

**THE EVOLVING DEFENSE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES: THE
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN POST COLD WAR ERA**

Hayatudeen Muhammad Konto,

Department of Political Science, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.

Bukar Jamri,

Department of Sociology Yobe State University Damaturu, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT

Since the Cold War, the likelihood of major inter-state warfare has been perceived as being more remote while instability, societal conflicts and terrorism have frequently led to confrontation and crisis. The sources of potential conflicts worldwide have increased and their forms have been diversified. The global system has become increasingly interdependent and interconnected and has given conflicts a challenge, wherever it occurs, a global dimension will deem to it. Military power cannot be separated from diplomatic and economic levers of power. Additionally military power cannot be considered in isolation in chaotic and complex strategic environment. These levers of power are amplified by the growing power of information, which forms the armory of statecraft; the use of wisdom and judgment that blends hard and soft powers in an integrated pursuit of national interests; however, these levers can be destabilizing if used with miscalculation and adventurism. Strategy is one element in practical application of statecraft. It seeks to align objectives, concepts and resources to increase the probability of policy success. The evolution of conflicts is not linear, nor is it driven by single factors such as technology, economics, religion or geography. The character of conflict evolves in a close relation to changes in a broader strategic context.

Keywords: Defense and Security and Global Perspectives

Introduction

Since the Cold War, the likelihood of major inter-state warfare has been perceived as being more remote while instability, societal conflicts and terrorism have frequently led to confrontation and crisis. The sources of potential conflict worldwide have increased and their forms have been

diversified. The global system has become increasingly interdependent and interconnected and has given conflict a challenge, wherever it occurs, a global dimension will deem to it. Some states and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, have gained increased global reach. These trends are likely to continue. However, by 2040, they are likely to converge with others, and further significant change in the character of conflict can be expected. Powerful states, such as China, are likely to continue their rise. Along with others, they are likely to develop military equipment developed by the Western powers and export it to partners and proxies. While stringent efforts will be made to prevent it Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) that are likely to proliferate and the likelihood of their usage will increase instability within states and will continue to. The incidence of armed conflict is likely to increase. In an era of persistent challenges the adaptation and evolution, and complex problems are unlikely to be solved by military power alone an integrated and multinational approaches will be the norm.

The Contemporary Military Context

It is impossible to assess trends in future warfare without first seeking to understand the contemporary military context globally. Military power is an agent of policy and will remain so. However, once if it started then conflict has its own dynamic that can drive the policy. Military power cannot be separated from diplomatic and economic levers of power. Additionally military power cannot be considered in isolation in chaotic and complex strategic environment. These levers of power are amplified by the growing power of information which forms the armory of statecraft; the use of wisdom and judgment that blends hard and soft powers in an integrated pursuit of national interests; however, these levers can be destabilizing if used with miscalculation and adventurism. Strategy is one element in practical application of statecraft. It seeks to align objectives, concepts and resources to increase the probability of policy success. It applies rationality and linearity to circumstances that may not be either despite the appearances and expectations; it is therefore primarily an art rather than a science. It is most effective when it's anticipates leads to change. Strategy is time sensitive; timing and rate of change matters.¹ Strategic stability, such as that enjoyed by the West at the end of the Cold War provided little

¹ Yarger H. Strategic Theory for the 21st Century, 2006.

impetus for change, and the strategic advantage reduced this impetus further. Western strategy has therefore become too often focused on short-term and it made it difficult to advocate for strategies that will pre-empt major upheavals in strategic environments. Such proactive strategies for change can be deferred as a result of preference for near-term stability and avoidance of political risk. The attacks of 9/11 have significantly disrupted the strategic equilibrium. By 2040, more numerous, rapid and complex changes are likely to require far-sighted and agile strategies. The evolution of conflict is not linear, nor is it driven by single factors such as technology, economics, religion or geography. Rather the character of conflict evolves in close relation to changes in a broader strategic context. Technology sets the parameters of possible tendencies, but its human endeavor and ingenuity which are expressed through innovative strategy, tactics and doctrine that generate radical changes in the character or conduct of war. These radical changes are often termed as Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs). They are frequently acclaimed in marketing strategies and academic papers, but in reality they are rare. The understandings of what constitutes Revolutions in Military Affairs (MRAs) have emerged and are often conflated. The first refers to a relatively rapid change at operational level of war which usually brought about harnessing of new technologies to new concepts of operations.² The application of Blitzkrieg tactics is an example. The second aspect is the concept of revolution in a larger sense of epochal upheavals in which the society itself is transformed. The ‘Levee en Masse’³ during the French Revolution which is an example, as changes in warfare that brought about industrialization in the 19th Century. The operational level of information-age and technology has spawned concepts such as Rapid Dominance⁴ that suggest Western technological superiority which allows it to define war on its own terms, as exemplified, by the defeat of Iraq’s conventional Armed Forces in 2003. Much current capability and thinking about conflict dates

² Roxborough I. From Revolution to Transformation-The State of the Field, Joint Force Quarterly, 2002.

