



THE REGIME AND THE CIVIL WAR: THE COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA

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ABSTRACT

The Sinhala Theravada nationalism and the Tamil nationalism have been relatively fixed and strong forces in Sri Lankan political development instead of Sri Lankan nationalism. Tamil nationalist dialogue protected traditional homeland for the Tamils in the north and east in Sri Lanka. Archaeological findings and colonial sources are taken as proof of ancient Tamil presence in the form of language, customs, and laws. Until in 1976, Tamil political parties encouraged federal reforms and managed to negotiator agreements safeguarding Tamil rights. After in 1976, Tamil political parties merged into the Tamil United Liberation Front, which openly came to advocate separatism through the 1976 Vaddukoddai resolution. Failure to live up to these ambitions legitimized gentleman politics, Tamil militant groups staged increasingly violent opposition and open group antagonism started in 1983, following the anti-Tamil massacres known as Black July. After in 1987, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam emerged as the self-proclaimed sole representative of the Tamils. They created its own navy, air force, and rudimentary structures and symbols of government, including administrative institutions, tax collection, banks, flag, and national day and so on. Therefore, Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms and their emulating state building development emerged in a conflicting method. That can be described as one of antagonistic interdependence both demonstrated their energy and legitimacy

for the survival of threatening each other. Finally, the Sri Lankan regime failed to develop state building through the social harmony, reconciliation, and good governance.

Keywords: Political Development, Identity Politics, Civil War, Tamil Military Organizations, Diaspora

Introduction

The political sub- cultures have treated through the political culture as though it were the same throughout the entire population of a political system. The differences emerge according to the level of education, ethnic groups, geographical location, economic and social position, religious faiths and etc. In many of the countries in the third world, the problem of political sub-culture is of major importance. For any political system to operate effectively there must be some level of agreement on the basic nature of politics, the general role of government in the society, and the legitimate goals of policy and participation. Especially in Sri Lanka, the differences of languages, religious faiths, class, and cast create enormous problems for the political regime. Actually, Sri Lanka, which represents a multi-ethnic, languages and religious community, is being continuously ruled by a government that represents the Sinhalese. Instead of devising a far-sighted, all-inclusive scheme to build the nation, which would reflect the plurality of the society, the governments during the post-independence era, to pander their myopic political goals, resorted to inciting racism to push their agendas. This resulted in Sri Lanka losing its unity, integrity, reconciliation, which created a dent in its autonomy, sovereignty, and reputation globally. The rages nationalist activities of the Sinhala- Theravada Buddhist nationalist turned Sri Lanka into the sanctum sanctorum of Theravada Buddhism. The Sinhala-Theravada nationalists claimed that special prerogatives should be bestowed upon them by virtue of the fact that they were the guardians of Theravada Buddhism internationally. The consequences of this resulted in the degeneration of reconciliation among the government, the regime and the ethnic groups causing long term effects in the country. On the other hand, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a leftist party, lead by Rohana Wijeweera and smitten by Marxist philosophies incepted an armed rebellion to create a proletarian government in 1971. In the North and East, having been frustrated by the ethnic identity and discriminatory political culture, in 1980, Tamil youths incepted an armed mutiny. Considering the Tamil militant organizations as a threat to the

national security, the government took steps to embargo such organizations while annihilating those organizations using its military power. Disappearances, illegal murders, sexual violence, and torture became a normalcy following this. Tamil youths who should have taken part in building the nation were instead attracted towards armed uprisings. The upshots of this were felt in the democracy, reconciliation, good governance of Sri Lanka. This research article tries to explore the efforts taken to absolve the political labyrinth, desires, and grievances that were behind the Tamil militant organizations, the effects of such efforts in the Sri Lankan political culture, and the steps that were taken to bring the civil war to an end through a qualitative approach. Primary and secondary data has been used for this purpose.

Concepts of Political Development

Concerning of political development, numerous social theorists made vast empirical studies of the developing countries in particular from economics, social, psychological, anthropological and political standpoint in order to describe the process of change. If massive literature on the subject of political development is that illuminates a situation of semantic confusion, *Lucian W. Pye* may be enumerated to driven that the subject of political development as under Identity, Legitimacy, Penetration, Participation, Integration, and Distribution.

