



## **MINORITY RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN INDIA: MYTH OR REALITY**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*The work is basically based on the relevance of minority rights in Indian democracy which is pluralist in nature. I have tried to explore that relevance in the present day scenario. I have extended my view points in the context of pluralism, multiculturalism, consociationalism and group rights. Recognition and autonomy for each group is essential for group rights or minority rights. Constitution is a form of accommodation of cultural diversity – an intercultural dialogue, when and where culturally diverse groups negotiate agreements in accordance with three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity. Cultures are interdependent and interactive, continuously contested, transformed and negotiated. Human rights or minority rights are regulatory devices for the accommodation of differences. The need is vibrant democracy with procedural and substantive justice and active participation of citizens other than Rawlsian procedural justice and Habermasian force of better argument. Indian nation-state has adopted Western parliamentary set up with liberal-democratic character and the ideology of majority-ethnicism. The nation-state is defined in terms of territorial political community of citizens. Nation-building process in India is associated with state-sponsored and state-directed process of economic development and social transformation. Minority protection has fallen in the private domain. But there is less emphasis on equal recognition to minority groups in the public sphere.*

*If gender equality is subordinated to religious claims and religious membership and gender equality come into conflicts with religious claims of a minority group, then cross-cultural dialogue is essential. It is the alternative ways of negotiating with conflicting claims. Cultural conflicts are rooted in a cosmopolitan point of view, from which negotiation of difference is both pragmatic and moral imperative. Three key principles are necessary for this multicultural arrangement – egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exist and association.*

*Pluralism is an idea by which the diversity underlies the nationhood. Citizenship is a key institution by means of which competing demands for membership are made, an engagement between individuals, social groups and the state, and a method through which nationhood is achieved. Among the three citizenship approaches of liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist, I do prefer the last one, where the liberals argue for individuals as units and bearers of individual rights, republicans for common good and community as unit and ethno-nationalists for citizenship membership by descent group that defines the nation. Hindu nationalist discourse began popularity in response to ethno-nationalist discourse of citizenship. In India the minority incorporates not only the Muslims, but also the Christians, SCs, STs and OBCs etc. Therefore, the Muslim citizenship in terms of ‘majority-minority’ question cannot be constructed. Indian leaders have adopted the concept of democracy or so to say market concept of democracy with a majoritarian tinge. It is the market democracy where the voters are treated as consumers with multifarious demands and politicians or leaders as entrepreneurs to bag their votes. Therefore, normative restraints are lacking in owning power. Further, Hindu religion is diffused and fragmented, so it is not possible to develop a unified nationalist ideology based on Hinduism.*

**Key words:** Minority rights. Consociationalism. Multiculturalism. Pluralism. Recognition. Accommodation. Citizenship. Nationalism. Hinduism.

There are four options to solve these problems of pluralism – (1) solving of differences through neutral approach in liberal democracy, (2) solving of differences through negotiation, trading and compromise formula, (3) solving of differences through segregation of group rights and consociationalism, and (4) solving of differences through recognition of differences and accommodation of differences etc. It mixes voices and promotes deliberation, pooling of sovereignty, partnership and dispersal of power (Scott, 1998).

Here, I do prefer consociationalism, where consociationalism and group rights attempt segregation, which give each group, autonomy within its domain and a mutual veto. Negotiated agreements, which offer genuinely reciprocal compromises – are mutually acceptable and legitimate, fair and stable. Constitution is a form of accommodation of cultural diversity – an intercultural dialogue, when and where culturally diverse groups negotiate agreements in accordance with three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity. Amy Gutmann regards that – ‘Recognizing and treating members of some groups as equals now seems to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities, at least for those people whose self-understanding depends on the vitality of their culture. This requirement of political recognition of cultural particularity – extended to all individuals – is compatible with a form of universalism that counts the culture and cultural context valued by individuals as among their basic interests.’ (Gutmann, 1994: 3). Cultural institutions should recognize the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities. Public institutions should justly respond to the strange multiplicity of culturally diverse voices, to inform constitutionalism where the demands are taken into consideration and adjudicated. Charles Taylor’s philosophy, Michel Foucault’s concept of genealogy and governmentality and Hannah Arendt’s concepts of freedom and active citizenship provide immense importance to the philosophical discussion of multiculturalism. The constitution cannot eliminate or overcome the cultural dimension of politics. Cultures are interdependent and interactive, continuously contested, transformed and negotiated. Culture is the natural language of difference. ‘... one of the basic values of our culture is that it and its basic values are relative, *i.e.*, that it is one culture among many essentially unrelated cultures.’ (McGrane, 1989: 120).