³ During the French revolution, in response to the dangers of foreign war, the Committee of Public Safety established a mass conscription (Levee en Masse) and succeeded in training an army of about 800,000 soldiers in less than a year this was much larger than any army available to other European states., laid the basis for Napoleon’s domination of Europe. In addition to bringing out the creativity of the Committee of Public Safety, the levee en Masse represents a turning point in the history of warfare and the starting point of ‘total’ war involving all elements of the population, and all the reserves of the state.

⁴ Rapid dominance, also known as ‘shock and awe’ was a military concept based on the use of overwhelming power, dominant battlefield awareness and maneuvers, and spectacular displays of force to paralyze an adversary’s perception of the battlefield and destroy its will to fight. Ulman H.K. and Wade J.P. Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, US National Defense University.

from such operational-level and concepts that produced some clear benefits, such as Network Enabled Capability (NEC). However, the operational-level of Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) and concepts cannot be a complete solution to the problems of conflict. Adversaries have to be adapted to counteract the West's preferred way of warfare in seeking a variety of 'high-end' and 'low-end' asymmetric techniques, ranging from suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices through innovative use of technologically advanced weaponry and development of agile, resilient, decentralized and organizational structures. At the strategic level over a longer time-scale, of the ongoing transformation of society at the global level is likely to be reflected upon as resulting in the Revolutionaries in Military Affairs (RMAs). The multi-faceted process of globalization is likely to continue in this transformation of both global and local societies over the next 30 years, in causing comprehensive changes in the character of conflict. Public perceptions will be a matter of both the West and elsewhere. The nature of the changes cannot be predicted in detail, but they are likely to be a wide-ranging and focused on national interest, the importance of influence is rather than just a kinetic activity, on networks of states, groups and individuals rather than hierarchical structures and organizations, and on agility and asymmetry rather than the simple balance of military power. This societal-level of Revolutionaries in Military Affairs (RMAs) has poses several dilemmas for Western defense strategists, especially given the associated requirement to prevail in current conflicts. First, strategy is best when based on pragmatism and not ideology. Additionally, it should be derived from, and should be rooted in; core national interests.⁵ The second dilemma is to understand the specific problems, given that future conflict will take many forms. This inherent unpredictability has traditionally been mitigated by spreading risk, for example, by maintaining a range of balanced forces as a hedge against uncertainty. Majority, if not all states has this approach which is likely to become prohibitively expensive due to pressure on financial resources combined with the increasing scope of conflicts. States are therefore likely to seek alternative strategies to manage risk including increased interdependence and burden-sharing with traditional allies, the formation of new partnerships with states and groups that share common interests or values. States are also likely to recognize that military cannot be used to achieve rapid effect at relatively

⁵ Flournoy M. brief to the US Army Leadership Forum, 2009.

low cost and with limited risk. The third task of strategists is to achieve an asymmetric edge, such that when required, the state maintains a capacity to apply power in order to deter, coerce, shape and seize the initiatives, or alternatively to respond to the unexpected. In the past along with Western way of warfare put at high premium on technology and organization to deliver this edge. While both factors remain vital, in achieving sufficient 103 mass which is already problematic and this will become increasingly more so especially as technological advantage is likely to wane.

The Trends in Armed Conflicts

Since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of armed conflict has increased, reaching a high magnitude in the early 21st century. Quantitative studies reveal that there were more inter-state and intra-state conflicts, and despite the global population increases, more battle-related deaths occur.⁶ However, these conflicts have become more pervasive both in terms of participation and public perception. The number of states engaged in armed conflicts has increased to its highest level since 1945,⁷ mainly due to participation in multilateral wars.⁸ Moreover; the number of active peacekeeping operations has doubled when compared to Cold War levels, with around half of these being conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The number of new armed conflicts erupting each year has been consistent and the increase in active conflicts since 1990 is due to de-freezing of resolutions of older conflicts. The public perception of conflicts has been shaped by media coverage. Enabled by rapid advances in communications and technologies, this coverage has made conflicts more conspicuous by distributing near real-time images and information to every corner of the globe. Since 1945, the average lethality of war has increased in combatants and the annual totals for battle-deaths have increased significantly. However, the increase in battle-deaths has painted the full pictures. On average, inter-state wars have typically lasted around 3 years, civil wars to over 5 years, and ethnic wars nearly 10 years. Moreover, since 1945, one-third of large-scale insurgencies have been linked to mass killing of

⁶ All quantitative surveys can be challenged on the basis of the definitions they use to define types of conflict. However, looking across a range of different datasets, the result are broadly consistent with those described in Peace and Conflict, 2008? Battle-related deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat. Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr, Peace and Conflict, Executive Summery, 2008.

⁷ Ibid. Figures are for 2005.