The first one is that the people identify themselves with their identity. They recognize their national territory as their homeland. They feel that their own personal identities are in part defined by their identification with their territorially delimited country. It is found that there is a lot of contradiction between the traditional political cultures having its roots in the loyalties of the individuals towards their culture, community, religion, language, and etc. People do not spirit to lose their primordial loyalty at the altar of their national obligations. The second one is that the legitimacy is achieving agreement about the legitimate nature of authority and the proper responsibility of government. It refers the pattern of central or regional or local authority, the limits of the executive or bureaucratic authority, structure of government which maintained in the post-independence era. These points have a more prominent place in backward societies. They are still clinging to the idea that the political structure should conform to the precepts of their religion. The third one is that the penetration denotes that the government in reaching down to the society and effecting basic policy. A government should carry out significant developmental policy and must be able to reach down to the village level and touch the daily

lives of the people. The fourth one is that the participation facilities should be given for a genuine democratic purpose or just for the sake of demonstration politics. The freedom should be allowed for various political parties and pressure groups to operate with a view to influencing the decision-making process. The fifth one is that the integration deals with the extent to which the entire polity is organized as a system of interacting relationship which among the officers and agencies of government and various groups and interest seeking to make demands upon the system. The sixth one is that the distribution refers governmental power are to be used to influence the distribution of goods, services, and values throughout the society. In a particular situation, the government seeks to meet the challenge directly by intervening in the distribution of wealth. In other circumstance, government is to strengthen the opportunity and potentialities of the disadvantaged groups

Without improving further dynamic structure differentiation or specialization and cultural secularization, the existing structure and culture of the political system are unable to find an appropriate resolution for the socio, economic and political problems in a country. The political system in a country may engage in four types of problems being state building, nation building, participation and distribution resources or welfare of the population.

State building is commonly associated with significant increases in the regulative and extractive capabilities of the political system. It is also associated with the development of a centralized and effective bureaucracy related to the increases in capabilities and with the development of attitudes of obedience and compliance in the population. Thus, state building involves mainly the development of new roles, structures, and subsystem which gain influence throughout the country. Nation building emphasizes the cultural aspects of political development. Nation-building refers to the process by which people transfer their devotion and loyalty from smaller tribes and village to the larger central political system. Participation in a political system commonly concerns the rapid increase in the volume and intensity of demands for a share in the making of decisions by various groups and levels in the domestic society. Such increases in demand for participation are usually associated with or have the consequence of production, political groups and functions and representative legislative assemblies. Distribution of resources or welfare occurs when there is a rapid increase in the volume and intensity of demands that the

political system control or affect the distribution of resources or opportunity among different elements of the population.

There in general, an association between structural differentiation, cultural secularization and an expansion of the capabilities of the political system. These associated attributes are involved in the development of the political system, although such development is not inevitable. In the same time, respect under circumstances of tension and stress, such as international threat, the secularization of attitudes regarding goals and values among the people may weaken the support for the system.

The identity politics in Sri Lanka

The ethnic identity politics that was initiated in the 1930s rose to prominence along with the discriminatory policies adopted by the rulers in the Sri Lankan political cultural. The fear imbued by the ethnic identity politics in the 1930s was felt vehemently by the Tamils after 1950. To counter this, Tamil political parties propounded demands for political autonomy in regions with a Tamil majority. Twice, both parties signed agreements to devolve power, which the Tamil political parties were after. The *Banda-Chelva* agreement that assigned in July 1957 laid the framework to empower regional councils (*Jeyaratnam, A Wilson, 1988*). The *Dudley-Chelva* agreement that was signed in 1965 further emphasized the need for a structure to empower regional councils. But the pressure from racist forces forwent the implementation of these pacts. The non-violent protest demonstrations by Tamils against the non-implementation of these pacts and for their political rights were all quashed by the iron fists of the Sri Lankan military. Finally, the demand for a federal government was defeated with the help of the armed forces.

