was born from the failure of some factions of the elites to achieve their economic interests. This is why politics during the period of the struggle for independence was dominated by conflicts arising from the assertion of interests of the various factions of the elite. In the words of Nnoli (1980) “thus, the search for petty bourgeois and comprador bourgeois fortunes dominated the struggle for power. Its inevitable consequences were the regionalization of politics and the politicization of ethnicity”

### **Insecurity**

The lack of security or simply put insecurity in the Northern part of the country has been perpetuated by Boko Haram, preceded by the Niger Delta crisis and recently the New Niger Delta 'Avengers' has strained the economic condition of the country a great deal. Government committed a lot of funds to relocate the Niger Delta agitators through Amnesty programme. In the same way, Federal Government of Nigeria has expended huge sums of money on containing the Boko Haram menace to secure weapons and other relevant artilleries. It is same to assert that the huge sums of money spent on these groups and the amount lost to their activities and attacks would have gone a long way in creating meaningful development and infrastructural facilities. Aside from this, no meaningful investment [local and foreign] could have taken place in such areas, thus denying the residents an opportunity to socio-economic benefits and the government's internal revenue. The new Niger Delta 'Avengers' have been responsible for blowing up pipelines in the part of the country, throwing the rest of the country in darkness and denying the Federal Government access to trade.

Similar to the above, is the level of manpower lost to these attacks. The human manpower that would have further added to the development of the country have been claimed by the

groups. According to Imobighe (cited in Oche 2001) “Security has to do with freedom from danger or with threats to a nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests and enhance the wellbeing of its people. Thus, internal security could be seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the cooperate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people. Internal security also implies freedom from danger to life and prosperity”

Corruption has also been blamed for the insurgency that is threatening the co-existence of Nigeria has a nation, notable personalities such as Noble laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka and the former United States President Bill Clinton have said that political corruption is responsible for the high level of insecurity being experienced in the northern part of Nigeria. In a similar same vein, the United State Under Secretary for State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Right, Sarah Sewall has stressed that corruption is the main obstacle to the fight against the insurgency group, Boko Haram, according to her, “despite Nigeria’s \$5.4 billion security budget for 2014, corruption prevent supplies as basic as bullets and transport vehicles from reaching the front lines of the struggle against Boko Haram” (Ameh and Oladimeji, 2014).

Insecurity challenges can be traced to the early years of military rule when large quantities of arms were imported into the country for the use of the military during and after the Nigerian civil war, some of which got into the hand of the civilians. Soon after the civil war these arms were used by civilians and ex-military men for mischievous purposes such as armed robbery. There was also the army of unemployed youths some of whom lost their job during the civil war. The level of insecurity assumed dangerous dimensions in the prolonged years of military rule beginning from 1970 during which people procure arms and light weapons for personal defence. Some of these arms and light weapons got into the hands of unemployed youths who used them for deviant purpose (Ewetan, and Urhie, 2014).

Ewetan and Urhie (2014), the inability of government to provide a secure and safe environment for lives, properties and the conduct of business and economic activities has led to resentment and disaffection among ethnic groups. This has resulted in ethnic violence, communal clashes, and religious violence in different parts of the country that has destroyed lives and properties, disrupted businesses and economic activities, and retarded economic growth and development of Nigeria. There is no investor whether local or foreign that will be

motivated to invest in an unsafe and insecure environment. In a globalized world investors are not only looking for high returns on their investments but also safe haven for their investments. Thus the alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria has made the economy unattractive to foreign investors, and this has impacted negatively on economic growth and development.

## **Conclusion**

Subjugation has formerly been explained as the suppression of a weaker entity; Africa by a stronger entity; Europe. It is however appalling to see it assume a new dimension where the average African leader is more interested in subduing his followers for appropriation of values rather than provision of leadership or governance. It is now the African version of subjugating and subduing the fellow African; Afrojugation. The master-servant and subjective-maternal relationship experienced under colonial rule has been stylishly introduced and this time, it is perpetuated by one's kinfolk. That Africa's backwardness is up-to-date caused by imperialism, colonialism, or neo-colonialism seems not to hold water anymore since African leaders have refused to rise to the task of lifting the continent from its present state of belly-dancing on the spot of poverty, low standard of living, lack of social benefits, low mortality rate, lack of economic policy and ideology, low technology, socioeconomic challenges, sociopolitical difficulties, ethno-religious trials, entronement of corruption and kickbacks, lack of vision and political will, insecurity, unemployment, failing standard of education, communal clashes, ethnic cleansing, lack of developmental paradigm, and overall dependence on foreign aid.