⁸ For example, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.

civilians, as in the Afghanistan, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Rwanda and Syria. For example, in the DRC, the war has resulted in an estimated 145,000 deaths, with 300,000 violent deaths of civilians, and up to 4 million deaths from all war-related causes, the most significant being disease and deprivation.⁹ High numbers of civilian casualties has been recognized, due to increasing numbers of combatant deaths, this has raised ethical questions regarding the legitimacy of the operations, proportionality and the importance of human security. Any lack of legitimacy will undermine soft power activities. However, disproportionate civilian casualties are likely to continue as long as irregular and societal war ‘amongst the people continued and¹⁰ remains dominant as a result of incidences of inter-state wars, typically associated with high numbers of combatant deaths which remains depressed. The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the incidence of armed conflicts has increased following a period of decline since the end of the Cold War. By 2040, the incidence of armed conflict is unlikely to resume its downward trend and is likely to increase, driven by a number of factors. First, the uni-polar United States-dominated world order has already started to develop a more multi-polar distribution of power, and this evolution will continue. Such a change can have positive effects by forcing states to find multilateral solutions to common problems. However, it also leads to instability in the international system and is likely to offer the opportunity for the suppressed state rivalries to re-emerge, increasing the potential for competition and confrontation between regional powers. Similarly, some of the conflicts frozen since the end of the Cold War may thaw quickly.¹¹ Second, global inequality is likely to remain widespread and will be made more explicit as access to globalized media increases. This access will heighten inequality associated with grievances by making them more apparent to those who lack, or are denied, opportunity. Third, population increases, resource scarcity and adverse effects of climate change, are likely to combine by increasing the likelihood of instability and disagreement between states in providing triggers that can ignite conflicts. Finally, since 1990, the absence of a clear ideological divide such that it existed between the West and the Soviet bloc has and contributed to rise in conflicts. By 2040, political and religious ideologies will espouse populist or belligerent

⁹ Hewitt, Wilkenfled and Gurr, Peace and Conflict, Executive Summary, 2008.

¹⁰ Smith Rupert, General, The Utility of Force, Penguin, London, 2006.

¹¹ For example, the Russo-Georgia conflict, 2008.

narratives that are likely to grow importance of (Resurgence of Ideology). All these factors will be exacerbated by periods of global economic recession. Other factors are likely to mitigate some of the risks. For example, the inclusive and effective global governance institutions and economic interdependence are likely to have a stabilizing effect. However, on balance of power, these factors are unlikely to further reduce the incidence of conflicts. Regionally, conflict is not evenly distributed with majority of recent conflicts that are erupting in Africa, Middle East and Asia. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, 77% of all international crises involved one weak state and the significant increase of the Cold War era is suggestive of a link between economic, political, social, development and conflicts.¹² Regions that have recent history of conflicts are particularly at risk, as are states that possess significant natural resources or are of geostrategic importance. Most weak states are located in Africa, Middle East and Asia and the greatest likelihood of most future conflicts will continue to be in these regions. By 2040, the United Kingdom is unlikely to become disassociated from global trends. Political choice will continue to be the most important factor in determining when and how the United Kingdom Armed Forces will experience combat. In particular, considerations regarding the United Kingdom's role in the international system, its alliances commitments and the degree of engagement to protect global interests will be important. Casualty rates will continue to have an important effect on these political choices and on public support. Nevertheless, concepts of casualty acceptance and aversion are likely to remain linked to perceptions of the importance and legitimacy of conflicts, and the likelihood of success rather than a simple compassionate response.

Defense and Security Strategy

Defense and security are linked, but with different concepts. Defense primarily refers to states and alliances resisting physical attack by a third party.¹³ Defense is about the survival of the state and is not a discretionary activity. Security is a contested concept that can never be absolute. It is therefore, to some extent, discretionary. It implies freedom from threats to core values both for individuals and groups.¹⁴ The decline in the incidence of interstate war and the emergence of

¹² Source Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)

¹³ Evans G. Dictionary of International Relations, 1999.

¹⁴ Baylis J and Smith S. 2005, Globalization of World Politics, 3rd Edition, page 300.

transnational threats, especially in the developed world, has resulted in greater political emphasis being placed on security rather than defense. Moreover, security has gradually evolved from the concepts of national and international security to the idea of human security. By 2040, defense and security will remain vital, both in the virtual and physical domains, including space and cyberspace. However, defense is likely to increase its importance as population growth increases, climate change, resource scarcity and instability has, threatened the ability of states to provide their population's democracy dive dance. These factors are likely to result an emphasis on defending access to physical necessities of survival. Many of these necessities are internationally linked to globalization by implying the need for major powers to operate globally and for alliances and partnerships that defend common interests. These common interests make it likely outweigh individual rights. Hence, to some extent, the trend towards human security is rather than international and national security it is likely to be reversed. It should be noted that defense activity is unlikely to be conducted solely by military forces should not be conflated with military activity, nor will security activity be purely the domain of security forces.