Genocide against Tamils was orchestrated through State terrorism in 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983, liberally assisted by the governments in power (*Tambiah.S.J, 1986*). The genocide in 1983 was the bloodiest and most brutal of all genocides in Sri Lanka. To carry out such heinous crimes, Sinhala mobs were allowed to use vehicles belonging to the Ceylon Transport Board and official voters' list was used to precisely identify and execute Tamils (*Tambiah.S.J, 1986*). Around 2000 Tamils lost their lives and 80,000-100,000 Tamils were curtailed inside refugee camps during the state-sponsored genocides (*Tambiah.S.J, 1986*). This caused massive internal and external displacements. The government stated that the attack was carried out in response to the death of

13 military personnel who were killed during a landmine attack. In an interview with a local television channel, speaking about the ethnic riots in 1983, the then president of Sri Lanka, J.R. Jayawardena said that the police and the military were, at times, provoked to be violent towards the Tamils. The same fact was reiterated by J.R. Jayawardena in another interview with the BBC by stating, "I think there were vehement anti-Tamil sentiments among the armed forces. They felt that the attacks against the Sinhala army men were a result of anti-Sinhala sentiments. I observed it at times" (*Tambiah.S.J, 1986*).

The armed rebellion reached a stage of extreme severity when Tamil youths decided to confront the iron-fisted oppressive activities of the government with armed violence. When the Tamil militant rebel groups guerilla attacks on the Sri Lankan armed forces, the Sinhala nationalists too were equal to the task by being more oppressive on Tamils. As an interim security measure, Prevention of Terrorism act (Temporary Provisions), Act No. 48 of 1979 was enacted in 1979 and was amended twice in 1982 and 1988 making it a permanent law. The faith Tamils had on the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to procure political power plummeted while the guerilla attacks became empowered. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as a military organization encompassing the triforms.

Predominance of LTTE in Sri Lanka

Tamil youths became enamored by the armed conflict after the surge in oppressive measures taken against Tamils following the 1983 genocide. India welcomed the trend and even encouraged the Tamil youths by providing them with ammunitions and training in the Indian mainland. Using this opportunity, Tamil youths incepted many military organizations and this sudden proliferation of militant groups resulted in around 37 Tamil military organizations subsiding from 1980 (*Sri Lanka Terrorist Groups, Updated till February 23, 2014*). Of all the military organizations, LTTE was the most disciplined well-organized and efficient organization that elicited strong Tamil nationalistic sentiments. Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), and LTTE became the forces and they became the decision makers of the agenda for the armed conflict. From 1986 to 1987, LTTE annihilated most of the other military groups and declared themselves as the sole and solitary representatives of the Tamils. LTTE's leader created an

efficient military structure with deferent loyalty, dedication, and power as its foundations. Being vehement detractors of internal democracy, LTTE branded anyone who they suspected of supporting the government and working for or with the government as defectors. Most of them were killed by LTTE at different time periods. LTTE managed to create a strong fear and suspicion among Tamils by murdering members of other military organizations and those who were suspected of treason. LTTE created a suicide squad and used it on political and military targets. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India (1991) and Ranasinghe Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka (1993) were assassinated in addition to many ministers, members of parliament, and pacifist Tamil leaders by LTTE's suicide squad, which included both men and women (*Rohan Gunaratna, 2000*). At times, religious places and economic centers became targets of these attacks and many civilians too lost their lives.

LTTE showed little interest in politicizing people, diplomacy, and believed that only military activities would help them accomplish their goals. In 1990, Muslims living in own homes were driven away with the use of force by LTTE and people of other ethnic groups living in the border of the regions controlled by the LTTE were subjected to attacks (*Imtiyaz. A.R.M and Iqbal .M.C.M, 2011*). LTTE used threats and violence to have the regions they occupied under complete control and conscripted children (*Child Soldiers Global Report 2001*). As a result, 32 countries including Canada, the European Union (27 countries), India, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declared LTTE as a terrorist organization and banned all their activities (*Council Common Position 2009/67/CFSP of 26 January 2009*).

Most parts of the North and East of Sri Lanka were under the domain of the LTTE from 1990 to May 2009. The boundaries of the LTTE controlled regions underwent continuous changes due to the battles the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE fought to have the regions under their respective control. LTTE managed to create a de-facto state administration and an illusionary projection of itself as the government of the *de-facto* state. In the Vanni region, which was under the control of the LTTE, police service, prisons, courts, an income tax department, banks and welfare institutions were established and administrated by the LTTE. In an interview with the Sunday Times on the 3rd of March, 2005, Peter Harrold, World Bank Country Representative for Sri Lanka said that:

"Given that there is such a thing as the LTTE controlled area, an unofficial state and an officially recognized part of the country as the LTTE controlled area... given that they are a party to the Ceasefire Agreement with the Government of Sri Lanka which confers on them a certain status as a legitimate stakeholder...."