Democracy can deliver justice to all its citizens. Neera Chandhoke regards that – ‘Whereas democracy has been used to defend the right to property in the name of freedom, it has been equally used to critique the institution of private property from the standpoint of equality or, democracy has been conceptualized as majority rule, as well as a protection against majority rule. Democracy has been interpreted as elitist or as pluralist democracy, participative, institutional or substantive democracy, or as egalitarian democracy. The way we interpret it, therefore, depends on the nature of the conceptual web in which we place democracy and the way we justify it.’ (Chandhoke, 1999: 123). Democracy will reduce the minimization of differences. The task here is to acknowledge the fact and fluidity of differences. The ineliminability of differences couples with the recognition of specific

differences. Human rights or minority rights are regulatory devices for the accommodation of differences. The need is vibrant democracy with procedural and substantive justice and active participation of citizens other than Rawlsian procedural justice and Habermasian force of better argument. Liberals on the question of secularism regard maximum individual autonomy by providing neutrality on the part of the state. Communitarians prefer perfectionism rather than that of state neutrality – the conception of good life and peace. Toleration of differences is more concerned with the promotion of peace between various groups. Bhiku Parekh's 'respect-based liberalism is wider and is more acceptable than that of 'tolerance-based liberalism'. The concept of cultural membership enhances self-esteem of John Rawls and Charles Taylor's struggle for recognition. It is politics of recognition that is simultaneously suspicious of all social differentiations and receptive to the homogenizing... tendencies of a politics of the common good,...' (Gutmann, 1994: xi). Taylor is concerned more with recognition for one's particularity. It is political recognition of the distinctive contributions and qualities of minority cultures are most often viewed as a way of treating members of those cultures as equals. 'Liberals like Rawls and Dworkin call for an ethically neutral legal order that is supposed to assure everyone equal opportunity to pursue his or her own conception of the good. In contrast, communitarians like Taylor and Walzer dispute the ethical neutrality of the law and thus can expect the constitutional state, if need be, actively to advance specific conceptions of the good life.' (Gutmann, 1994: 111). 'The problem here is that we must decide between the ideal of peaceful coexistence and the imperatives of justice, and between the politics of identity and those of reform... Whereas change and reform are allowed by Parekh only from within the group itself, Kymlicka's claim is that the moral and cultural frontiers of a group do not necessarily coincide... Kymlicka is aware of the multiple, sometimes hybrid, voices within a group, that he is concerned about the voices of discontent – those raising the demand for autonomy – within minority groups. Parekh's respect-based liberalism values our socio-cultural associations, but is apparently unconcerned about conflicts within these groups. Mutual respect between different communities could end up privileging the hegemonic expression of patriarchal and other elite sub-groups within cultural communities.' (Rajan, 2002: 131).

Indian nation-state has adopted Western parliamentary set up with liberal-democratic character. The nation-state is defined in terms of territorial political community of citizens. Nation-building process in India is associated with state-sponsored and state-directed process of economic development and social transformation. The 'concept of nation building has