The Future of Deterrence

By 2040, the discouraging conflicts will be increasingly important especially as the strategic balance of military power shifts away from the United States to a more multi-polar distribution. Deterrence will remain a vital conflict prevention tool. The object of deterrence is to maintain the status quo by preventing real or potential enemies from initiating hostile acts. It is related to, but different from coercion, where the goal is changing the behavior of an adversary is changing the situation too. To be effective deterrence must be credible, capable, and should clearly signal such actions so that the target audience should fully understand the consequences of their behavior. The main expression of deterrence has often been nuclear weapons, but most military forces have a deterrence role. The scope of conflict has broaden so will the scope of deterrence associated with many actors can also be expected to develop, for example, cyber deterrence capabilities, as well as mechanisms to deter adversaries in the economic, financial and other domains. Nuclear deterrence will be complicated by the emergence of more actors capable of delivering Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) at range. Instability is likely, until states develop the necessary understanding of diverse political and strategic cultures required in a

multi-polar world, and cope with the reality of horizontal proliferation and the rising number of de fact nuclear weapon states. The existing arms control mechanisms are likely to endure in some form and relationships between the established nuclear powers that are likely to remain stable. Relationships between the established nuclear powers and those who are currently developing their own nuclear capability have aroused, although the challenge of maintaining effective communication will be high. Broader participation in arms control may be achieved; although this is unlikely to reduce the probability of conflicts.¹⁵ Effective ballistic missile defense systems will have long-term potential to undermine the viability of some states' nuclear deterrence. Much of the activity will focus on deterring irregular actors, including terrorists. This includes deterring them from acquiring and employing CBRN materials, and also from committing more conventional violent attacks. Some individuals and groups are unlikely to respond to deterrence, and most groups with political objectives, including many of those that espouse to religious narratives which are likely to act rationally and respond, and would be provided with deterrence and intelligently focused and signaled. This will require detailed study of individual and groups in order to develop a deep understanding, rather than blanket application of a universal deterrent solution. Even groups that seemingly have nothing to lose, such groups that are espouse of suicide attacks, will continue to value and protect their ideology cause and narrative. Moreover, many irregular actors have links to states that will recognize and respond to both deterrence and coercion. Some groups that remain resistant to deterrence will respond to coercion, including non-kinetic methods such as investment in development, while others will necessarily be subject to disruption and attacks.

The Imperatives of Technology and Conflicts

Technology has already broadened the scope of conflicts from land, maritime, air and environments to encompass cyberspace and space. It offers new possibilities for conflict and is exploited through innovations in organization, strategy and tactics. By 2040, rapid technological innovation will have a significant impact on the evolving character of conflicts. It will continue to be a double-edged sword, offering advantages to major powers who are able to afford the most

¹⁵ Dale W.C and Gray C.S. Strategy in the Contemporary World, Edition 3, 2006.

advanced technologies, entrepreneurs and innovators who also collaborate to find new uses for existing technologies. This entrepreneurship includes smaller states and non-state actors, and they will rapidly be able to adapt strategies, whereas major powers are likely to suffer from institutional inertia and financial dragging associated with large weapons and programmes. For the first half of the period by 2040, the vanguard for technological development is likely to continue to shift from states to the commercial sector. The proliferation of these commercial systems and technologies will allow allies and adversaries to be similarly equipped, and they can afford to buy in open market. Developing states and non-state actors will rapidly be able to exploit low-cost, evolving and emerging technologies to gain an asymmetric advantage. However, for the latter part of the period, the trend towards the commercial sector may slow or even reverse as states focus on self-interest and invest in research to combat climate change, resource scarcity and other challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, the largest suppliers of conventional weapons to the international arms market have been the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.¹⁶ The major purchasers have been China and India, with Asia accounting for 37% of trade, Europe 23%, and the Middle East 22%.¹⁷ The overall level of transfers has increased from as low as in 2002 and is valued at around \$45 billion per annum. The forward orders suggest that the volume of international arms transfers is likely to increase during the first half of the period and that Saudi Arabia, Libya and Taiwan are likely to feature as major importers. The future strategic challenges faced by major powers are unlikely to be resolved by technological ‘magic bullets’ alone. However, wealthier states, especially those with shrinking populations, maybe seduced into favoring complex technological solutions over more traditional, human approaches, despite struggling to meet the associated costs. The dominance of technological quality over quantity, is exemplified by the conventional combat phases of the Gulf Wars, where mass was superseded by sophisticated weaponry and improvements in organization and training, will be challenged. The value of human will remain critical in people-centric operations where influence is vital, and some military tasks will remain both manpower and equipment intensive. The trend towards highly specialized weapons and systems that prevailed throughout the Cold War era has resulted in their adaptation for use in

¹⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Handbook 2008, page 316.

¹⁷ Ibid, page 294. Cover the period 2003-2007.