De-facto State Administration is a well-planned and structured strategy for procuring international recognition. LTTE created an army that was capable of fighting in the air as well as the sea and fashioned an excellent, well-established intelligence organization, with the help of whom carried out a war using both traditional and guerilla tactics. Kristian Stokke said the following regarding this:

“The emerging LTTE state builds on institutional experiments in the period from 1990 to 1995, when LTTE controlled Jaffna and parts of *Vanni* and established various local administrative bodies. While the control over Jaffna has been lost, these institutions and experiences have been incorporated into the new state building project which is now centered on Kilinochchi.”

Owing to the increase in political violence, genocide, torture and oppression, Tamils migrated to foreign countries especially to the European countries seeking asylum. Thus, the population of the Tamil diaspora grew up to a million in many parts of the world. Around 200,000 Tamils live as refugees in the South Indian state Tamil Nadu while 200, 000-300,000 Tamils live in Canada. In the United Kingdom, around 180,000 Tamils live whereas in Germany, Australia, Switzerland, France, the USA, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden 60,000, 40,000, 47,000 40-50,000, 25,000, 15,000, 20,000, 10,000, 7,000, 3,000, 2,000 Tamils live respectively (*Crisis Group Asia Report N°186, 23 February 2010*). Independent sources claim that most of these people had helped LTTE financially and had supported them during the civil war.

Strategy toward the final civil war

The government of Sri Lanka and LTTE agreed to use Norway as a mediator to bring the civil war to an end and to bring about a political solution. On the 22nd of February, 2002 Norway aided the Sri Lankan government and LTTE to sign a ceasefire agreement. To establish mutual confidence, so as to lay the foundation for a direct peace-talk, a subgroup was established to help both parties engage in discussion on gender equality. As a result of the ceasefire agreement and

the Status of Mission agreement, signed on the 18 of March 2002, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was established (*Gunnar M. Sørbrø, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, Ada Elisabeth Nissen and Hilde Beate Selbervik, September 2011*). The SLMM included representatives from the Scandinavian countries and they had the power to conduct inquiries whenever the ceasefire agreement was violated. Barring the LTTE controlled regions of Mullaitivu and Kilinochi, all the other parts of Sri Lanka were monitored by SLMM. The Sri Lankan government accused SLMM of having failed to monitor the many violations committed by the LTTE and decommissioned the mission in 2008.

The international community based on the outcomes of the Tokyo Conference on monitoring political progress, reconciliation, reconstruction and development in Sri Lanka, which include the European Union, the USA, Norway, and Japan, supported third party mediation. Since 2002, when the ceasefire agreement was signed, Norway mediated six rounds of peace talks in Thailand, Norway, Germany and Japan (*Gunnar M. Sørbrø, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, Ada Elisabeth Nissen and Hilde Beate Selbervik, September 2011*). Concerns such as humanitarian aids, rebuilding, removal of land mines, rehabilitation and resettlement of internally displaced people and safeguarding human rights took primacy in these negotiations (*Gunnar M. Sørbrø, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, Ada Elisabeth Nissen and Hilde Beate Selbervik, September 2011*). As per the ceasefire agreement, LTTE was allowed to carry out its political activities in the regions that weren't under its control in the North and East which helped them expand their influence on these regions. However, it could be observed that many were shocked that such prerogatives were not granted to the government in the LTTE controlled areas. Moreover, Norway that regulated the SLMM could not implement the ceasefire agreement in LTTE controlled areas like Mullaitivu and Killinochi. Norway could not stop or control when LTTE heavily taxed people, vehicles, and properties that were transported through their de facto state after the main road connecting Jaffna was opened, nor could they stop or control LTTE strengthening its military power. Simultaneously, a culture of both parties assassinating their political enemies developed. Even though an exact figure is not available, it is estimated that until August 2005 around 3113 were killed (2002-2005) with 141 of them having been killed by the government. 38 political assassinations took place until September 2003 alone (*Asoka Bandarage, 2004*).