It has been over five decades since the end of colonialism when the baton of leadership and governance for Nigeria was assumed by Nigerians and Nigeria could still be seen to be grappling with forging a clear path for development. Despite the various trial-and-error methods adopted, Nigeria is still walloping in a state of development-slipup-cum-political-depravity. Before there can be any panacea to the present woes, we as Nigerians and Africans must at first admit that we have a problem in our hands and we caused it, that we can no longer live in denial of it and the solution lies within our admission and change of attitude and orientation towards it. It is high time Nigeria situated the problems of Nigeria within Nigeria and find Nigerian-solutions to Nigerian-problems or else 'we' will not rise beyond the school-boyish level of blame-game.

## References

- Abubakar, D. (2001). "Ethnic Identity, Democratization, and the Future of the African State: Lessons from Nigeria". *Ethnicity and Recent Democratic Experiments in Africa, African Issues*, 29(1/2):31-36
- Adeola, G.L (2007). "Politics and Democratization Process in Nigeria: The Prevailing Issues", *LASU Journal of Social Sciences*, 6(1&2).
- Afegbua, S.I. and Adejuwon, K.D. (2012). The Challenges of Leadership and Governance in Africa. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 2(9), 141-157.
- Ake, C and Onoge, O (1995). "The Theories and Conception of Leadership", in Fafowora, et al (eds), *Nigeria: In Search of Leadership*, Ibadan: Spectrum Book.
- Aluko, M.A. (2003). The Ethnic Problem in Africa. *Anthropologist*, 5 (2), 93-99
- Ameh, J. & Oladimeji, R. (2014). Corruption Stalls Nigeria's War against Boko Haram-US. *The Punch Newspapers*. Retrieved from <http://www.punchng.com/news/corruption-stalls-nigerias-war-against-bharam-us/>
- Awojobi, O.N. (2014). Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa: A Discourse Approach. *International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management*, 2(10), 1-14
- Awojobi, O.N. (2014a). Political Corruption and Underdevelopment in Nigerian Fourth Republic. *International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research*, 11(1), 151-157
- Bratton, M. and Rothchild, D (1992). "The Institutional Bases of Governance in Africa", in Hyden, G and Bratton, M (eds), *Governance and Politics in Africa*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Coetzee KJ, Graaf J, Heindricks F, Wood G (2007). *Development: Theory, Policy and Practice*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Ewetan, O.O and Urhie, E. (2014). Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development Studies*, 5(1), 40-63
- Fischer, J. (2002) *Electoral Conflict and Violence/ IFES*, Washington, D.C.
- Frank, E.O. and Ukpere, W.I. (2012). The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in Nigeria. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 33(3), 285-292
- Haque, M. S. (1999). *Restructuring Development Theories and Policies, A Critical Study*. New York, State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Jain, A. K. (2001), Corruption: A Review. *Journal of Economic Survey*, 15(1): 71-121.

- Kalejaiye, P.O. and Alliyu, N. (2013). Ethnic Politics and Social Conflicts: Factors in Nigeria's Underdevelopment. *The Journal of International Social Research*. 6(27), 251-262
- Kuhnen, F. (1987). Causes of Underdevelopment and Concepts for Development: An Introduction to Development Theories. *The Journal of Institute of Development Studies*, 3, 1-14
- Maathai, W. (2009), *The Challenge for Africa*, New York: Pantheon Books.
- Matunhu, J. (2011). A critique of modernization and dependency theories in Africa: Critical assessment. *African Journal of History and Culture*, 3(5), 65-72
- Meredith, M. (2006). *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, Great Britain: The Free Press
- Monday, O.E. and Simon, O.E. (2013). Electoral Violence and the Crisis of Democratic Experiment in Post-Colonial Nigeria. *Journal of Arts and Humanities (JAH)*, 2(5), 45-55
- Ndibe, O. (2006). A nation of big divine thieves,” *The Guardian Newspapers* (Thursday, October 26). Lagos: Nigeria.
- Nnoli, O. (1980). *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- Oche, O. (2001) “Democratization and the Management of African Security” in Akindele, R. and Ate, .B (eds) in *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*. 13(1), Lagos, NIIA.
- Omotoye, R. (n.d.) Corruption and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience. *LUMINA*, 22(1) 1-13
- Onwudiwe, E. and Berwind-Dart, C. (2010). *Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria*. United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 263
- Osaghae, O.E. (1998). *Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence*. London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd.
- Owoeye, O. and Bissessar, N. (nd) *Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa: Symptoms of Leadership and Institutional Failure*. Not available.
- Reece, E.A. (1983). *Development and Underdevelopment in the Third World: Theoretical Approaches*. M.A. Thesis (Unpublished) Submitted to McMaster University, Ontario, Canada
- Rodney, W. (1973). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.

- Shareia, B.F. (2015) Theories of Development. *International Journal of Language and Linguistics*. 2(1), 78-90.
- Umezina, C. (2012). Ethnicity and Nigeria's Underdevelopment. *Ogirisi: a new journal of African studies*, 9, 215-229.
- Uwa, O.G. and Ologunowa, C.S. (2013) 2011 Post-Electoral Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Lesson for 2015 General Election. *American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences*, 4(1), 45-55