new contexts. However, highly associated costs of novel weapon technologies and the multitude of potential tasks faced by militaries will make it simple, versatile, kinetic weapons will be invaluable. This is true for developed states, but also for irregular actors who will seek to use simple, flexible and inexpensive weapons, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to achieve effect at all levels of conflicts. Technology inevitably spreads, and no military has ever enjoyed a perpetual monopoly on any capability. The technological advantage enjoyed by the West since 1945 is likely to be eroded as technological diffusion and strengthened Research and Development (R&D) are the key activity, particularly in Asia, it feeds through to weapons production. For example, in some areas, China's military equipment are available for export to potential adversaries and is likely to be comparable to European equipment by 2020 and would approach the United States standards by 2040.¹⁸ Technological parity is likely to challenge Western paradigm of war; that technology can replace mass and lead to rapid, decisive effect.¹⁹ Moreover, combat between equally matched adversaries is likely to result in escalating numbers of casualties. This changing paradigm will also require the ability to plan for modes of conflicts with adversaries that will leverage and niche high-tech capabilities and employ innovative concepts of operation.²⁰ For example, regional powers are armed with precision-guided missiles and anti-access technologies, such as submarines, cruise missiles and sophisticated surface-to-air missiles that may make traditional power projection strategies infeasible. The development of networked systems will continue. Access to information will spur knowledge and understanding, and it will act as a critical enabler in future conflicts. Irregular actors will continue to use widely available technology such as the Internet to both conceal and promote their activities. Similarly, developed states will seek to integrate and synchronise platforms, sensors and shooters in a quest to lessen to the 'Fog of War.' Although technical improvements will be considerable, tactical advantage is likely to be short-lived as adversaries rapidly adapt.

The Balance of Military Power

¹⁸ Bowns, Middleton et al, The Effects Defense R&D Military Equipment Quality, Defense and Peace Economics 2006. Volume 17 (2), April 2006, pages 117-139.

¹⁹ Bowns, Cornish et al A Quantitative Analysis of Modern Conflict, Chatman House International Security Programme, 2009.

²⁰ RAND (Europe) , Perspectives on the Future of Conflict: UK MOD Discussion Paper, May 2009.

The balance of military power will become multi-polar, although the United States is likely to remain pre-eminent. It would be confronted with few direct territorial threats and ageing populations and most affluent societies are likely to minimize their defense expenditure by investing in conflict prevention and burden-sharing through participation in alliances and contracting out security. The United States is likely to be an exception in making far and greatest commitment to defense, although its economic power and technological advantage is likely to become increasingly challenged. These developments are likely to make intervention and operations that will increasingly fraught with military risk, unless they command widespread multilateral support. Adversaries will seek to prolong conflict if they consider it advantageous, in targeting the cohesion of alliances, coalitions and public support will exist. Prevention and strategies will offer attraction of avoiding conflicts with associated human and financial savings. However, they will require sustained investment patient and intelligent implementation, and are unlikely to be entirely successful as partnership rests upon a shared assessment of risk and reward. Moreover, success will be difficult to measure and it will require early political engagement and commitment of resources. Defense spending of rising powers is likely to increase in proportion to their economic growth and their expanding range of global interests. Sino-United States is rivalry and is likely active with hostility and belligerency especially through proxies which is possible. However, direct war between the world's foremost powers remains unlikely. China is likely to seek a range of important asymmetric capabilities in the form of an 'assassin's mace' of deterrent, that will compel lent and attack capabilities for immediate regional requirements that will offset the United States offshore maritime capability.²¹ This is likely to constitute 2-tier armed forces consisting of nuclear weapons with large and relatively unsophisticated forces for territorial defense, together with smaller higher-capability forces for power projection, predominantly within their sphere of interest rather than globally. Low-income states will continue to operate forces that, in principle, are organized along conventional lines, but will probably bear a closer resemblance to the irregular armed groupings operating locally within them. However, the diffusion of technology is likely to provide even low-income states with some access to advanced weaponry that adds risk and complexity to the battle space.

²¹ An 'assassin mace' is used to designate a wide array of technologies that may afford an interior military advantage in a conflict with a superior military power.

Alliances and partnerships, linked to spheres of influence, are likely to be fundamental to the future balance of military power. Their nature and objectives are likely to reflect on the geopolitical realities that are linked to the fears and interests of their constituents, which may be both to state and non-state. NATO is likely to endure and remain the basis for collaboration between western states, in performing vital roles of facilitating political dialogue and military interoperability between members, partners and prospective partners to underpin multinational operations. The defensive alliance at its heart will remain extant. A full and constructive partnership between NATO and Russia is unlikely. The United States, however, will increasingly view Asia and Latin America, rather than Europe and the Middle East as the focus of threats to its security. Additionally political difficulties are likely to persist, complicating NATO's utility as a collective security implement. NATO expansion, particularly into the Caucasus, is possible, but most probable partnership arrangements are rather than formal alliance. Other alliances and partnerships, with political, defense and security objectives will emerge, that will be focused primarily on the major powers and their spheres of influence, although they are unlikely to be ideologically opposed blocs, as seen during the Cold War. Rather, the alliances and partnerships are likely to share some common security interests, such as the protection of the global supply chain, and are likely to cooperate with each other, within the framework of a globalized world, rather than simply confronting each other along fixed frontiers. The Importance of Influence of Military operations will focus on influencing people. Despite the unifying effect of globalization people from dissimilar cultures will continue to act and think differently, depending on their personal and group context. Hence, knowledge and understanding will be required of how people from different cultures think; what symbols, themes, messages, etiquette and practices are important to them; how systems of reciprocity or kinship function are and how these establish deep allegiances and social obligations. Relevant groups will include domestic audiences, key regional leaders, populations, coalition partners with Diaspora communities and broader international opinion. In conflict and confrontation, most actors will place considerable emphasis and dependence on psychological behavior rather than just the physical. All military activity, including force, will continue to be designed to influence, and is likely to be planned and executed in support of a campaign narratives. Technology will enable the development of extensive social networks that in turn will multiply opportunities for those