Both Norway and Denmark were accused of siding the LTTE and it was claimed that these two nations were funding LTTE through organizations like Norad and RedBarna. It has also been claimed that Eric Solheim bequeathed 2.2 million USD to Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). Furthermore, Norway was also accused of helping LTTE establish an International Communication Headquarters in Oslo while aiding LTTE in constructing a profound radio communication network. This created an opportunity for Norway to be branded as an aide of LTTE. Notwithstanding this, Asia-Pacific countries, the USA and the European countries extended their support to Norway to mediate peace talks in the Sri Lanka- donor conference held in Oslo on the 25th of November, 2002. It was also agreed to financially assist the humanitarian programs in the North and East. Even though LTTE and the Sri Lankan government agreed to a federal government within a united Sri Lanka in the third session of the peace talks, LTTE withdrew from peace talks, which was considered as a rejection of the international community.

The vested interest in nationalistic politics among both Sinhalese and Tamils, intolerance, extremist qualities resulted in the failure of the peace talks, much like the previous peace talks. Many political factors contributed to the failure:

- Extremist Sinhala Nationalists opposed Sri Lankan government signing the ceasefire agreement.
- LTTE's proposal to establish an Interim Self-Governing Authority further strengthened Sinhala nationalists' opposition.
- LTTE's decision to withdraw from the peace talks in April 2003.

These political scenarios united the political parties in Sri Lanka giving birth to a new coalition called the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which participated in the 2005 presidential election with Mahinda Rajapaksha as the nominee and emerged victoriously. This was considered as people's approval to go ahead with the final war.

On the 11th of September, 2001, Islamic terrorist organization, Al Qaeda, hijacked two American flights and used them to destroy the twin towers in New York after which the USA and other western countries embarked on a combined effort to wage an international war against terrorism. This became a boon to countries at war against terrorist organizations and their international networks, the effect of which also affected LTTE. This led to LTTE, which had already been

classified as a terrorist organization by many countries, being secluded both domestically and internationally, and the ban on them became even more severe (*Gunnar M. Sørbo, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, Ada Elisabeth Nissen and Hilde Beate Selbervik, September 2011*). Sri Lanka government made use of the setback LTTE incurred by assassinating Sri Lanka's minister of Foreign Affairs, Lakshman Kadirgamar, in 2005 and began a diplomatic mission to induct international stakeholders for the final war against LTTE. Both parties started exchanging attacks until the final war began in August 2006.

In the meantime, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna Amman succeeded from LTTE along with 5000 LTTE cadres and initiated a political party called Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal. He then joined the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party as a member and enlisted his cadres as a para-military force into the Sri Lankan military. This shocked LTTE. Having been a member of LTTE for a long time Karuna had a very deep knowledge about LTTE's secrets, which was utilized by the Sri Lankan government during the final war. The para-military forces of Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal and the remaining members of the military organizations functioned as secret agents and helped the government during the war (*Gunnar M. Sørbo, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, Ada Elisabeth Nissen and Hilde Beate Selbervik, September 2011*). The Maavilaaru Dam that supplied water to many farmers in the government-controlled regions of the Eastern province of Sri Lanka was shut down by LTTE. To appease this tense situation, the international community made several attempts to re-open the dam through Norway. When this failed, the Sri Lankan government launched a mission to re-capture the regions of the Eastern province that were under LTTE. After around two decades, in July 2007, with the help of Karuna's paramilitary forces, the Sri Lankan government managed to bring the Eastern province completely under its control.

The Sri Lankan army had been training for war and war-related strategies and utilizing the high spirits gained after a victory in the east, the Sri Lankan government launched a fully-fledged war over the Vanni region on the 16th of January, 2006. In 2008, LTTE had control over the Vanni region that wasn't part of the Eastern province or the Jaffna peninsula. Even among the four districts of Vanni, only Mullaitivu and Killinochi were under the complete control of LTTE. In addition, LTTE also controlled the northern portion of Vavuniya, the North West region of Mannar and certain other regions in the Jaffna peninsula. The United Nation's secretary general

and the member countries of Tokyo Conference warned the Sri Lankan government that violating the ceasefire agreement and trying to find a solution to the ethnic problem through military forces could have serious consequences. The Sri Lankan government proved that a sovereign state doesn't need to give up its legal rights to take actions to annihilate terrorism within its own country by their complete military victory over LTTE on the 18th of May, 2009.