been challenged... Infused with a strong missionary zeal of unitary nationalism *Hindutva* seeks to legitimize majority communalism in the name of nationalism. Such an ideology of nationalism, *i.e.* majority-ethnicism, cannot serve as the basis for the functioning of a modern state in India – a multiethnic society.’ (Seth, 1999: 35). In India, we find a contradiction between civil society and political national society and minority rights in terms of citizenship rights, are insufficient to protect cultural identity of the minority communities. In liberal democracy fairness demands more than state neutrality and considerations of justice, freedom, citizenship and equality demand differences of cultural identities, cultural and group rights, multiculturalism, the claims of diversity, politics of difference and recognition. Public institutions should recognize cultural and disadvantaged minorities. ‘This requirement of political recognition of cultural particularity – extended to all individuals – is compatible with form of universalism...’ (Gutmann, 1994: 3). Culture is marked with marginalization and politics of redress of grievances. Multicultural perspective is concerned with justice, fairness and citizenship. Constitution is a ‘form of accommodation of cultural diversity’ and ‘an intercultural dialogue in which the culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements.’ (Tully, 1995: 30). It is essential to justify multiplicity of culturally diverse voices. Wittgenstein’s idea of language game, Michel Foucault’s genealogy and governmentality, and Hanna Arendt’s concept of freedom and active citizenship are sources of multicultural tradition. Politics of cultural recognition means gathering the broad and various political activities which jointly call cultural diversity into question as constitutional problem. ‘A constitution can seek to impose one cultural practice, one way of rule following, or it can recognize a diversity of cultural ways of being a citizen, but it cannot eliminate, overcome or transcend this cultural dimension of politics.’ (Tully, 1995: 6). In fact, cultures are overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated. Culture is the universal and commanding natural language of difference. All the differences are fundamentally relative. ‘... one of the basic values of our culture is that it and its basic values are relative, *i.e.* that it is one culture among many essentially unrelated cultures... knows that it is relative, ... it locates its own superiority in this knowledge of its relativity, as it likewise locates inferiority in ignorance of this relativity.’ (McGrane, 1989: 120). Taylor (1992) finds that politics of equal recognition is important and fundamentally human life is dialogical and interactive. As human agents we define our identity. We are interacting with significant others. Human identity rests on autonomy, on the ability of each person to determine the good of life. In ‘politics of equal identity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical

basket of rights and immunities... forms of non-discrimination that is quite “blind” to the ways in which citizens differ.’ (Taylor, 1992: 38-39).

Minority protection has fallen in the private domain. But there is less emphasis on equal recognition to minority groups in the public sphere. The public sphere in India is not sensitive to diversity and cultural plurality of this country. On 30<sup>th</sup> December, 1948 Sardar Patel observed that members of the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly felt that – ‘... conditions having vastly changed since the Advisory Committee made their recommendations in 1947, it was no longer appropriate in the context of free India and of present conditions that there should be reservation of seats for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs or any other religious minority.’ (CAD, Vol. III: 311). On 25<sup>th</sup> May, 1949 Sardar Patel observed that time has come when the vast majority of the minority communities have realized that the reservation should be dropped. Ansari (1999) says that the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Minorities, H.C. Mookerji and Tajmal Hussain played a key role in supporting the ideal of pure homogenized nationhood. ‘The compulsions of the pursuit of undiluted pure nationalism made further demands on whatever little was left intact by way of assuring minorities, in terms of due consideration to their claims in public services, though qualified by of efficiency of administration... When the assembly met on 14<sup>th</sup> October, 1949 it was presented with a changed text of Articles 296 and 299 deleting ‘minorities’,... All amendments seeking guarantee of minorities share in public services were, however, defeated.’ (Ansari, 1999: 123).

Gender equality in *Shah Bano* case was subordinated to religious claims and religious membership and gender equality came into conflicts with religious claims of a minority group. In *Danial Latifi* case the Supreme Court in its judgement recognized the diversity of traditions. In *Shah Bano* and *Danial Latifi* cases the Supreme Court attempted to ensure equal respect and treatment for Muslim women, regardless of religious membership and diversity of traditions. The question is to resolve the conflict between gender equality and religious cultural claims, to reforming the religious-cultural traditions. Deliberative democracy based on multiculturalism so to say can reconcile the conflict between gender equality and religious cultural claims. Cross-cultural dialogue is essential in this respect. It is the alternative ways of negotiating with conflicting claims. Cultural conflicts are rooted in a cosmopolitan point of view, from which negotiation of difference is both pragmatic and moral imperative. In this resolution of conflicts Benhabib (1992, 1995 and 2002) relies on dialectical process of reasoning and universal and necessary presuppositions of communicative speech. Within the