seeking to achieve influence through the distribution of recorded images. This imagery, combined with simple and fluid narratives can shape both local and global perceptions. Individuals, groups and states will be subject to influence from sensational acts of terrorism, such as 82 mass casualty events or executions, conducted to influence populations. Terror attacks are likely to demoralize and encourage intimidate and motivate messages that can highly tune to specific target audiences in order to alter opinions. Knowledge will empower and enable even the physical contest that cannot be waned. Information and intelligence gathering systems will be required to provide knowledge about people's perceptions, beliefs and opinions, and how they can be influenced. Influence will be attained when the behavior of the target audience changes through the coordination of all levers of power including military action, words and images. Influence will not just be about messages or media, but how the combination of word and deed are portrayed, interpreted and understood through the lens of culture, history, religion and tradition. Speed of responses is likely to be vital and first impressions will count. Notions such as winning and victory are likely to be of little relevance if an adversary can remain credible in the battle space of ideas.

The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear proliferation will be a significant factor affecting global security, especially as the transition to a multi-polar distribution of power brings change and uncertainty. The number of nuclear weapon states has gradually increased, although this increase has not been linear. The long-term credibility of treaties designed to limit nuclear proliferation and the reactions of international community to proliferation of nuclear by Israel, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea will affect decision-making of states tempted to acquire nuclear weapons.²² The policing regimes associated with nuclear non-proliferation are likely to be increasingly intrusive. Some states, such as Iran will view development of nuclear weapons as both a security guarantee and a source of national prestige. Other states, such as Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are faced with nuclear armed neighbors and concerns over United States commitment to their security, may react by creating deterrent forces. While this raises the specter of regional arms races and it

²² Such treaties include the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty along with numerous others.

may, paradoxically, bring a degree of high-risk stability to regional relations provided a mutual understanding of motives and red-lines can be reached rapidly. However, some states may view tactical nuclear devices as weapons rather than deterrents. States, and extremist groups, lacking the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery systems may seek to purchase the knowledge, materials and technology via illicit channels. However, terrorist groups are unlikely to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons without state sponsorship, but are likely to acquire some aspect of a biological, radiological or chemical weapons capability, ranging from simple devices with localized effects through to mass casualty attacks.²³ Although less than 10 states have offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes, the number with which the potential capabilities to produce such weapons is likely to increase in the future. Some of those who seek to achieve strategic effect at the expense of legitimacy, especially terrorist groups, are likely to use them. The choice of agent in the future is likely to be determined by the need to defeat defensive measures; circumvention of arms controls; credible deniability of use; and ease of production within the existing industrial facilities. In particular, the production of chemical and biological agents will be difficult to detect and counter them when legitimate industrial and pharmaceutical facilities are used. Attacks, akin to those carried out by the Aum Shin cult in Tokyo are probable.

The Evolving Legal Norms and Legitimacy

Future conflicts will continue to be characterized by disputed interpretations of legitimacy. Western norms for conflict based around notions of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in Bello*,²⁴ and the widely accepted Hague and Geneva Conventions, are likely to be challenged by alternative paradigms for conduct of conflicts. Furthermore, the application of domestic law and international human rights obligations may result in unanticipated restrictions. In general, it is affluent and well-integrated states that are likely to promote international legal norms, while poor and weakly-integrated states and non-state actors are likely to be guided by different norms that develop from their individual circumstances. While majority of states will continue to legitimize

²³ For example, in 2007 Iraq insurgents used chlorine truck bombs as improvised chemical weapons.

²⁴ The laws of war are divided into 2 categories; *Jus in Bello*, law concerning acceptable conduct in war and *Jus ad bellum*, law concerning acceptable justifications to use armed force.

their actions under existing international law, constraining international legal arrangements that may become such an impediment to the achievement of strategic objectives that they are bypassed or ignored; competition for resources, for example, may exacerbate unconventional interpretations of international law. Conflict classification, and the legal envelope for operations, will contribute to the complexity of future conflicts, in creating major challenges for those engaged in the planning and conduct of operations. The challenges to legal norms and legitimacy include: the blurring of roles between civilian and military, regular and irregular; the chameleon-like behavior of groups with switch identity are being concurrently organized as criminals, terrorists, insurgents and agents of a state; the varying national and cultural interpretations of what constitutes legitimate behavior; with novel means and methods of conflicts, for instance in cyberspace; the implications and effects of armed conflict on regional social, economic, political and financial security; employment and the role of Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) are numerous. Kinetic operations amongst the people, rather than around them, will require the most careful prosecution to remain within the taut of legal framework of combatant/civilian distinction. Advanced weapons capable of great precision and discrimination will be available to both state and non-state actors; however, widespread technological diffusion of communications technology for instance, will also make indiscriminate improvised weapons more accessible. States will be more constrained in the conduct of operations than many non-state actors.