In conclusion

Even though ever since gaining independence, attempts were made to find a solution to the ethnic conflict, due to the disharmony and disputes that existed among the political parties in handling subjects of national importance, Sri Lanka failed to make solid decisions. Harmony among political parties is paramount to find a long-term political solution to problems of national importance. But in contrast, the *Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam* agreement in 1957, *Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayagam* agreement in 1965, All Party Conference in 1984, the 13th amendment in 1987, the parliamentary select committee report in 1992 and proposal for a draft constitution in 2000 were all opposed by the opposition parties. This played a major part in sovereign Sri Lanka's political defeat. Simultaneously, District Political Authority System was experimented in 1973 and in 1979, District Development Council System experimented. But the general public's apathy towards Sri Lanka's administrative systems leads to these experiments failing to make a permanent impact on Sri Lanka's political culture. Before the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002, a plethora of attempts was made to find an agreement on ceasefire and conducting peace talks such as the Thimbu negotiations in the mid-'80s, negotiations with *Ranasinghe Premadasa* in 1989/1990, negotiations with Chandrika in 1994/1995 and negotiations with Chandrika 2000/2001.

A Certain incident that happened during the time period between 1990 and 2000 created a military and political environment for a ceasefire agreement. They were:

- The Second Battle of Elephant Pass (codenamed Operation Unceasing Waves III) base was captured by LTTE killing around 2000 Sri Lankan armed forces.
- The Sri Lankan army incurred casualties of around 500 in operation *Agni Suwalai*.
- In July 2001, the air force base in Katunayake International Airport was raided by LTTE causing massive damages to a lot of properties and passenger flights.

These incidents weekend the government both politically and economically and impacted Sri Lanka's economy. Thus, the Sri Lankan government was forced to reckon LTTE as an equally strong force and was compelled to enter into peace talks with LTTE as a stakeholder. It would be the final attempt peace talks to bring about peace in the island. However, when the ceasefire agreement was canceled political environment nationally and internationally had changed dramatically. When the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002, there was a joint government in power with the prime minister and ministers and the president belonging to different parties. Just as how this created a lot of predicaments between the judiciary and the executive council in Sri Lanka, it also had a negative impact on the structure of the ceasefire agreement and the execution of it. The UNP government that came to power under Ranil Wickramasinghe with a slight majority was politically weak. Using the power to dissolve the parliament after one year of election, Chandrika Kumarathunge dissolved the government. The abnormal scenario of having an executive president belonging to one party, and ministers and the prime minister belonging to another was a golden opportunity for the political parties in Sri Lanka to show their support for each other during times of national importance. If they had used this opportunity to execute the ceasefire agreement and conduct peace talks, the consequences of the ceasefire could have brought in a permanent solution to the ethnic conflict. However, the political parties failed to support each other in taking a unanimous decision.

Due to the war that lasted almost three decades, human rights were violated severely, independent institutions were debilitated, and the rule of law and good governance became weak. When the government began the final war, human rights further hit a new low. Independent news services, opinions, and humanitarian activities were incapacitated. The government laid down a mechanism to oppress journalist who wrote about the civil war in 2006. Instead of opposing military activities, writing the truth became a crime and the media was heavily censored. Journalist and political activists were anonymously threatened. This was forced some people to flee the island. NGOs and international workers had their visas rejected which terrified them. Hence, some of them too left the country. The government believed that a strong administration was needed to annihilate terrorism completely and to build a strong socio-economy after the war. The government was of the opinion that only a strong administration for political stability and strength. In September 2010, the government passed the 18th amendment to the subsisting constitution, through which the 17th amendment was made void. The 18th amendment allowed

the president to hold office for any number of terms and granted the president supreme power over all the important posts in the country. This bequeathed executive power to the president. For someone who wanted to abolish democracy and good governance in order to create an authoritarian government, the 18th amendment was a pillar of support. The political development comes from the international environment and action of the political elites whom leading groups with the political system. A political system may be threatened by a rival group internally or externally. The challenge may come from an internal change in the society of which the political system is a part. In meeting this challenge, the system may find that it needs more resources and more effective methods of organizing and distributing its resources. If threat continues over a long period of time, it may have to adapt itself culturally by stimulating military type attitude and acquiring the skills and values associated with warfare. The impulses for political development consequently involve some significant change in the size and substance of the flow of inputs into the political system. Development results when the existing structure and culture of the political system is unable to contend with the challenge.

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