limits of reasonable pluralism conflicting cultural claims can be negotiated and resolved. Benhabib (1992) makes a multicultural arrangement. Three key principles are necessary for this multicultural arrangement – egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exist and association. For a just multicultural arrangement the freedom to exist and to disassociate from the group must be unrestricted, which communitarians like Bikhu Parekh does not believe and specify culture as a matter of non-preference and cultural membership as mandatory. Critics find that Benhabib does not find the role of culture put forwarded by communitarian multiculturalists. Kymlicka puts forward his conception of multicultural citizenship based on respect-based liberalism. Benhabib’s model of deliberative democracy and unrestricted freedom to exist and to disassociate may challenge the cultural “ways of life” of different cultural groups and cultural membership. Benhabib’s voluntary self-ascription recognizes individual self-ascription and determination with group membership. She goes beyond mere legal regulation of conflicting cultural claims of communitarian multiculturalism and democratic equality. A combination of legal regulation and constitutional enforcement with expanded cross-cultural moral-political dialogue allows subaltern and subordinated voices within religious minority groups to be expressed and given proper weightage. Benhabib’s approach is different from Shachar’s ‘joint governance’ model recognizes the importance of legal regulation. ‘The strategies adopted by the Indian Supreme Court provide us with valuable lessons on the cultural mediation of human rights norms... the Supreme Court chose to listen to sub-altern voices,... Those voices, though often appealing to background cultural justifications to support their claims, accepted Muslim women’s right to be treated as equal citizens. A commitment to the constitutional essential of equality was the starting point for the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Latifi case. In the Shah Bano case, it was the generally applicable law, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the societal obligation to ensure that Muslim women were not vulnerable to destitution and poverty as a result of a discriminatory application of the law. In both of these cases, we see an attempt to combine legal regulation with an expanded moral-political dialogue on the meaning and scope of constitutional essentials and religion-based personal laws.’ (Mullally, 2004: 689).

Another aspect is national symbols and anthem. In fact, ‘... the various national symbols that have defined the public sphere have invariably acquired a majoritarian tinge, making it difficult for the minorities to identify with them. In any attempt to place multiculturalism on the agenda in this country, it is the aspect of making the public sphere more conducive to the expression of cultural diversity and difference...’ (Ali, 2000: 2503).

Pluralism is an idea by which the diversity underlies the nationhood. Citizenship is a key institution by means of which competing demands for membership are made, an engagement between individuals, social groups and the state, and a method through which nationhood is achieved. Among the three citizenship approaches of liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist, I do prefer the last one, where the liberals argue for individuals as units and bearers of individual rights, republicans for common good and community as unit and ethno-nationalists for citizenship membership by descent group that defines the nation.

Diverse social groups can find an important place by negotiating and balancing overlapping conceptions for competing membership claims without sacrificing various group identities. In India ethno-nationalist citizenship discourse gained currency after partition. Indian constitution established a common citizenship based on individual rights and collectivist notion of citizenship and common good. In 1950s and 1960s Government failed to provide equal citizenship to the Muslims. There is a liberal dilemma in the role of the state with respect to religious community – ‘If the government defers to the wishes of the religious group, a vulnerable groups of individuals will lose basic rights; if the government commits itself to respecting the equal human rights of all individuals, it will stand accused of indifference to the liberty of conscience.’ (Nussbaum, 1999: 84). By the mid-1970s the republican conception of citizenship was called into question by non-statist citizenship discourse. During the emergency period an attempt was made by the Indira Gandhi government to restore republican discourse of citizenship by achieving socio-economic revolution, reducing poverty and ignorance. During this period a fundamental shift began to take place – growing prominence of ethno-nationalist and liberal citizenship discourses were balanced against each other. However, the process of economic liberalization from the 1980s provided the liberal citizenship discourse. Hindu nationalist discourse began popularity in response to ethno-nationalist discourse of citizenship. In India the minority incorporates not only the Muslims, but also the Christians, SCs, STs and OBCs etc. Therefore, the Muslim citizenship in terms of ‘majority-minority’ question cannot be constructed. ‘Caste, tribal, linguistic as well as religious groups can be self-defined minorities for any one of a number of reasons: they have a distinctive group identity that they fear is eroding; they regard themselves as socially and economically subordinate to others; or they believe that they suffer from discrimination, either from others in the society or from the state itself... To declare one’s group a minority is, therefore, a political act. In the Indian context, it is a way

of calling attention to a situation of self-defined deprivation... The term ‘minority’ has come to be reserved for those who are “disadvantaged”.’ (Weiner, 1989: 42-43).