The Imperatives of Future Conflicts

Conflicts will continue to evolve, reflecting on developments in society, politics and technology involving a range of transnational, state, groups and individual actors. These actors will operate wherever they can gain advantage, broadening the scope of conflict beyond the pure military domain. The strategic operational and tactical levels of war as well as the physical and virtual environments will become increasingly compressed, porous and difficult to differentiate. Activity at one level, or in one environment, will have effect on others. This compression will shape the character of military activity, demanding increased discrimination and judgment about how to deal with the situations holistically; both from military forces and from the political leaders who employ them. Economic, financial, legal and diplomatic conflicts are likely,

challenging legal norms and is requiring coordinated and integrated responses in order to protect them from and respond to attacks. Orbital space and cyberspace will be part of the battle space in the same manner as the air, land and maritime environments will be, but the activity will also expand the underground, deep into the ocean and other extreme environments. The complex cross-environment links will continue to make it difficult to constrain conflicts to geographic localities. The technologies employed and the tactics and techniques practiced are likely to converge as adversaries rapidly learn and adapted from each other. Potential adversaries range from potent state military forces through to disorganized and poorly equipped groups, and even individuals. A single adversary may constitute an amalgam of regulars, insurgents, terrorists, irregulars, and criminals. Political violence will often be indistinguishable from criminal violence. Criminal elements will become more sophisticated; they may have access to military hardware and will be comfortable in operating the cyberspace. Many of these groups will share information, lessons, tactics and procedures where they see mutual benefit and be unencumbered by bureaucratic process. Many will adapt rapidly to changes of the environment or its context. These adversaries may be structured as distributed in social networks with no identifiable structures or coherence and no recognizable centre of gravity. The distinction between inter-state and intra-state war, and between regular and irregular warfare, will remain blurred and categorizing conflicts will often be difficult. State actors are likely to develop in an increased capability to the conduct of irregular activity and non-state actors are likely to employ a broad range of capabilities, some of which have traditionally been associated with states. For example, some non-state actors will deploy advanced technological capabilities while continuing to use irregular tactics and formations, to sponsor terrorist acts would provoke criminal disorder.²⁵ This blurring was demonstrated in 2006 the Lebanon War when irregular Hezbollah units defended their territory against Israeli forces, it utilized high-tech weaponry such as unmanned air vehicles and stand-off missiles, Hoffman F, Conflicts in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, page 58, December 2007. And it sought to provide humanitarian relief to those affected by the conflict. Even in the developed world, some non-state actors are likely to deploy capabilities beyond the ability of law enforcement agencies to counter in isolation, requiring the use of

²⁵ Hoffman F. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, page 58, December 2007.

military, paramilitary or other security forces, such as cyber security groups. However, not all actors will embrace this form of multi-modal conflicts, with some restrained by ethical, cultural or legal constraints from operating across the full spectrum. In particular some states will lack the confidence in their own cohesion to develop forces and structures that are necessary to conduct irregular conflicts. By 2020, instability, and threats that will radiate from weak states and transnational terrorism are likely to remain the dominant Western military paradigm. Conflicts generated by horizontal inequalities in particular and the intersection of economic, social and political inequalities with ethno-nationalism, are likely to remain particularly intractable. Internationalized intra-state conflicts and associated irregular conflicts will frequently be characterized by inter-communal violence, terrorism, insurgency, pervasive criminality and widespread disorder as experienced in Afghanistan,²⁶ Central African Republic, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Sudan and Syria. Military operations in support of stability are likely to be multi-faceted and blur elements of high intensity combat with the requirement to establish security and provide the needs of the population. These operations will be multinational and dependent on wide interoperability between a multitude of partners both civilian and military. Intervention, on the back of the United States military dominance to stabilize weak states that will be a feasible policy response, although with the gradual rise of multi-polarity will make such strategies less attractive, especially when other major powers oppose such activity. Direct inter-state conflicts between major powers are unlikely given the legacy of the United States military hegemony and interdependence that raises the cost of conflicts. However, inter-state rivalries are likely to be expressed through proxies that have linked to complementary objectives. Many of these proxy forces are likely to employ irregular tactics including terrorism, while concealing and refuting links to state sponsors in order to preserve their freedom of action and maintaining a degree of deniability for the state. Proxies are unlikely to follow predictable paths and are likely to prove difficult to control over time.²⁷ From 2020, Western military powers are likely to evolve, particularly in response to the changing balance of military power and the likelihood of proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Major Powers are likely to

²⁶ For example the Taliban have proven difficult to control the Pakistani state intelligence services.