Following the Hindu nationalist discourse Baxter (1969) points out Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)’s version of Hindu nationalism that the non-Hindu peoples in India must adopt Hindu culture, must learn to respect Hindu religion, must cease to become foreigners and may stay in this land ‘wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privilege, far less any preferential treatment – not even citizens’ rights’. (Baxter, 1969: 31). Minorities must reconcile with the majority Hindu domination. Articles 30 and 30(1) essentially permit concessions to the minorities that go against the spirit of Hindu state. Rajni Kothari (1986) rightly says that being afraid of losing their dominant and privileged position the Hindu middle classes have taken to Hindu nationalism. Indian leaders have adopted the concept of democracy or so to say market concept of democracy with a majoritarian tinge. It is the market democracy where the voters are treated as consumers with multifarious demands and politicians or leaders as entrepreneurs to bag their votes. Therefore, normative restraints are lacking in owning power. Further, Hindu religion is diffused and fragmented, so it is not possible to develop a unified nationalist ideology based on Hinduism.

David Washbrook finds that – in India ‘in the 1950s Milton Singer attempted an explication through the concept of ‘compartmentalization’. But not only does this challenge the theory of modernization itself... The specific tradition to which Singer referred was Brahmanic Hinduism... In the 1960s, Suzanne and Lloyd Rudolph tried to clarify the issue with their concept of ‘the Modernity of tradition.’... In the 1970s, Stephen and Marguerite Barnett attempted their own formulation. Noting the highly competitive nature..., with... pressures for social mobility,... that competition came to be mediated through the categories of caste, they offered the concept of ‘collective individualism’... From the 1980s, the waning influence of Parsonian and neo-Weberian sociology meant that few scholars continued to try to understand southern in these terms. However, the debate revived again in the 1990s with the post-colonial turn... Modernity now became seen as an oppressive, de-humanizing discourse,...’ (Washbrook, 2010: 128-129). In this context the question of minority rights is important, which may not be actually realized in a multi-cultural settings like India with an ideal-typical set of qualities consisting of tendencies towards individualism and rejection of collective rights or group rights, universalism and the recognition of the qualities of subjects, rationality, progressiveness and improvement of human conditions etc. An accommodative process of nation-building is necessary for the minority groups in identifying themselves with

the nation, in limiting the homogenization process by the nation-state, in tackling the cultural hegemony of religious minorities and aggressive secularism, and in sharing the advantages of democratic institutional pluralism.

Considering group rights and diversity in Indian society the framers of the Indian constitution pointed out the following guidelines – freedom of conscience and religion, non-discrimination on grounds of religion by the state, no communal electorates, social welfare and reform, right to establish and run institutions for religious and charitable purposes, rights of religious minorities to establish and administer educational institutions, non-discrimination on the grounds of religion for employment etc. Indian constitution accepts the liberal-secular framework of freedom, equality and fraternity, for example Articles 25 and 26 stating freedom of conscience and right to profess religion. However, secularism, nation-building and development as the core legitimizing concepts help the Indian state leaders ‘to legitimize themselves as the sole arbiters among traditional communities, to claim for themselves a monopoly on religious and ethnic tolerance and on political rationality.’ (Nandy, 1988: 192). Here, religion is treated as politically constructed monolithic, communalist ideologies of sectarianism and intolerance. Secularist ideology is not an adequate political perspective for meeting the challenge of Hindu majoritarianism. Following Ashis Nandy’s religious tolerance Partha Chatterjee (1994) calls for political tolerance as a part of non-Western form of modernity. There should be a proper relationship between state and religious, ethnic and cultural groups and a framework beyond state sovereignty versus individual rights discourse of liberalism. Likewise Foucault, he maintains that modern form of power is not concentrated within a single whole, cuts across the liberal division between state and civil society and is exercised through various forms of representation and methods and technologies of governmentality. It is argued that ‘there will be political contexts where a group could insist on its right... toleration here would be premised on autonomy and respect for persons,...’ (Chatterjee, 1994: 1775). Religious, cultural and ethnic communities are institutional sites or strategic locations of the politics of identity and difference. To Chatterjee, ‘if a religious group declares that the validity of its practices can only be discussed and judged in its own forums, those institutions must have the same degree of publicity and representativeness that is demanded of all public institutions having regulatory functions.’ (Chatterjee, 1994: 1775).

Power in modern society is pervasive. Civil society has emerged as the central player in championing the cause of the minority communities against the power of Hindu majoritarianism. Strong and active civil society in India is characterized by heterogeneity and

representation of multiple ideologies. Though the civil society organizations have different ideological positions, they have a common starting point – constitutional guarantees providing few rights to the minority communities. There is a closer relationship between socio-economic deprivation and religious, cultural and ethnic identity. Barbara Harriss White (2002) and Justino and Litchfield (2003) find the implications of religious plurality on capitalist economy and in shaping the economic capabilities and of relative deprivation and discrimination that contribute to the socio-economic exclusion of the minority communities. Hasan (2003) tries to find out that constitutional guarantees for religious and cultural rights of minorities have proved not proper in protecting minorities from discrimination. Failure to develop socio-economic development of the minorities by the Indian state is equal to discrimination. Political analysts must recognize that in a country which is characterized by glaring inequalities, appalling poverty, a highly vitiated social and political climate, wherein traditional loyalties are critical and where the political system has encouraged the jockeying for power caste by caste and community by community, the political secularization of minority communities cannot take place at a rate faster than that of the whole society. The whole society must grow and change at an even pace, and that is the only course for the successful socio-political integration of an otherwise diverse and plural society.’ (Ahmed, 1971:26). With minority politics the emphasis is on inclusive citizenship and with majority politics, the emphasis is on exclusivity as a people. The conflict is between majoritarianism and minoritarianism. The conflict is between citizens and people. People mean aggregation of citizens under nationalism. In liberal democracy citizens take precedence over people and thus a nation-state faces two options – liberal-democratic and nationalist. In liberal democracy citizens as individuals have rights, which are inviolable. Citizenship becomes a viable project when the enforcement of law respects the individual as a citizen and it does not make concessions to the sentiments of the ‘people’. ‘There are,..., two possible scenarios in the contemporary nation-state by which religion and politics can come together. The first arises from minority anxieties about their self-respect and their consequent demands for cultural equality. The second arises from majoritarian attacks on religious minorities in the name of protecting the nation-state from enemies within.’ (Gupta, 2007: 31). Myron Weiner (1968) says that whether the minority group is a tribe or a religious or linguistic group, it is often concerned with preserving its cultural identity and resisting assimilation into larger regional and national culture. Minorities are even more protective. Narendra Subramanian (1999) finds that India’s success in maintaining democracy in the midst of deep ethnic cleavages was ascribed to the accommodation of ethnic demands. Accommodative

institutions eroded in the 1980s and 1990s and alternative secular pan-Indian nationalism grew its popularity. Hindu revivalism opposes official commitments to secularism, Sikh movement opposes pan-Indian nationalism, Kashmiri nationalism is secular but ambivalent about being part of India, and the Dravidian movement opposes pan-Indian, but accepts federalism. Organizational pluralism assists social pluralism and tolerance of difference within organizations enhances social tolerance among the members. Negotiation of differences builds an institutional culture to negotiate and compromise with other political forces. Social pluralism does not preclude the growth of non-pluralistic parties and movements.

To solve the problems of minorities the federal theory must self-consciously engage more thoroughly. The need is to develop the cosmopolitan model of democracy, which would delimit the form and scope of individual and collective action within the organizations and associations of state and civil society. Few standards are specified for treatment of all, which no political or civil association can legitimately violate (Held, 1994). Paul R. Brass (1974) calls for multi-ethnic and multinational state formation, where many nations bound together in a single political and territorial unit by feelings of patriotism derived from ideology, memories of a common struggle against external or alien powers, and rational calculations of common advantage in the sharing of a single political structure, but not by a common nationality. In fact, consensus has deep roots in Indian decision-making process. Indian conditions are favourable to power sharing. Conflict management in India has become more difficult with the decline of Congress organization and the weakening of federal structure with the centralization of power in post-Nehru leadership, mass mobilization and activation, decline of Congress party's electoral strength, attack on minority rights and rise of militant Hindu nationalism. Consociationalism will reduce group conflicts. Concessions to group power and preferences will be reinforced with this process of consociation. Nordlinger's 'conflict-regulating' practices are associated with consociationalism, though Nordlinger excludes federalism from the power sharing process.

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