²⁷ A discussion of drivers for inter-state conflict can be found in Roberts, Adam, Zaum, Domick, Routledge, London, 2008, *Selective Security: War and United Nations Security Council since 1945*. For example, World War II.

find many areas of shared interest to facilitate cooperation, but they will also find issues on which cooperation is impossible. States, such as China and India, are likely to close technological gap with Western powers in certain areas and will maintain strong military forces and defense industries that will export advanced military equipment to partner with states and proxies. This proliferation is likely to alter the strategic balance of military forces. Threats will still radiate from weak states, but the potential threats posed by some, more powerful, states and their proxies will become more relevant to total sum of war, by harnessing full power of industrial states, and war between major Western powers, and war between liberal democracies are unlikely. However, disagreements between major powers over borders will influence and resources are probable and may lead to confrontation, including limited wars, where adversaries will deliberately exercise and restraint the methods of conflict, their level of commitment or the objectives will sought. In such confrontations and conflicts, which are likely to be conducted using proxies can be a coalition-based with much emphasis will be on diplomatic and economic levers of national power.

Responding to the Challenges of Future Conflicts

Future strategic challenges are unlikely to be successful as been addressed through utilization of single levers of power, or unilateral responses. Military power will be necessary, but not sufficient. Similarly, hard power will be important, but combining it with soft power in a smart strategy is likely to be vital. The national security of major powers will dictate that they will engage globally, and to a greater or lesser extent, multilaterally, in order to maintain the international system and ensure a degree of shared access to the global commons. For example, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, climate change, the proliferation and probable use of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), particularly chemical and biological devices, uncontrolled migration and cyber attacks are impervious to single-state or one dimensional policy responses²⁸. In particular, the need for shared access is likely to mean the multilateral coordination to secure supply lines, robust alliances and partnerships, and a varying degree of commitment to international legal norms. States will seek to integrate their national

^{28 28} Land, Air, Maritime, Space and Cyberspace

levers of power. Military force is unlikely to be effective as a discrete form of response. This need to integrate and synchronize responses is likely to result in increased international cooperation and the formation of new alliances and partnerships. Interoperability between joint and coalition of military forces will be vital. Training of partners, including state militaries, other arms of government and non-state partners, such as Partner Military Security Companies (PMSCs) and others, will grow in importance. The parallel challenges of state sponsored proxies and instability in weak states is likely to make investment in capacity building and partnership to a significant task. Military education will be a vital component in preparing for the diversity of future challenges. Command and control of integrated multinational operations will evolve slowly, with organizations capable of directing integrated responses being developed incrementally. Victory in conflicts will be difficult to Non-state actors and are likely to develop capabilities traditionally associated with states define and winning maybe reliant upon public perception or stability. It will still be possible to defeat an enemy militarily, just as Sri Lankan forces defeated the Tamil Tigers in 2009. However, military victory alone will not necessarily lead to strategic success unless an enduring political settlement is achieved. As integrated approaches are adopted, the roles and activities of civilian and military personnel will make the distinction between combatants and non-combatants difficult to discern at an individual level. Extensive use of Partner Military Security Companies (PMSCs) will add further complexity to the operating environment. Regular military forces that will deploy the environments where armed irregular forces, for example gangs, bandits, semi-official militias, Partner Military Security Companies (PMSCs), terrorists, child soldiers, criminal elements, cyber warriors and tribal groups and insurgents, are operating, often as adversaries, but sometimes as neutrals or even as partners. Armed Forces are likely to be organized, trained and equipped to fight both irregular wars amongst the people and high-end threats at the same time. Military personnel will find themselves employed in essentially non-military roles, owing to their readiness and profile, training and capacity for organized actions that will often be the first response to natural disasters and other serious civil contingencies. The future threats to the environment, is fusing all the environmental domains and it will be complex, as well as contested, congested, cluttered, connected and constrained. This is likely to require a shift in mindset by conventional defense and security forces. Conventional military powers have traditionally been built around fixed

processes and hierarchal structures that for both institutional and historic reasons focus on providing military effect from environmental stovepipes.²⁹ Such structures may need to adapt to maintain their utility when faced by a decentralized, asymmetric and agile adversary.

Conclusion

The sources of potential conflict worldwide have increased and their forms have been diversified. The global system has become increasingly interdependent and interconnected and has given conflict a challenge, wherever it occurs, a global dimension will deem to it. Some states and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, have gained increased global reach. These trends are likely to continue. However, by 2040, they are likely to converge with others, and further significant change in the character of conflict that can be expected. While stringent efforts will be made to prevent it. Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) that are likely to proliferate and the likelihood of their usage will increase instability within states and it will continue. The incidence of armed conflict is likely to increase. It is impossible to assess trends in future warfare without first seeking to understand the contemporary military context globally. Military powers are an agent of policy and will remain so. However, once if it started then conflict has its own dynamic that can drive the policy. Military power cannot be separated from diplomatic and economic levers of power. Additionally military power cannot be considered in isolation or in chaotic and complex strategic environment. These levers of power are amplified by the growing power of information which forms the armory of statecraft; the use of wisdom and judgment that blends hard and soft powers in an integrated pursuit of national interests; conflict evolves in close relation to changes in a broader strategic context. Technology sets the parameters of possible tendencies, but its human endeavor and ingenuity which are expressed through innovative strategy, tactics and doctrine, that will generate radical changes in the character or conduct of war.

²⁹ Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FA&SOC) 2009, page, 1-8, paragraph 122.